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JANUARY, 1921.

MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

EDITED BY

G. E. MOORE,

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF PROFESSOR E. B. TITCHENER, AMERICAN EDITORIAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND OF PROFESSOR WARD, PROFESSOR PRINGLE-PATTISON, DAVID MORRISON, M.A., AND OTHER MEMBERS OF AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

I.—Prof. Ward's Psychological Principles: G. DAWES HICKS	1
II.—Prof. Alexander's Gifford Lectures (I.): C. D. BROAD	25
III.—Hume's Ethical Theory and Its Critics (I.): F. C. SHARP	40
IV.—Discussion:	
Plato's Misconception of Morality	57
V.—Critical Notices:	
W. McDougall: <i>The Group Mind</i> : B. BOSANQUET	63
R. F. A. Hoernlé: <i>Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics</i> : J. LAIRD	71
A. N. Whitehead: <i>The Concept of Nature</i> : A. E. TAYLOR	76
C. A. Richardson: <i>Spiritual Pluralism and Recent Philosophy</i> : H. V. KNOX	83
J. Handyside: <i>The Historical Method in Ethics</i> : E. E. C. JONES	88
VI.—New Books	94
VII.—Philosophical Periodicals	119
VIII.—Notes	122

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXX.

(NEW SERIES.)

ARTICLES.

	PAGE
ALEXANDER, S.—Some Explanations	409
BROAD, C. D.—Prof. Alexander's Gifford Lectures (I.)	25
" "—"The External World" " " " " "(II.)	129
" "—"The External World" " " " " "(II.)	385
FIELD, G. C.—Faculty Psychology and Instinct Psychology	257
GREGORY, J. C.—Realism and Imagination	303
HICKS, G. DAWES.—Prof. Ward's Psychological Principles	1
LEON, P.—Literary Truth and Realism (I.)	287
" "—" " " " " " "(II.)	429
MONTAGUE, W. P. and H. H. PARKHURST.—The Ethical and Æsthetic Implications of Realism	172
PARKHURST, H. H.—See Montague, W. P.	
SHARP, F. C.—Hume's Ethical Theory and Its Critics (I.)	40
" "—" " " " " " "(II.)	151
SIDGWICK, A.—Statements and Meaning	271

DISCUSSIONS.

BOSANQUET, B.—The Basis of Bosanquet's Logic	-	-	-	-	191
DUDDINGTON, Mrs. N. A.—Do we know other minds mediately?	-	-	-	-	195
HALE, E.—Plato's "Misconception" of Morality	-	-	-	-	57
SCHILLER, F. C. S.—The Meaning of "Meaning"	-	-	-	-	185
" " " " " "	-	-	-	-	444
STRONG, C. A.—	"	"	"	"	513

CRITICAL NOTICES.

<i>Aristotelian Society, Proceedings of the</i> , Vol. XX., 1919-20 (H. Barker)	220
CAMPBELL, N. R.— <i>Physics: The Elements</i> (A. D. Ritchie)	207
DRAKE, H., etc.— <i>Essays in Critical Realism</i> (A. Dorward)	299
DRIESCH, H.— <i>Wirklichkeitslehre</i> (Miss H. D. Oakeley)	346
EDDINGTON, A. S.— <i>Space, Time, and Gravitation</i> (A. E. Taylor)	76
EINSTEIN, A.— <i>Relativity, the Special and the General Theory</i> (A. E. Taylor)	76
FAWCETT, D.— <i>Divine Imagining</i> (J. S. Mackenzie)	455
HALDANE, VISCOUNT.— <i>The Reign of Relativity</i>	462
HANDSIDES, J.— <i>The Historical Method in Ethics</i> (Miss E. E. C. Jones)	88
HOERNLÉ, R. F. A.— <i>Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics</i> (J. Laird)	71
JOHNSON, W. E.— <i>Logic: Part I.</i> (J. Gibson)	448
LAIRD, J.— <i>A Study in Realism</i> (R. F. A. Hoernlé)	393

	PAGE
LEVI, A.— <i>Sulle Interpretazioni Immanentistiche della Filosofia di Platone</i> (A. E. Taylor)	214
LEVI, A.— <i>Il Concetto del Tempo nella Filosofia di Platone</i> (A. E. Taylor)	214
MCDUGGALL, W.— <i>The Group Mind</i> (B. Bosanquet)	63
MCTAGGART, J. McT. E.— <i>The Nature of Existence</i> (C. D. Broad)	317
RICHARDSON, C. A.— <i>Spiritual Pluralism and Recent Philosophy</i> (H. V. Knox)	83
RIVERS, W. H. R.— <i>Instinct and the Unconscious</i> (J. W. Scott)	198
WHITEHEAD, A. N.— <i>The Concept of Nature</i> (A. E. Taylor)	76

NEW BOOKS.

ALIOTTA, A.— <i>L'Estetica del Croce e la Crisi dell' Idealismo Moderno</i> (H. W. C.)	488
ARISTOTLE, <i>The Works of</i> , trans. into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross, Vol. X. (A. E. Taylor)	488
BACONI, Rogeri, <i>Opera hactenus inedita</i> , Fasc. V. (A. E. Taylor)	369
BÖHME, J.— <i>Six Theosophic Points and Other Writings</i> (B. Bosanquet)	111
BOIRAC, E.— <i>The Psychology of the Future</i> (F. C. S. S.)	243
BRIFFAULT, R.— <i>Psyche's Lamp</i> (L. S. S.)	479
BROWN, W.— <i>Psychology and Psychotherapy</i> (W. Whately Smith)	476
CAJORI, F.— <i>A History of the Conceptions of Limits and Fluxions in Great Britain from Newton to Woodhouse</i> (C. D. B.)	372
CARLINI, A.— <i>La Filosofia di Giovanni Locke</i> (H. Wildon Carr)	294
CARR, H. WILDON.— <i>The General Principle of Relativity in its Philosophical and Historical Aspect</i> (W. D. Ross)	232
CASOTTI, M.— <i>Introduzione alla Pedagogia</i> (B. Bosanquet)	481
— <i>Saggio di una Concezione Idealistica della Storia</i> (B. Bosanquet)	104
CASSIRER, E.— <i>Zur Einstein'schen Relativitäts-theorie: Erkenntnis-theoretische Betrachtungen</i> (W. D. Ross)	232
CAZAMIAN, L.— <i>L'Évolution Psychologique et la Littérature en Angleterre</i> (I. A. Richards)	483
CHIOCCETTI, E.— <i>La Filosofia di Benedetto Croce</i> (H. Wildon Carr)	107
CULPIN, M.— <i>Spiritualism and the New Psychology</i> (F. C. S. Schiller)	247
CUNNINGHAM, E.— <i>Relativity, the Electron Theory and Gravitation</i> (C. D. B.)	490
DES BANCELS, J. LARGUIER.— <i>Introduction à la Psychologie</i> (J. Drever)	478
DREVER, J.— <i>The Psychology of Industry</i> (B. M.)	486
DUNLAP, K.— <i>Mysticism, Freudianism and Scientific Psychology</i> (J. W. S.)	487
DWELSHAUVERS, G.— <i>La Psychologie Française Contemporaine</i> (B. Edgell)	246
FERENCZI, S., etc.— <i>Psycho-analysis and the War Neuroses</i> (E. Prideaux)	486
FINDLAY, J. J.— <i>An Introduction to Sociology for Social Workers and General Readers</i> (W. McD.)	242
FREUNDLICH, E.— <i>The Foundations of Einstein's Theory of Gravitation</i> (C. D. Broad)	101
GABELLI, A.— <i>Il Metodo d'Insegnamento nelle Scuole Elementari d'Italia</i> (B. Bosanquet)	481
GATTI, P.— <i>L'Unità del Pensiero Leopardiano</i> (A. E. Taylor)	489
GEMELLI, A.— <i>Religione e Scienza</i> (H. Wildon Carr)	107
GENTILE, G.— <i>Discorsi di Religione</i> (B. Bosanquet)	98
— <i>Giordano Bruno e il Pensiero del Rinascimento</i> (J. L. M.)	489
— <i>Teoria Generale dello Spirito come Atto Puro</i> (B. Bosanquet)	96
GENTILE, P.— <i>L'Essenziale della Filosofia del Diritto</i> (B. Bosanquet)	105

CONTENTS.

vii

	PAGE
GILSON, E.— <i>Le Thomisme: Introduction au Système de S. Thomas d'Aquin</i> (A. E. T.)	115
GODDARD, H. H.— <i>Psychology of Normal and Subnormal</i> (F. C. S. Schiller)	106
GUZZO, A.— <i>I Primi Scritti di Kant, 1746-1760</i> (A. E. T.)	243
HOBHOUSE, L. T.— <i>The Rational Good: A Study in the Logic of Practice</i> (J. Laird)	360
James, William, <i>The Letters of</i> (H. V. Knox)	354
JASTROW, J.— <i>The Psychology of Conviction</i> (C. W. V.)	485
JONES, W. TUDOR— <i>The Making of Personality</i> (F. C. S. S.)	490
" — <i>The Training of Mind and Will</i> (F. C. S. S.)	490
KREMER, R.— <i>Le Néo-Réalisme Américain</i> (F. C. S. S.)	244
LADD, G. T.— <i>Knowledge, Life and Reality</i> (M. Lebus)	239
LALO, C.— <i>L'Art et la Vie Sociale</i> (L. A. R.)	491
LEIGHTON, J. A.— <i>The Field of Philosophy</i> (F. C. S. S.)	244
LEVI, A.— <i>Sceptica</i> (A. E. Taylor)	470
LINK, H. C.— <i>Employment Psychology</i>	113
Louvain, Université de, <i>Annales de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie: Tome IV.</i> (A. E. T.)	240
MACINTOSH, D. C.— <i>Theology as an Empirical Science</i> (G. Galloway)	103
MACPHERSON, W.— <i>The Psychology of Persuasion</i> (W. McD.)	243
MARETT, R. R.— <i>Psychology and Folk-lore</i> (J. Drever)	114
MARSHALL, H. R.— <i>Mind and Conduct</i> (J. Drever)	94
MAXWELL, J. CLARK— <i>Matter and Motion: reprinted with notes by Sir J. Larmor</i> (C. D. B.)	372
MCCABE, J.— <i>Spiritualism: A Popular History from 1847</i> (F. C. S. Schiller)	371
MCDOWALL, S. A.— <i>Beauty and the Beast</i> (B. Bosanquet)	110
MENTRÉ, F.— <i>Les Générations Sociales</i> (B. Bosanquet)	363
MÜLLER-FREIENFELS, R.— <i>Das Denken und die Phantasie</i> (J. Laird)	228
O'CALLAGHAN, J.— <i>Dual Evolution</i> (L. J. Russell)	480
OLTRAMARE, P.— <i>Vivre: Essai de Biosophie Théorique et Pratique</i> (F. C. S. S.)	114
PARKER, DEW. H.— <i>The Principles of Aesthetics</i> (L. A. R.)	491
PILLSBURY, W. B.— <i>The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism</i> (C. C. J. W.)	237
PRATT, J. B.— <i>The Religious Consciousness: A Psychological Study</i> (J. W. S.)	368
PUTNAM, J. J.— <i>Addresses on Psycho-analysis</i> (E. Prideaux)	474
READ, C.— <i>The Origin of Man and of His Superstitions</i> (J. Drever)	230
RIGNANO, E.— <i>Psychologie du Raisonnement</i> (F. C. Bartlett)	468
ROBB, A. A.— <i>The Absolute Relations of Time and Space</i> (C. D. B.)	490
ROYCE, J.— <i>Lectures on Modern Idealism</i> (C. C. J. W.)	227
SCHJELDERUP, H. K.— <i>Hauptlinien der Entwicklung der Philosophie von Mitte des 19 Jahrhunderts bis zur Gegenwart</i> (J. L. M.)	245
SCHLICK, M.— <i>Space and Time in Contemporary Physics</i> (C. D. Broad)	245
SCHOFIELD, A. T.— <i>The Mind of a Woman</i> (F. C. S. S.)	114
SPAVENTA, B.— <i>La Libertà d'Insegnamento</i> (B. Bosanquet)	481
SPIRITO, U.— <i>Il Pragmatismo nella Filosofia Contemporanea</i> (F. C. S. Schiller)	362
STEIN, L.— <i>Philosophical Currents of the Present Day: Vol. II.</i> (J. L.)	113
TANSLEY, A. G.— <i>The New Psychology and its Relation to Life</i>	115
TURNER, J. E.— <i>An Examination of William James's Philosophy</i> (H. V. Knox)	244
URWICK, E. J.— <i>The Message of Plato</i> (A. E. T.)	235
WAHL, J.— <i>Les Philosophes Pluralistes d'Angleterre et d'Amérique</i> (L. J. Russell)	366
WALKER, C. T. H.— <i>The Construction of the World in Terms of Fact and Value</i> (O. C. Quick)	109
WALLAS, G.— <i>Our Social Heritage</i> (P. V. A. Benecke)	472
WARD, S.— <i>The Ways of Life: A Study in Ethics</i> (B. Bosanquet)	112

	PAGE
WELTSCH, F.— <i>Gnade und Freiheit</i> (J. Lindsay) - - - - -	484
WICKSTEED, P. H.— <i>The Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy</i> , illustrated from the Works of S. Thomas Aquinas (A. E. Taylor) -	357
ZERVOS, C.— <i>Un philosophe Néo-platonicien du XIe Siècle, Michael Psellus</i> (A. E. T.) - - - - -	116

PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

<i>British Journal of Psychology</i> (vol. x., Part I.; Nov., 1919) - - -	375
" " " (vol. x., Parts II. and III.; March, 1920)	495
" " " <i>Medical Section</i> (vol. i., Part I.; Oct., 1920) - - - - -	376
<i>Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods</i> (vol. xvii. (1920), 9-15) - - - - -	119
<i>Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods</i> (vol. xvii. (1920), 16-26) - - - - -	250
<i>Journal of Philosophy</i> (vol. xviii. (1921), 1-2) - - - - -	251
" " " (vol. xviii. (1921), 3-10) - - - - -	494
<i>Logos</i> (vol. iii., 3-4, July-Dec., 1920) - - - - -	380
<i>Philosophical Review</i> (vol. xxx., 1-2) - - - - -	495
<i>Revue Neo-Scholastique de Philosophie</i> (85 and 87; Feb. and Aug., 1920)	120
" " " (88; Nov., 1920) - - - - -	252
" " " (89; Feb., 1921) - - - - -	378
" " " (90; May, 1921) - - - - -	496
<i>Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scholastica</i> (xii., 5; Sept.-Oct., 1920) - -	381
" " " (xiii., 1-2; Jan.-April, 1921) - - - - -	498
<i>Scientia</i> (vol. xxxviii., 9-12; xxxix. 1-2; Sept. 1920—Feb. 1921) -	377

NOTES.

ANGLO-AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY FOR CENTRAL EUROPE - - -	255
FAWCETT, D.— <i>Dreams</i> - - - - -	122
HOOPER, C. E.— <i>"Common Sense and the Rudiments of Philosophy"</i>	254
" " " - - - - -	501
MIND ASSOCIATION: List of Officers and Members - - - - -	125
" " : Notices of Annual Meeting - - - - -	256, 384
" " : Report of Proceedings at Annual Meeting - - - - -	504
OBITUARY NOTICES: A Meinong - - - - -	124
" " : F. Picavet - - - - -	502
" " : W. Wundt - - - - -	123
RUSSELL, L. J.— <i>"Common Sense and the Rudiments of Philosophy"</i>	382
SOCIÉTÉ FRANÇAISE DE PHILOSOPHIE. INVITATION DE - - - - -	255
TAYLOR, A. E.— <i>"The Message of Plato"</i> - - - - -	384
URWICK, E. J.—" " - - - - -	382

MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—PROF. WARD'S PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.¹

BY G. DAWES HICKS.

THE twentieth volume of the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, containing the article on "Psychology," appeared in 1886. Alexander Bain, who wrote on it in that year's October number of MIND, was among the first to acknowledge its importance, and characterised it as "a signal achievement of philosophical ability". "When," he said, "the matters excluded by the narrow limits are filled in, when the illustration of the whole is duly expanded, and when, finally, the exposition of subtleties is transferred from *brevier* to *pica*, Mr. Ward will have produced a work entitled to a place among the masterpieces of the philosophy of the human mind." After an interval of thirty-two years, the desiderata thus specified have been made good, and it can now unhesitatingly be said that the prediction then recorded has been fulfilled. The article has developed into an imposing book, and serious students of the subject everywhere will wish to congratulate the author upon the completion of a work that will assuredly rank as a classic in psychological literature. Of the real greatness of the book one becomes conscious at well-nigh every turn. The originality and acuteness of its leading ideas, the thoroughness with which they are worked out and applied, the comprehensive insight which is brought to bear in the treatment of special problems,

¹ *Psychological Principles*. By James Ward, Sc.D., LL.D., D.Sc., F.B.A., Professor of Mental Philosophy, Cambridge. Pp. xiv., 478. Cambridge Press, 1918, 2nd ed., 1920.

the wealth and freshness of illustration, drawn from the most varied fields of inquiry—all combine to confirm the impression that we have here a monument of careful, profound and resolute thinking and research, a product of true genius in the sense in which Prof. Ward himself distinguishes genius from mere talent.

Bain's reception of the article was, as is observed in the preface to the present volume, generous; and no doubt would still have been so, had he actually gauged its revolutionary character. There is, however, in his running commentary no indication that he in the least suspected the extent to which the associationist psychology had been undermined. The time, indeed, was ripe for a new departure. The younger workers in psychology were casting aside one after another of the traditional doctrines. Adamson, in his lectures at Owen's College, had been gradually developing a view of the mental life and of its growth and evolution altogether unlike that of any of the current text-books, and which was only briefly hinted at in the very significant review he wrote of Sully's *Outlines* in the volume of *MIND* for 1884; even Croom Robertson, as is apparent from the posthumous Lecture Notes, had been deviating widely in his own teaching from the teaching he had imbibed in his student-days in Aberdeen. The *Encyclopædia* article came at an opportune moment and signalled a complete revolt from the school of which Bain was the last representative. No sooner was it published than it was at once recognised as a contribution to the science of first-rate value; it laid the foundation, in fact, of the best psychological work that has been done in this country during the last quarter of a century.¹ Although based upon the article, the book contains a large amount of fresh matter, the last seven chapters, dealing with experience at the self-conscious and social level, being almost entirely new. There are certainly some differences, and these not altogether unimportant, between the article of 1886 and what we have now before us; yet the slightest comparison of their contents will enable it to be seen that the root conceptions have remained the same, and it is a sufficient indication of the thoroughness with which those conceptions were originally thought out that now, after thirty-two years of subsequent research, Prof. Ward finds little to modify and is mainly

¹ A supplementary article was prepared for the tenth—the *Times*—edition of the *Encyclopædia* and was published in vol. xxxii in 1902. Finally, the two articles, with omissions and additions, were amalgamated into the new article of the present or eleventh edition, and this appeared in the twenty-second volume in 1911.

concerned to expand and carry forward the principles he had formulated in early life.

The *Encyclopædia* article has become, as its author is fully entitled to feel, "the common property of students"; and on that account a review, in any ordinary sense, of the work before us would, in these pages at least, be no less superfluous than difficult to write. One may be permitted, therefore, to make the appearance of *Psychological Principles* the occasion for referring here to certain fundamental issues which Prof. Ward's treatment of the mental life forces to the front, his own position in regard to which we now have stated in the form that seems to him, after long reflexion, to be the most adequate.

1. "It is the sole and the whole business of the psychologist to trace the history of the conscious life of the individual subject, and it is in the notion of the individual subject that he will find the limits of his treatment." So Adamson wrote in 1884. And no less emphatically Dr. Ward has consistently maintained that the standpoint of psychology is 'individualistic,' that psychology is 'the science of individual experience,' and that it 'never transcends the limits of the individual' (p. 27). Probably it is doing little more than re-stating in other words the position thus characterised to assert that "it is the exclusive business of psychology to analyse and trace the development of individual experience as it is for the experiencing individual" (p. 104), and not, that is to say, as it might be supposed to be displayed to an external spectator. But the really vital consideration receives in the latter mode of statement explicit recognition. There is nothing, of course, to preclude the psychologist making use of all the help he can get from the study of animal behaviour, physiological conditions, and the various other sources to which he is wont to have recourse; but in so far as psychology claims to be the science of the actual life of mind there can be no question as to the soundness of the contention just indicated.

I would urge, however, that Dr. Ward does injustice to the standpoint he has so convincingly put forward as the right one when he apparently identifies it with that of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, and declares theirs to be 'the proper' standpoint for the science of psychology. It is true that he guards himself from any implication of giving countenance to their *method*; but the question is whether their faulty method was not due, at any rate in part, to an erroneous standpoint. And I believe such can be shown to be the case. "There is no denying," we are told, "a steady psychological advance as we pass from Locke to Hume and his

modern representatives" (p. 26). Yet when, for instance, in violent antithesis to what Dr. Ward finds to be the case, Hume alleged that "all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences," and that "the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences," is it not manifest that he was trying to survey conscious experience not from within but *ab extra*, as though it were itself an object to be observed, and that consequently he was compelled to reject whatsoever did not present itself as so much matter of objective observation? Surely, it is here the *standpoint*, and not merely the method, that is *verkehrt*—a standpoint from which it was inevitable not only that any real connexion among so-called 'perceptions' should be missed, but that also the being of an experiencing subject as more than a succession of discrete perceptions should evince itself as an unwarrantable assumption. I would venture, therefore, to claim for the standpoint of *Psychological Principles* that it implies, as, indeed, I have already indicated, an entire inversion of the standpoint of Hume and his modern representatives—an inversion that was imperatively necessary if psychology was not to remain stationary before an *impasse* that blocked the road of further advance. The author's emphatic repudiation of the view that presentations are 'subjective modifications' ought, at any rate, to obviate a kind of misunderstanding to which the *Encyclopædia* article frequently gave rise.¹

In point of fact, the radical divergence of the new standpoint from the old becomes apparent at the start—in determining, namely, the definition of psychology. The empirical psychologist cannot, it is contended, follow the procedure of the natural sciences, just because the two standpoints are utterly different (whereas according to Hume and his modern representatives they are essentially similar). The physicist asserts simply: there *is* this or that. But were the psychologist to give expression to the facts he is concerned with merely in the form: there are such and such presentations or feelings or movements, as though these were independent entities, he would be mutilating his data in a way that would render dubious every subsequent step he took. Either explicitly or implicitly he is bound,—at any rate, when dealing with the mature mind,—to express himself in the form: the individual experient *has* such and such presentations, *feels* thus or thus, *acts* in this wise or that. And this 'form

¹ *E.g.*, Mr. Prichard's criticism (*MIND*, N.S., xvi, p. 27, *sqq.*) was to a considerable extent misdirected, because he supposed Dr. Ward to be seeking "to vindicate the possession by psychology of a standpoint which may be or rather must be philosophically false".

of consciousness' cannot be eliminated except by ignoring what is, or has become, characteristic of concrete experience, and accordingly deserting the ground that is peculiar to psychology. So-called 'states of consciousness' are not, that is to say, independent entities; they are states of a subject, modes in which that subject lives and acts. And so-called 'contents of consciousness,' though not necessarily actions or affections of a subject, must be contents for a subject. The reference of what is experienced to a subject experiencing may be said, therefore, to be an inexpugnable postulate of psychology; the concept of a 'self,' or conscious subject, cannot be banished from psychological treatises—it is to be found "not more in Berkeley, who accepts it as a fact, than in Hume, who treats it as a fiction".

Bain, observing how, as it seemed to him, in the course of the exposition, the scope of the subject gradually extended, until finally it absorbed all the three elementary properties—cognition, feeling, and conation—and left only presentations, sensory and motor, outside its range, declared not unnaturally that 'this aggrandisement of the subject' staggered him. No doubt the shock in his case was partly due to a suspicion that he was here confronted with a 'nucleus and hiding-place of mysticism'. The suspicion was, however, an unfounded one. For in the article it had been expressly insisted that the psychological concept of a self or subject is in no sense coincident with the metaphysical concept of a soul, and might be kept as free from the implications of the latter as the concept of an organism in biology. So far from intending to postulate, as Bain supposed, "an entity distinct from feeling, knowing, and doing, and having a common relation to all three," the author had rather been showing grounds for assuming an entity of which feeling, knowing and striving are modes or activities—modes or activities that, in fact, go to constitute the very entity which had been taken to be distinct from them. What the contention amounts to is, I take it, that wherever we have a state or mode of consciousness, there we have what may otherwise be called, using Lotze's terminology, a mode of 'being for self,' a mode of self-expression on the part of a subject that in and through such act is in some measure and to some degree aware of, or experiencing, itself. The awareness in question may be confused and indefinite to any extent, it may be no more than the first dim obscure stirrings of feeling; but the point is it is always there, and were it not the gradual development of self-consciousness would be inexplicable. The objection that the notion of 'subject' has no legitimate place in an empirical science hardly requires serious refutation. There is surely nothing

'metempirical' in the argument that on the one hand the mature self-consciousness would be impossible if the earlier phases of the mental life did not possess, as part of their nature, this admittedly crude self-reference, and, on the other hand, that neither the primitive self-reference nor the mature self-consciousness indicates an entity which is distinct from the inner states themselves.

2. Everything experienced is, then, referred to a subject experiencing. Not only so, Prof. Ward is emphatic in contending that for psychology the antithesis of subject and object is primordial; absolute beginnings are beyond the pale of science, and, so far as it can be handled psychologically, experience already implies, or is constituted by, the duality in question. The relation of object to subject is, psychologically conceived, the relation of presentation, in the sense of that term which Prof. Ward has made familiar. Moreover, the relation is so fundamental in character as to justify 'the resolution of psychological facts into two entirely distinct categories—the subjective faculty or function of action-under-feeling, or consciousness, on the one side, and a field of consciousness, consisting of objects, ideas, or presentations, on the other' (p. 70).

The subject has the one 'capacity' of feeling—i.e., susceptibility to pleasure or pain, and the one 'power,' that, namely, of attending to, or of variously distributing attention upon, given objects. The term 'attention' is used as practically synonymous with what has usually been called 'consciousness,' or, at any rate, so much of what has been meant by 'consciousness' as answers to being mentally active, active enough at least to 'receive impressions' (p. 49).

Inasmuch as it is only objects that sustain the relation of presentation, such objects, it is maintained, may safely be spoken of as 'presentations'. That is to say, it is proposed to use the name 'presentation' as a designation both for the relation and for one term of the relation. It is worth noticing that in the passage explaining the latter usage some significant changes have been introduced.¹ In dis-

¹ Formerly the passage ran as follows: "All that variety of mental facts which we speak of as sensations, perceptions, images, intuitions, concepts, notions, have two characteristics in common: (1) they admit of being more or less attended to, and (2) can be reproduced and associated together. It is here proposed to use the term presentation to connote such a mental fact, and as the best English equivalent for what Locke meant by idea, and what Kant and Herbart called a *Vorstellung*." Now the passage reads: "All the various constituents of experience spoken of as sensations, movements, percepts, images, intuitions, concepts, notions, have two characteristics in common: (1) they are more or less

carding the phrase "mental facts," Prof. Ward wishes, if I mistake not, to avoid any suggestion that, because they are 'in the mind' in the sense of being present to the mind, presentations are necessarily mental in nature. He would, I take it, allow that, from an epistemological point of view, presentations are appearances to the subject of entities other than the subject,¹ while insisting, at the same time, that the being and character of such appearances depend in part upon the being and character of the subject to whom they are presented. A presentation has then a two-fold relation—(a) directly to the subject, and (b) to other presentations. Following in this respect the Herbartian tradition, Prof. Ward sharply severs the presentation from the act of apprehending—the act which he calls the act of attention. The presentation is that which is attended to, that which in and through attending the subject is aware of; and, consequently, it may with propriety be described as an object, or better perhaps, in order to differentiate it from objects conceived as independent of any particular subject, a psychical object. Within the region of experience, presentations constitute the objective factor, and from them must be distinguished as heterogeneous whatsoever attaches only to the subject and the subject's attitude towards presentations.

That it is possible on this basis to offer a psychological account of experience which is fairly coherent Prof. Ward has sufficiently shown. Nevertheless, the theory of presentations requires, I venture to think, to be much more radically dissociated from its Herbartian prototype before it can be regarded as a satisfactory principle of psychological explanation. I am ready to admit that the objections one would press are mainly objections of an epistemological kind; but on a matter so fundamental as this I do not see how any hard and fast line can be drawn between psychology and epistemology, and, in any case, despite what has sometimes been urged to the contrary, Dr. Ward does not think that a position epistemologically untenable can be sound psychological doctrine. The query I would raise is that which was raised many years ago by Adamson,² whether, namely, 'presentations' are rightly described as objects, even of the kind called 'psychical' or 'immanent'. And, on this matter, I am constrained to differ

attended to, and (2) they can be variously combined together and reproduced. It is here proposed to denote them all by the general term *presentation*, as being the best English equivalent for what Locke meant by idea and what Kant and Herbart called a *Vorstellung*" (p. 46).

¹ Cf. C. A. Richardson, *Spiritual Pluralism*, p. 110.

² *Development of Modern Philosophy*, ii, p. 173.

from Dr. Ward. The difficulties which the treatment of presentations as objects occasions seem to me to be many, but it will suffice here to single out two of them. (a) A presentation, so regarded, occupies the position of a *tertium quid*; and, after the manner of an 'idea,' as conceived by Locke, stands in the way of any direct apprehension on the part of the cognising mind of an external object, in the ordinary sense of the term, or of what Dr. Ward has designated a 'transsubjective object'. Dr. Ward's contention is that it is only in so far as we in common experience relate numerically different but qualitatively similar immanent objects of various individual experiences to a single reality that there comes to be for us awareness of common or transsubjective objects. But, not to mention the embarrassing circumstance of having thus to allow that the awareness of other minds must in some form or other be for the individual prior to the awareness of external things, it is peculiarly perplexing to be driven to assume that our belief in external things rests ultimately upon an inference, and upon an inference moreover that is logically invalid.¹ (b) The theory precludes, so far as I can see, the possibility of giving an intelligible account of the nature of the act of cognition or attention. For in what precisely does the activity of attention consist? Is it merely a process of contemplating the presentation offered to it, of accepting it as given, after the manner in which, according to another theory, we are supposed to be 'acquainted' with a datum? Certainly I do not imagine Dr. Ward to be intending to suggest anything of the kind. He frequently speaks of 'concentrating attention'. And by that he cannot mean a merely *gesteigertes Hinstarren auf den Gegenstand*, which, as Lotze urged, would be perfectly fruitless, if there were nothing either in the object or around it to compare and bring into relation. For he represents the conscious subject as, through the act of attention, differentiating and distinguishing the parts of the presented object, as gradually becoming aware of its several features. Now, any such process of gradual discrimination presupposes (assuming that the presentation is the presented object) that what the conscious subject is at first immediately aware of is not

¹ Logically invalid, because clearly the presence of similar features in numerous immanent objects would justify only the formation of general notions of those features and not the thought of a real external thing of which they are properties. It is no doubt the case that true beliefs often are attained psychologically through processes of reasoning that are logically vicious. But that we have, even from an epistemological point of view, no other ground than that indicated for the fundamental antithesis in knowledge is a conclusion in which, at any rate, one would only reluctantly acquiesce.

the presentation as it really is in its completeness of detail but the presentation as it appears to be when much of its detail is obscure or unrecognised. In other words, there breaks out within the field of presentation just that very contrast between appearance and reality which has usually been taken to subsist between the presentation and the external object. So far, then, as apprehension of it is concerned, an object derives no advantage from being a 'presentation'; whether the object be 'subjective' (in what Dr. Ward would call an epistemological sense) or 'transsubjective,' the problem which the cognitive relation forces upon us is in either case precisely the same.

To put the matter briefly, I conceive there is an alternative to the 'theory of presentations,' as here interpreted, and an alternative other than that which in the work before us is considered. This alternative may perhaps be brought into view by the suggestion that under the one term 'presentation' two essentially different factors are liable to be confused—factors which, for want of better technical terminology, one may be allowed to designate 'awareness of a content' and 'the content of which there is awareness'. What is meant can best be made clear by an example. Take Prof. Ward's own classical illustration of bestowing in the course of a few minutes half a dozen glances at a strange and curious flower. Let us, however, for the sake of the argument, suppose that the act of attention is directed, as it would certainly seem to be, upon the actual flower, and not upon a 'presentation' of it. Then, following Prof. Ward's account, we may assert that the attending subject will gradually discriminate a multiplicity of features—at first the general outline, next the disposition of petals, stamens, etc., afterwards the attachment of the anthers, position of the ovary, and so forth—that is to say, his state of mind will become by degrees a state in and through which he may fairly be said to be aware of the features of the flower. Now, this *awareness* of the features of the flower is not, it will be agreed, something that can be severed from the act of being aware, the act of attending. If one describes it not as the content of which there is awareness, but as the content of the act of attending at a particular stage of its progress, or as that which gives to the act in question its specific character and enables it to be distinguished from other acts of the same cognising individual, one will be doing no violence either to the facts or to language. No one would wish to maintain that awareness of the flower is that which is in this instance attended to, that *it* is the object upon which the act of attention is

directed. No one, I should suppose, would wish to deny that such awareness *is* a characteristic of the act of attending, when that act has reached a certain degree of completeness. Consider, now, the other factor—'the content of which there is awareness'. Again, meanwhile, we are, for the sake of the argument, taking the object upon which the act of attention is directed to be the actual flower. That object the conscious subject gradually comes to recognise has a variety of characteristics—a definite shape, a definite size, definite colours, and so on. The sum of the characteristics which the conscious subject will be aware of at any given moment will be different from the sum of characteristics which he will be aware of at another moment, and either of these will only be a fragment of the much larger sum of characteristics which there are good grounds for believing the flower itself possesses. Furthermore, the sum of apprehended features (= 'the content of which there is awareness') is clearly *distinguishable* from the larger sum of characteristics just mentioned. But just as clearly there is no reason for supposing that the former constitutes an existent fact, be it called a 'presentation,' or 'sense-datum,' or what not. What, on the contrary, we do seem entitled to affirm is that *it* only comes to be in virtue of the act of attention having been first of all directed upon the actual flower and that apart from that act it would have had no 'being' of any sort. If, then, it be described as a presentation *of* the flower, it is surely imperative to avoid any implication of the 'presentation' being there, as an existent fact, prior to the act of attention and in some way calling forth such act. As Prof. Strong concisely puts it, "when I present a lady with a bouquet of flowers, I do not present her with the presentation of the flowers, but only with the flowers".¹

Such, then, expressed in a few words, is what I take to be a tenable alternative to the theory we are considering, and I hope enough has been said to make manifest where the roads diverge. Dr. Ward still retains, though it is true in a modified form, the old notion of the individual mind as a reacting essence, and of sensory presentations as the results of such reaction. I am far from saying that the view in question is not entitled to respect. Lotze's adherence to it is alone sufficient to elicit that. All the same, I believe it to be a mistaken view, and that a more resolute working out of our author's own theory of attention would compel its rejection. For, after all, the really significant feature of the last mentioned theory is not a mere matter of terminology, but the distinct

¹ *The Origin of Consciousness*, p. 37.

recognition of the truth that cognitive apprehension is, so to speak, from first to last of one piece, that its later and more developed phases differ in degree but not in kind from its earlier and more rudimentary phases. Once allow that cognitive apprehension is from the beginning a discriminative activity, and the doctrine of 'presentations' as themselves objects is, it seems to me, undermined.

3. "Psychologists have usually represented mental advance as consisting fundamentally in the combination and re-combination of various elementary units, the so-called sensations and primitive movements" (pp. 75-76). By no writer has this notion of 'mental chemistry' been more effectively disposed of than by Prof. Ward. It would not be untrue to say that his entire work is one sustained refutation of it. He has shown convincingly how impossible it is to proceed on the hypothesis of numerically distinct sensory units without attributing to such units a species of independent existence for which experience furnishes no justification and which cannot be brought into conformity with any really scientific conception of the development of mind. On the one hand, those who have attempted to work out the view have had in point of fact to admit that in the composite formations of actual experience the assumed units do not maintain their independence, that the complex formations cannot be interpreted as merely aggregates of the units supposed to make them up. Appeal, therefore, has had to be made to some other and indeterminable feature to explain the obvious fact of composition in the content apprehended. And on the other hand, experience supplies no warrant for the assumption that under *any* conditions the supposed units are independent facts capable of appearing to consciousness in isolation. The very reverse is suggested by the slightest inspection of the course of conscious experience. Conscious experience, taken collectively, resembles rather a continuous process than an aggregate of independent parts. In this process we can indeed effect distinctions of qualitative and other aspects. But what is thus distinguishable does not thereby establish a claim to be considered as an independent fact, and ought not to be thought of as having a separate mode of being. It is an aspect rather than a part of an aggregate or collective whole. In other words, it is an error to take for granted that the phases of experience which are the less developed and which, on that account, may be described as the more simple, exhibit a simplicity of ultimate elements which, as evolution proceeds, merely enter into more and more complicated combinations. What, on the contrary, does characterise the earlier stages of experience is specially the want o

definiteness and of precision in the apprehension of relations among the contents discriminated. And the contents themselves appear as vague and obscure, wanting in sharpness of outline and loosely connected with one another. Objects are apprehended by a mental life containing but small preparation for the apprehension of them. Consequently, the awareness of them is crude and confused, and the confusion is aggravated by the circumstance that what then constitutes the general point of reference in the inner life consists for the most part of a vague fluctuating mass of organic sensations and feelings connected primarily with physiological changes in the body. No steady background of 'self' has yet been formed against which the successively apprehended contents can stand out, and accordingly the mental life betrays a certain want of continuity, an aimless and easily distracted character.

All this Prof. Ward enforces with a wealth of argument that is irresistible, and unquestionably we have here one of the most far-reaching advances ever effected in the history of psychological theory. Let me not, then, be thought to underestimate its importance if, in the light of what I have been urging with respect to 'presentations,' I confess to misgivings in regard to the notion of a 'presentational continuum,' a *totum objectivum* that is gradually differentiated. My difficulty is this. It seems to be implied that the continuum, holding, as it were, its manifold elements in solution, is already there for the individual subject from the outset, either as awaiting the exercise of the activity of attention that its various factors should be disentangled or else as gradually becoming differentiated through some inherent tendency of its own. 'The presentational continuum as a whole, as *totum objectivum*, is,' Dr. Ward writes, 'for the subject, so to say, all there is, is the universe' (pp. 117-118). Yet he would agree that in mature experience we do come in point of fact explicitly to contrast what he understands by the phrase 'presentational continuum' with what is—that is to say, the universe. The external world we certainly do, in ordinary common-sense experience, take to be independent of any such 'presentational continuum' as is here conceived; and if, in this respect, common-sense experience be, as I believe it is, logically justified, a perfectly intelligible analysis can, as I have tried to show, be given of the way in which such experience is psychologically developed. How far the term 'continuum' is applicable to the real world of fact is, of course, another matter. In any case, the real world of fact is not a 'presentational continuum'; and its parts are already differentiated, whether the individual conscious subject be aware of the differentiation or no. The stamens of the flower are, *in*

rerum natura, different from the pistils, although these to a casual observer may appear as confused. Moreover, no amount of attention to the confused *appearance*, in and for itself, would bring about its differentiation, still less would the confused appearance differentiate itself; it will only be through direction of attention upon the actual flower that, in the instance supposed, the parts in question will come to appear different, or to be presented as different. However true it may be, then, that "at any given moment we have a certain whole of presentations, a 'field of consciousness,' psychologically one and continuous"; and, at the next moment, "not an entirely new field but a partial change within the old field," yet one may fairly doubt the appropriateness of describing the change as coming about through the differentiation of a 'presentational continuum'. Nor will it do, I think, to reply that the description is appropriate *from the point of view of the experiencing subject*. It will not do, because, as already noted, the experiencing subject does come himself to distinguish between the confused appearance, the blurred presentation, and the object upon which his attention is directed, which object he does not then take to be in fact blurred, however much it may appear to be so.

4. The chapters on Imagination and Memory, the handling of which Bain took to be a good test of psychological ability, are full of original and valuable work. Prof. Ward questions, and evidently with justice, the sufficiency of 'force or liveliness' as a criterion for distinguishing 'ideas' or 'images' from 'primary presentations'. Intensity alone, he urges, is clearly not enough to account for the discrimination, nor will the further characteristic of 'strikingness' serve to render Hume's explanation of it adequate, for we are familiar with 'striking ideas' as well as with striking, but not necessarily intense, 'sensations'. The author is himself inclined to lay the chief stress upon the superior steadiness of percepts. "Images are not only in a continual flux, but even when we attempt forcibly to detain them they are apt to vary continually in clearness and completeness, reminding us of the illuminated devices made of gas jets, common at fêtes, when the wind sweeps across them, momentarily obliterating one part and at the same time intensifying another" (p. 171). On the other hand, what we perceive is not liable to this perpetual 'flow and flicker'. Now that it has been pointed out, no psychologist would, I suppose, doubt the importance of the feature thus admirably specified. I am disposed, indeed, to go further in the direction here indicated, and to contend with regard to a certain definite class of so-called 'images'

that the attempt to 'concentrate attention' upon them results not in their increased clearness and distinctness but in their gradual fading away and disappearing—a consequence we should, it seems to me, naturally expect on the view of attention I have been defending. At the same time, Dr. Ward would allow that there are other circumstances likewise of moment in this connexion. One is that which Stout and others have emphasised—the more or less fragmentary character of 'imagery' as compared with what is perceptually apprehended. And another, which has not often been noted, is, I think, the difference in amount of feeling-tone that is concomitant with a percept and its 'image' respectively.¹

It is coming more and more to be realised, and I am sure Prof. Ward would concur in the statement, that the crucial problems of the psychology of cognition centre round that of the nature of imagination. *What* is it that in and through an act of imagining is presented to the conscious subject? *What* is the character and status of the content thus apprehended? In answer to that question, it is, as Dr. Ward insists, useless to say that what is perceived is present, and what is imaged is past or future. "The images may have certain temporal marks by which they are referred to what is past or future; but as imaged they *are* present" (p. 172). And it is in regard to the nature of this present something that psychology still finds itself almost wholly in the dark. Mr. Bradley once poured ridicule upon the 'pious legend' of the ghosts of former 'impressions' waiting in disconsolate exile in some sub-conscious Hades, till association announces resurrection and recall; and Dr. Ward is no whit less severe upon the thought of images or representations being accumulated and "somewhere crowded together like shades on the banks of the Styx" (p. 81). What, then, is it that persists? Not, Dr. Ward replies, the particular presentation as an isolated unit, but the continuum as differentiated. Waiving, however, meanwhile such objections as I have been pressing to the notion of a continuum, the reply would obviously carry us but a short way. If it enables us to understand to some extent the presence, in the later stages of a process of attention, of the traits first attended to, it throws little or no light upon the appearance of a memory-image, in the ordinary sense of that term. So far from being an outcome of the continuum's progressive differentiation, a memory-image would seem

¹ Dr. Ward does in one place note the fact, but not in this connexion. I may perhaps here refer to a paper of mine written twenty years ago and published in the *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, N.S., Vol. I., 1901, p. 200 sqq.

rather to imply a reverting on the part of the continuum to a former condition of its being. Dr. Ward is unquestionably on the right lines in pointing to the necessity of taking into account the intermediate forms—after-sensations, recurrent sensations, and memory-after-images, as Fechner called them—between the original presentation and the image. Yet, when all this has been recognised, the real problem remains, obstinately refusing to be solved. "Images as a whole are," it has to be admitted, "distinct from the presentation-continuum" (p. 173), and it is found needful to postulate the formation of a 'secondary- or memory-continuum,' which in some way gets split off from the primary continuum in consequence of movements of attention. "The precise connexion of the two continua is," we are told, "very difficult to determine" (p. 177); and in spite of much resolute wrestling with the situation, has in the end to be left undetermined. At the root of the whole difficulty is, I take it, the fact that we are not in a position to offer any psychological explanation of retention or revival, and are, therefore, compelled to accept it as, for psychology, an ultimate characteristic of mental life. But the notion of a memory-continuum seems to encumber us with an additional embarrassment—namely, that such a continuum is in no sense parallel to the continuum from which it is said to be derived. That is to say, it does not appear to be a continuum that can be intelligibly thought of as undergoing differentiation.

Prof. Ward considers the genesis and development of ideation from two sides, which he designates the subjective and the objective respectively. The discussion of the former—of the manner in which familiarity and facility are gradually acquired both in the process of apprehension and in practical activity—seems to me especially valuable, and to follow a line of reflexion along which one may hope a clue may some day be obtained to the nature of retention or revival. I am persuaded that the distinction I have laid stress upon between 'the awareness of a content' and 'the content of which there is awareness' is here of vital significance; and that it is the former alone that 'persists,' while "the ineptness of the atomistic psychology with its 'physical' and 'chemical' analogies" is nowhere more apparent than in its taking it to be the latter. But this is too big a theme to attempt to develop now.

5. No part of Prof. Ward's psychology is more distinctive than the theory he has propounded of the nature of feeling. Feeling, as he views it, is sharply contrasted, on the one hand, with presentation and, on the other hand, with

attention. (a) Strict accuracy would oblige us to say, he would contend, that there is a feeling subject rather than, as in ordinary parlance, there is a subject that has feelings. Feeling, in other words, is never itself an ingredient of the objective continuum; it is always a purely subjective state or condition. Presentations stand in the relation of objects to the subject, but that is not the only relation in which they stand; they affect the subject, and this affection is feeling. Since, then, all knowledge is concerned with objects, we cannot be said to know feeling, any more than we can be said to know attention, immediately in itself. Feeling is immediately *experienced*, but only mediately *known*—known, that is to say, through its effects, through the changes it brings about in the presentational continuum. Furthermore, it follows from the opposition thus constituted, that the features most generally characteristic of presentations—that they can be attended to, revived, and associated—must be absent from feeling. (b) Not only is feeling not known as objects are known. It is not a mode of *knowing*. We do not apprehend in and through feeling. Feeling is a condition of *being* rather than a condition of *doing*; it is a *receptive* attitude on the part of the subject, not an exercise of activity. In a complete *psychosis*, feeling, then, occupies an intermediary position. On the one side, it follows the act of attention; it is the *effect* of non-voluntarily attending to changes in the presentational continuum. On the other side, it precedes the act of attention; it prompts to, and is in that sense the *cause* of, that voluntary attention which produces changes in the motor-continuum.

Despite the efforts of Stumpf and others to sustain a contrary view, there can, I think, be little doubt that in the mature mental life feeling does evince itself as being in contrast with presentations markedly subjective in character, and as being in contrast with modes of apprehending and striving a way in which the subject is affected. The doubt one would entertain turns upon the question whether we are justified in assuming this to be a primordial contrast, a contrast characterising the life of mind from the beginning. Whoever holds recognition of the distinction between subject and object to be derivative, to be gradually attained in the course of the development of conscious experience, will be bound to answer that question in the negative. For my part, I find it well nigh impossible to assign any meaning to the phrase 'awareness of an object' which does not involve applying to that of which there is awareness a number of predicates—*e.g.*, independence of the act of apprehending (*cf.*

p. 417)—that even in their crudest forms must obviously be altogether beyond the range of the primitive mind. Dr. Ward apparently considers an argument of this sort to be vitiated by a confusion of the standpoint of a given experience with the standpoint of its exposition. "The infant who is delighted by a bright colour does not of course," he writes, "conceive himself as face to face with an object; but neither does he conceive the colour as a subjective affection" (p. 48). Quite so; but the observation is scarcely relevant. The whole point of the contention against which it is directed is that recognition of what is subjective is just as much a derivative fact as recognition of what is objective. And if "it is the exclusive business of psychology to analyse and trace the development of individual experience *as it is for the experiencing individual*" (p. 104), is it not imperative to avoid using terms in our description that impute to the experience we are describing features which we have every reason for thinking it does not possess?

So far as I can see, then, the term 'subjective' expresses a characteristic which can only properly be said to belong to feeling as it is for the experiencing individual when that individual has attained a certain stage of mental development. And it is not, I think, difficult to point to the positive features that account for feeling acquiring the characteristic in question. For instance, apart from the opposition indicated by the terms pleasurable and painful, the several states of feeling exhibit no definitely qualitative differences; relatively to even the crudest kinds of sense-apprehension they are *uniform* in character. So too, and in virtue of this uniform character, feeling serves as a *constant* accompaniment of the variety of presented factors, and in regard to the latter there is no necessary connexion between any one of them and a specific degree of pleasurable or painful feeling. This relative uniformity and constancy of the feeling experience would in itself suffice to explain how it comes to be marked off from 'presentative' experience, and to be connected in a special manner with what eventually develops into the consciousness of self. But, in addition, there gradually comes to be established a close juncture between the pleasure-pain of feeling and the body; the body comes to be regarded as the *locus* of, or centre of reference for, pleasurable and painful feeling. And, to mention only one other consideration, those experiences which are beyond all others instrumental in defining for us the division between subject and object, the experiences of movement and of resistance to movement, are, as Dr. Ward has conclusively shown,

intimately associated with feeling as that which initiates and sustains them.

From the point of view I have indicated, one would not take the antithesis between presentations and what are ordinarily called feelings to be primitive and psychologically ultimate. In reply to one of the arguments on which the contention I am calling in question has been rested—that, namely, which points to the qualitative differences and distinctness exhibited by presentations as contrasted with feelings—it has often been urged that what is thus assigned as a characteristic mark to presentations is in fact, even in mature experience, a very varying one, that while it is prominent in visual and auditory presentations, it becomes less and less prominent as we descend the scale, until when we come to organic sensations, so-called, it appears hardly possible to discover a qualitative content describable in any other terms than those of feeling. I have no desire to insist upon this counter-argument as being in itself satisfactory. But it is worth while noting that it in no way depends upon the assumption that increasing indistinctness of content ultimately merges a presentation into mere feeling. One need not intend by it to imply that if two things approach one another so nearly as to be indistinguishable they become identical (*cf.* p. 43), but only to draw attention to certain facts which throw a doubt upon the primordial character of an opposition the reality of which in the mature inner life one would not dream of denying. Moreover, if bodily pains be admitted to be presentations, the significance of the term 'object' as applied to them must be stretched to the breaking point. They exhibit no trace of that reference to the outer world which is characteristic of visual and auditory presentations; and, although in our mature experience they are vaguely localised in the body, no one, I imagine, would maintain that even the faintest localisation is necessary in order that there should be experience of pain.

The truth is that the terms cognition and feeling carry with them, as familiarly employed, a connotation that renders them peculiarly inappropriate for delineating rudimentary phases of conscious experience. "Absolute beginnings are," it may be admitted, "beyond the pale of science," but still psychology is not on that account debarred from reasoning backwards to a stage of psychical existence that is prior to the emergence of either feeling or cognition as its differentiated aspects. There is no possibility, certainly, of deducing one of these from the other. But there is a possibility of forming some conception of a common root, so to speak,

from which the two diverging stems have originated. And when Prof. Ward insists upon the notion of experience as being wider than that of knowledge (p. 378), is he not laying stress upon a consideration that followed out genetically must lead very much in the direction to which I am pointing?

6. From what I have been saying I am afraid I may be thought to differ more fundamentally from Dr. Ward than as a matter of fact I do. Happily with regard to his masterly treatment of the thorny topic of conation I have no other duty to discharge than that of emphasising its great value. While strenuously maintaining that activity is for psychology ultimate, and that the mental life *is* only in being active, Dr. Ward refuses to look upon the specific mode of activity called conation as a unique or unanalysable faculty. Activity in consciousness, be it cognitive or conative, is what he designates attention (p. 344); conscious activity is, therefore, wider than and inclusive of conative activity (p. 262).

Conation, so conceived, is, of course, complex; it involves the conscious subject's activity, but it involves much else besides. In the first place, it is dependent on feeling; feeling, particularly painful feeling, initiates that change in the direction of attention to which conation is due. In the second place, feeling enters in more ways than one into the conative complex itself. And, in the third place, movements—or, as is here said, motor-presentations or re-presentations—form part at least of what is attended to.¹ Moreover, in view of his well-known contention that conscious action, either in the experience of the individual or of his ancestors, preceded automatic or habitual action, it should be noted that Dr. Ward is no less strongly of opinion that even the simplest purposive movement must have been preceded by some movement simpler still. For there could have been no ideal re-presentation of a movement without a prior experience of the actual movement. Movements, then, must be conceived as immediately expressive primordially of

¹ Stout supposes Prof. Ward to agree with him in holding that "the conative complex contains a simple and unanalysable element uniquely characteristic of it"—an element to which he gives the name of 'felt tendency' (*Brit. Journ. of Psychol.*, vol. ii., p. 4). I do not find in *Psychological Principles* any warrant for attributing this view to its author. On the contrary, I believe he would maintain that what Stout calls 'felt tendency' is not an unanalysable element, and that the subjective activity involved in it is fundamentally one in kind with that also involved, for example, in the non-conative attention of which feeling is an effect. "It is," he says, "difference in the objects that makes all the difference in our attitude, but it is not a difference in the psychical activity concerned with them" (p. 68).

pleasure or pain, and voluntary movements as elaborated out of these.

Why it has so often been thought that injustice is being done to the volitional side of experience unless conation, or some element in conation, be regarded as unique, and as alone strictly entitled to be spoken of as 'activity,' has long been a puzzle to me. Dr. Ward, at any rate, cannot be charged with overlooking the importance of the conative aspect of mental life. Psychology he defines as "the science of individual experience—understanding by experience not merely, not primarily, cognition, but also, and above all, conative activity or behaviour" (p. 28). And he expresses his full agreement with those who hold that we are primarily conative and became intellectual, because knowledge proved subservient to action (p. 262). With this position, which in more places than one he strongly enforces, his rejection of the view that conation is a specific faculty is, in no way, inconsistent.

7. The two remarkable and intensely interesting chapters with which the volume concludes throw a considerable amount of fresh light upon the author's point of view as a whole.

Hitherto Prof. Ward has been making use of a working conception that enabled him, for the time being, to set aside the troublesome question of heredity. After the manner of Hegel in the *Phänomenologie*, he had assumed himself to be dealing with one individual, a typified individual, whose development had been continuous from the beginning of psychical life, rather than with a series of individuals, each of whom except the first 'inherited' certain capacities from its progenitors. At the end, however, when in particular the formation of character calls to be considered, and when the emphasis will have to be on the experient rather than on the experience, a device of that kind can no longer be adhered to; instead of the 'psychological individual,' the concrete individual must constitute the subject-matter of investigation, and, instead of an *analysis* of mind, it will be a process of mental *synthesis* with which the inquirer will be mainly concerned.

But, by way of transition from 'general' to 'special' psychology, an extremely suggestive survey is taken of mental synthesis or development as a whole, to which all the partial processes depicted in the earlier chapters contribute. To the psychological observer, the prominent fact is a unity that is differentiated but never disintegrated; but, as the differentiation proceeds, the work of synthesis within the whole becomes to him more and more apparent. Starting with pronounced homogeneity, plasticity, potentiality, rather than with

definitely distinguished features, he reaches at the close pronounced heterogeneity, structure, actuality, such as are exemplified in a person. At every stage of the development, the two factors—the subjective and the objective, function and structure, the experient and the experienced—have been mutually involved. Yet, while in the analytic study, the objective results were the more obtrusive, here in the synthetic study it is the subjective process that is paramount; here 'the good which every soul pursues' becomes the chief clue to the intricacies of psychical evolution.

Regarding, then, the genesis of experience structurally, as the self-made property of the psychological individual, Prof. Ward now introduces the notion of 'psychoplasm,' in contradistinction to that of a 'manifold of sensations' or 'mind-stuff,' and corresponding to the notion of bioplasm in biology. The notion implies the evolution of a psychical organism, a gradually articulated system. Functionally, this organism is the work throughout of the feeling and active subject. The material, no doubt, is 'given'; but it is not merely on the ground of presentation that the synthesising supervenes. The objective differentiation progresses on subjectively determined lines; not only concentration of attention but interest is from first to last operative. And interest secures that stability and progression are correlative conditions of psychical, as of all other, evolution. Besides subjective selection, there is, however, implied in this psychogeny an objective factor—understanding now by the latter term not the psychoplasm but the common-sense world that each one comes to know and distinguish from himself, the epistemologically objective factor. Herein is included all that we collectively describe as circumstances, everything, in short, that is an antecedent condition or occasion of the successive syntheses which differentiate and articulate the psychical organism. This objective factor is, in fact, the environment of the psychological individual—on the one hand, the natural environment, which plays in the main a negative part in the individual's development, and, on the other hand, the social environment, which has none of the impassivity of nature, and is not subject to the rigidity of mechanical laws.

Passing, at last, to 'special' psychology, to the concrete individual, Prof. Ward is face to face with the problem of heredity, and propounds the view that all that can be said to be psychologically heritable is merely the psychoplasm which the conscious subject elaborates, not the conscious subject or 'psyche' itself. Just as for the biologist the organism given to the concrete individual is a more differentiated stage of the

bioplasm from which the series of ancestral organisms began, so for the psychologist the organism given to the concrete individual is a more differentiated stage of the psychoplasm with which the psychological individual began. Presuming, now, that acquired qualities are inherited, the broad difference between the organisms of two generations would be that what were *functional* modifications in the earlier would be *structural* modifications in the later; habit in the individual life would be the ground of heredity in racial life. Accordingly, what is inherited is not individuality or character but a particular *Anlage*—i.e., psychoplasm as modified by heredity which the concrete individual has to elaborate.

My rapid sketch has done the theory scant justice, but has perhaps made manifest its singular acuteness and suggestiveness. That it contains much that is both true and significant I should be among the first to insist. But that certain portions of it bring into prominent relief the difficulties in Dr. Ward's general position to which I have been alluding can hardly, I think, be gainsaid.

I will touch, first, upon a minor point. Dr. Ward is quite aware that in certain respects the analogy between psychoplasm and bioplasm breaks down. I do not know that this is a matter of any consequence, but it is perhaps worth while pointing out that it breaks down in one important respect to which he does not refer. The bioplasm of the biologist is made up of elements similar in kind to elements of the natural environment. The elements of which psychoplasm consists—presentations, ideas, concepts, and the like—are *toto genere* unlike the elements of the natural environment; they are, as he here puts it, contents of 'mind,' and in the natural world "as common sense understands it" their counterparts are not to be found. The relation, therefore, of the psychical organism to the natural environment must obviously be a relation very different from that of the biological organism to the same environment.

I pass, however, to a much more fundamental matter. The psychoplasm which experience is said to differentiate and to organise is repeatedly identified by Prof. Ward with the presentational continuum, and is, I take it, regarded by him as, at any rate, including the latter, though it may include more. It would, therefore, appear that the psychical organism, instead of being, as the bodily organism is, "diaphanous for its own subject and opaque to all subjects besides,"¹ must, on the contrary, be said to be opaque to its own subject and dia-

¹ *Realm of Ends*, p. 466.

phanous for all subjects besides. As the objective continuum which is gradually differentiated, the psychoplasm is that upon which the subject's power of attention is throughout directed; as *totum objectivum*, it is for the subject "all there is," that is to say, "is the universe" (p. 118). The concrete individual starts, so it would *seem* to be implied, with an inherited psychoplasm already differentiated up to a certain level; and his conscious activity is then devoted to further elaborating that psychoplasm, which in consequence gives rise to an ever increasing variety of more or less distinct and clearly defined presentations. And yet this cannot be what Prof. Ward really intends. For the presentational continuum of any concrete individual at each successive stage of his history can obviously not have been elaborated out of the psychoplasm with which he started. At every moment of his being, it is dependent for its material upon the environment; and the great mass of the presentations that *ex hypothesi* come to be distinguished can evidently not have been contained, even implicitly, in the inherited *Anlage*.

If, therefore, by 'psychoplasm' be meant the presentational continuum, the obstacles the theory has to encounter would appear to be insuperable. But in working out his conception of *Anlage*, of the psychoplasm with which the concrete experient starts invested, Dr. Ward departs more and more from that view of its nature. When he proceeds to scrutinise the contents of a concrete individual's *Anlage*, they turn out to be quite other than the contents of the objective continuum, as these have previously been determined in the main body of the book. Temperamental attitudes, moods resulting from coenæsthesia, instinctive emotions and appetites and actions, the constituents of talent, native endowments or capabilities—these are singled out as instances of the various facts which the term *Anlage* covers. Yet none of these can be described as 'objects,' extend the significance of the term how we may; they are said to be "tendencies to develop certain ancestral characteristics" (p. 428), and tendencies or dispositions, whatever else they may be, can surely not be classed under the head of 'presentations'. Once dissociate the notion of psychoplasm from that of a presentational continuum, and I believe it will prove to be a valuable and fruitful notion. I think, indeed, that even then the psychical structure would have to be thought of as far more intimately connected with the conscious subject whose structure it is than Dr. Ward seems willing to allow. Sometimes he appears to speak of it as a kind of clothing, which the individual puts on at birth and divests himself of at death (*cf.*, *e.g.*, p. 442); at any rate, the

soul or 'psyche' has in his view an origin quite different from that of its *Anlage*, the latter being transmitted, apparently through the instrumentality of physiological factors, from parent to offspring, while the former *may* be a new creation (pp. 423-425). But, to mention no other reason, on account alone of its being largely composed of feeling, admittedly an affection of the subject, it is hard to understand how the psychoplasm can be so "essentially distinct" (p. 443) from the subject that controls it as it is thus taken to be.

8. It will be seen that almost everything I have pressed by way of criticism has had reference either to the theory of presentations or to what is bound up with it. Repeating a statement of his in a well-known article in *MIND*, Prof. Ward expresses the opinion that 'presentationism' is able to account for nine-tenths of each of the facts, but that for the remaining one-tenth it requires to be supplemented by recognition of a dominating subjective activity or function (p. 411). I venture to urge that thoroughly as he has exposed the weaknesses of 'presentationism' he has yet been too lenient with it, and that the conception of the conscious subject, which he has himself done so much to develop, can not, in truth, be brought into coherence with the remnant of that doctrine which he retains. In the later portions of his book, I seem to discern indications of an interpretation of experience that has left presentationism in its entirety a long way behind. For example, in the concluding paragraph of the very valuable chapter on "Self-consciousness," it is argued that we are driven to regard experience as reciprocal interaction or *mutuum commercium*, which implies two agents, and not merely two kinds of phenomena (p. 382). It is true that here just as he conceives the self is only *known* reflectively in the phenomenal "Me" which is constructed by it, so he seems to imply that the external agent is only *known* reflectively in the phenomenal presentation-continuum which is partly, at any rate, constructed by it. But yet, in other passages, he speaks unhesitatingly of this external agent as the world we each of us come to "know," and to know as object of our contemplation (p. 417 *sqq.*). This "transsubjective level" of apprehension has no doubt to be attained; we do not start with it. But the question is whether it ever could be attained were our conscious activity directed always on 'presentations' that are intermediary between the transsubjective and the subjective.

II.—PROF. ALEXANDER'S GIFFORD LECTURES¹ (I.).

BY C. D. BROAD.

PROBABLY few of the courses delivered under the Gifford bequest have been so eagerly awaited by philosophers as Prof. Alexander's. We all knew that he had an extremely ingenious and original system 'up his sleeve'; his scattered articles and his synopsis had served to whet rather than to slake our curiosity; and reports from those who listened to the lectures at Glasgow encouraged the hope that England was at length to produce a comprehensive system of constructive metaphysics in which the speculative boldness of the great Germans should be combined with the critical good sense of Locke, Hume, and Berkeley. On the whole, Prof. Alexander's readers will not be disappointed; they will feel, whether they agree with his conclusions or not, that he has at least produced a work in the grand manner.

The book is of stupendous size, occupying nearly eight hundred pages. It is therefore quite impossible to treat it with anything like adequacy. What I propose to do is to start by giving a neutral account of Prof. Alexander's general conclusions, and then to discuss in somewhat greater detail the arguments by which he supports certain of these.

SYNOPSIS.

Everything in the universe, according to our author, is a differentiation of one fundamental stuff, called Space-Time. Space without time and time without space are abstractions, legitimate enough when properly defined and used, but contradictory if taken in isolation. S.-T. is really Motion, but we have to remember that it is not the motion of *things* in space during time. Let us call it Pure Motion, and defer for

¹ *Space, Time, and Deity*, S. Alexander, vol. i., pp. xii., 347; vol. ii., pp. xiii., 437. London: Macmillan & Co., 1920.

the present the question whether such a thing be really conceivable. All things are complexes of motions of various kinds, which persist within more or less constant contours. (I think the vortex-atom theory provides a helpful analogy to this view of Prof. Alexander's, though it would certainly misrepresent him if pressed too far.) There are certain features which characterise, in some form or other, all possible bits of S.-T.; these are called Categories. They are in no sense mind-dependent. Different bits of S.-T. will exhibit these general characteristics in different special forms; thus everything will have some shape and size, but one thing will be circular and another square. The particular forms in which a thing exemplifies the categories are the primary qualities of the thing. On the other hand there are qualities which only belong to complexes of a certain degree of complexity; they appear in different forms among different complexes of the right degree of complexity, but they do not belong in any form whatever to those of lower degree. These are called secondary qualities. They are in no sense mind-dependent, nor are they in general dependent on the physiological peculiarities of a percipient's body. Thus any set of motions of the right degree of complexity, when illuminated by the right sort of light (itself a form of motion), is red; and its redness is independent alike of the presence of a percipient mind and of the presence of a normally constructed eye. If either of these be lacking the red colour will not be *seen*, but that is the whole difference that will be made. Secondary qualities form an hierarchy in the sense that those which come higher in the scale belong to motion-complexes which also possess all the lower qualities. Thus the highest secondary quality that we know is mentality; this only belongs to motion-complexes such as brains; but brains also have the secondary qualities of life, chemical affinity, colour, and inertia—to mention them in descending order. Prof. Alexander further holds that a motion-complex with a higher secondary quality is always a distinct part of a larger complex, specially connected with this part, but possessing only lower secondary qualities. Thus our brains, which have mentality as well as life, etc., are specially differentiated parts of our bodies. The remaining parts have life, etc., but not mentality. Similarly he holds that in a blue body the peculiar motions that are blue are merely dotted about the contour, the interstices being filled with simpler motion-complexes which have only mechanical properties. At each new stage in the hierarchy something genuinely new appears in the universe. There is no possibility of predicting that such and

such a type of motion-complex will have such and such a quality until you have actually found that this kind of complex does in fact have this kind of quality. Such novelty is clearly compatible with complete obedience to law; it is a law of nature that such and such a complex has such and such a quality, but it is an *irreducible* law and cannot be discovered until instances of its operation have been met.

On Prof. Alexander's view, then, there is nothing sacrosanct about mind. It is just one stage in the hierarchy of qualities, as closely bound to brain as colour is to certain types of vibration. It happens to be the highest quality that we know; but, in the first place, even if there be higher qualities we could not know them, and, in the second, even if there be not now higher qualities there certainly will be such in course of time. Nothing in the world depends on mind, either for its existence or for even the most trivial of its qualities, with the single exception of value. Prof. Alexander takes an obvious pleasure in 'dressing down' and 'telling off' the exaggerated claims of mind, and I suspect that he secretly cherishes a hope that in the New Jerusalem, whose charter is the Treaty of Versailles and whose streets are paved with paper-currency, this journal may be rechristened SPACE-TIME. The main importance of mind for philosophy is that in it we can read in large and familiar letters types of relation which are common to all orders of existence, but are obscure to us from the very simplicity that they assume in lower orders of reality. There is nothing peculiar about the cognitive *relation*; there is one common relation in which any part of S.-T. stands to any other that affects it. Exactly the same relation of 'compresence' unites me to a book that I read, and a plant to the soil that it grows in. But the quality of the reaction differs, because my brain is so complex as to possess mentality while the plant is only complex enough to possess life. It is for this reason that my relation to the book is called cognitive, whilst the plant's relation to the soil is not. A complex of a given order can stand in this relation to any complex of a lower order, but not to itself or to any other of the same order or *à fortiori* to one of a higher order. A mind 'enjoys,' but does not 'contemplate' itself and its states; a plant 'enjoys' its own life, it cannot 'contemplate' it, though in a wide sense it can contemplate the soil that it lives in and the purely mechanical processes that go on in its own structure.

Now, knowing that I come at a certain stage in a hierarchy of complexes, I can understand that complexes may arise in

the future, or may even exist now, which stand in the same relation to me as that in which my brain stands to the rest of my body. Brain is a highly differentiated part of living matter with the new quality of mentality; so there might be complexes whose constituents are brains, and these might possess a new quality. A being so constituted would contemplate minds as minds contemplate life, and would enjoy its own peculiar quality as minds enjoy themselves. Such a being would be for us a god or angel, and its peculiar new quality would be deity or godhood. In this sense we are gods to plants; for they only live, whilst we think as well as live. But *our* gods would not be gods to themselves; *their* gods would be hypothetical beings of the next stage in the hierarchy. The world, considered as the matrix which is going to produce beings with godhood, is what we mean by God. If this stage be ever reached there will not be God but gods, and their God will be the world regarded as the matrix of the next stage. Thus we may sum up Prof. Alexander's theology in two parodies: 'God never is, but always to exist,' and 'There is no God but gods'.

The one place in Prof. Alexander's system where minds come into their own is in connexion with values. These he calls Tertiary Qualities. Truth, goodness, and beauty would not exist if there were no minds. This does not mean that they are subjective in the sense that there is no question of right or wrong judgment about them. It means that the only entities that have these qualities contain minds as constituents. Truth, *e.g.*, belongs neither to minds as such nor to objects as such, but to the complex mind-contemplating-object. And it is perfectly possible to believe that such a complex has the tertiary quality of truth when, in fact, it has that of falsehood. Moreover, these values are essentially social; they arise out of the intercourse of minds, some of whom are right and others wrong in their judgments or actions. There are analogies to the tertiary qualities at levels below mind. Thus adaptation, or the lack of it, of a plant to its environment is a value, and it is an attribute of the whole situation plant—living in—environment.

There is one other feature in the system that must be mentioned. Prof. Alexander, in common, I suppose, with most philosophers, is concerned to maintain that the actual is logically prior to the possible. Universals for him are types of pattern in S.-T., and are meaningless in any other connexion. And it is owing solely to the actual constitution of S.-T., which is homoloidal, that universals are possible at all. He has therefore to devote a good deal of argument to

apparent exceptions, such as four-dimensional and non-homoloidal spaces, which seem, on the face of them, to be other possible instances of universals which, instead of falling within S.-T., are genera of which actual S.-T. is merely one possible specification.

I have now, I hope, given a fair and intelligible account of the main outlines of Prof. Alexander's theory. The book contains, in addition to what I have mentioned, many very valuable discussions about particular categories such as substance, cause, intensity, etc. But space forbids entering into details. I propose therefore to devote the rest of this article to a fuller account and some criticisms of the doctrines of Space-Time, Mind, the hierarchy of Qualities, the nature of Universals, and Deity.

A. SPACE-TIME.

It is idle to pretend that S.-T., as introduced to us in this book, is easy to understand. We must of course distinguish between the doctrine itself and the arguments for it; the latter might be false or inconclusive, whilst the former, if we could understand it, might still be a valuable alternative in terms of which to construe the world. Let us first try then to get some idea of S.-T. For Prof. Alexander the proximately fundamental thing is the event-particle. An event-particle, is the limiting case of a motion; moreover there is a motion-quality—presumably what one is aware of when looking at an object that moves quickly enough—but it is not, like genuine qualities, *correlated with* certain motions, it just is the motion. (Cf. Vol. I., p. 321.) Now motion does not imply something that moves; it is anterior to things and is the stuff of which they are made (I., 329). So it would seem that ultimately the fundamental thing is pure motions. These will differ from each other, of course, in direction, in the place and time where they happen, and so on. But we leave these matters aside for the moment. The intrinsic difference between them will be their swiftness; and if you ask how you are to understand a motion which is not the motion of something, I suppose the answer would be that *e.g.*, you can see a difference between a swifter or slower motion, and that this is independent of what happens to be moving. We are told that the best way to think of an event-particle is to start by thinking of a very simple qualified event—*e.g.*, a flash of red colour. Then think away the quality of redness; the residuum is an event-particle. (Cf. I., 48, note.) Similarly

I suppose that the best way to think of a pure motion is to compare the jump given by the second hand of your watch with that given by the minute hand of a big public clock; then think away the other qualities of the moving object and just bear in mind the observable difference in the perceived jumps. The important point to notice is that for Prof. Alexander the pure motion is not an *abstractum* incapable of actual existence; it is a real particular, which in the special case of the watch-hand happens to have other perceptible qualities. Such pure motions are to be taken as fundamental and unanalysable; space and time are *abstracta* derived from them by a legitimate process. The event-particle is a kind of half-way house between motions and space or time. It is a limit which has spatial and temporal characteristics, and I imagine, also something corresponding to the swiftness of the motion whose limit it is. I think Prof. Alexander might have made all this very much clearer if he had known of Whitehead's work on Extensive Abstraction. It does not seem to me that his exposition of the nature of S.-T. is particularly clear. I have had to gather my notions of it from hints scattered all over the first volume, and my interpretation may quite well be wrong.

Now of course it seems extremely odd to the reader at first sight to take pure motions as fundamental and to analyse space and time out of them. For our normal procedure is to regard motion as analysable into the successive occupation of points of space by a bit of matter or by a recognisable quality or state of affairs. Still we know from experience in other branches of knowledge that it is often equally legitimate to regard A and B as fundamental and to construct C out of them or to regard C as fundamental and construct A and B out of them. Geometry offers many examples of this fact. Hence we ought to regard the *possibility* of Prof. Alexander's procedure with an open mind. But he holds that we ought to go much further than this; for he thinks he can prove that there are contradictions in space and time taken by themselves, and that these only vanish when they are taken in connexion with each other as characteristics of pure motions. Thus two questions arise: (i) Does Prof. Alexander succeed in constructing space and time from his S.-T. of pure motions? and (ii) Is it *necessary* to proceed in this way; is there really any objection to the more usual course which makes motion derivative?

The derivation of space and time occurs in the chapter on Perspectives and Sections of S.-T. Once more I must put the matter in my own words, and it may be that I have mis-

understood the theory. Take any event-particle e_{st} . If I am right, this will have a spatial characteristic s , a temporal characteristic t , and a 'quality' corresponding to the swiftness of the motion of which it is a limit. We must not suppose that the s and t factors are really separable; they are essentially bound up with each other and I suppose that the intensive quality of swiftness is the way in which the two are combined. Now (a) we can consider all the event-particles contemporary with e_{st} . These constitute a *section*. We might be inclined to say that the s -factors of all such particles is what is meant by space at the moment t . This would be a mistake according to Prof. Alexander. The reason apparently is that even by space *at a moment* we do not mean *instantaneous space*. Nothing instantaneous would have the properties of a space, for reasons which we shall have to consider later. I would remark at this point, however, that it is not obvious why a section should not be at least as legitimate a notion as an event-particle. Doubtless a space of contemporary points is a conceptual limit, but then so is an event-particle. However, there is another way of classifying points with respect to a given event-particle, and this provides another and—according to Prof. Alexander—more legitimate meaning of space at an instant. We can consider (b) the class of all event-particles, which are either (i) intrinsically contemporary with e_{st} , or (ii) are earlier stages of motions of which the assigned particle is a stage, or (iii) are later stages of such motions. This class is called a *perspective* with respect to e_{st} . It obviously includes event-particles of various dates. The s -factors of all these constitute space at t from the point s . Such a perspective of course includes many sets of contemporary event-particles, but many event-particles contemporary with any such set will fall outside the perspective to which the set belongs. *E.g.*, two flashes of light and a sound might start at the same moment from points equidistant from e_{st} and the flashes might pass through s at t . The three initial events would then be intrinsically contemporary; but the starting of the two flashes would be in the perspective while that of the sound would not, because it could not—owing to its smaller velocity—be on a course of motion that contains e_{st} .

A difficulty that I feel about this notion of perspectives is the following: We are here supposed to be at the level of pure unqualified space-time. But all examples of perspectives have been in terms of definite qualified events with characteristic rates of transmission, such as light or sound. Now the question is: Could one attach any meaning to perspectives

without these characteristically different velocities of transmission, and are not these velocities merely empirical, *i.e.*, characteristic of special complexes of S.-T. and not of S.-T. as such? I question the legitimacy of the notion of perspectives at the level of pure S.-T. If Prof. Alexander answers that there are differences of intensive magnitude even among *pure motions*, there is another question that I must raise. An event-particle is a limit, a kind of mathematical device, *bene fundatum* indeed, but not a genuine part of S.-T. Is it supposed to represent in some way, not only the spatial and temporal characteristics of a certain stage in a pure motion, but also the intensity of the motion (*i.e.*, its velocity)? On the one hand this seems necessary if there be intrinsic differences of intensity even among pure motions, and if event-particles are to be an adequate device for dealing with such motions. But, on the other, in the doctrine of perspectives a *single* event-particle is assumed to belong to various motions of various degrees of swiftness, *e.g.*, to the course of a wave of sound and to that of a wave of light which arrive at the same time. I confess that I find this very puzzling. If pure motions do not differ intrinsically perspectives seem out of place at the level of pure S.-T. But if they do then I do not see how you can talk of a single event-particle common to a number of intrinsically different motions; it would rather seem as if we should need a plurality of event-particles with the same spatial and temporal factors but some difference in quality to represent the different intrinsic swiftnesses of the different pure motions of which they are the limits.

To proceed. Two different kinds of sections and perspectives are possible with respect to a given event-particle e_{st} . We might consider the class of event-particles co-punctual with e_{st} , and say that the t -factors of all these constitute time at the point s . Again Prof. Alexander will not allow this, because in his view it is essential that time—even if it be in a certain sense time *at a point*—shall not have all its instants confined to one point. Accordingly, instead of such a section, we take a new kind of perspective. We include in it (i) all event-particles co-punctual with e_{st} , and (ii) otherwise include the same event-particles as in our previous perspective. We now consider the temporal factors of all these particles. Thus the 'temporal perspective' from e_{st} includes event-particles of the form $e_{st'}$ but none of the form $e_{s't}$, whilst the 'spatial perspective' includes particles of the form $e_{s't}$ but none of the form $e_{st'}$; for the former refers to a centre with fixed spatial characteristics and the latter to a centre

with fixed temporal characteristics. This, at least, is how I interpret the rather difficult statements in I., 75-76.

S.-T. as a whole is just all the pure event-particles. Any perspective is a selection of event-particles. In any perspective every position in space and every instant of time is represented by *some* event-particle, but there are many event-particles absent from any given perspective. Perspectives are inter-connected and include between them all event-particles. 'Points of space which are simultaneous in one perspective may be successive in another . . .' (I., 77). I take this startling statement to be a Pickwickian way of asserting that the perspective P_1 may contain the event-particles e_{st} and e_{yt} , whilst the perspective P_2 may contain e_{xt} and e_{yt} .

I find some difficulty in following Prof. Alexander's account of *total space* and *total time*, and their connexion with sections. His view *seems* to be the following: Total space is the space-factors of all event-particles, and total time is their time-factors. But if s be any point there are event-particles of the form e_{st} , where t ranges over all possible values. Similarly if t be any moment there are event-particles of the form e_{st} where s ranges over all possible values. Thus, whilst a section is not what we mean by space, because space confined to a moment is impossible; yet, since every position is in fact correlated with any moment, such a section does contain every position in total space. Similar remarks apply to temporal sections and total time. Thus momentary spaces and punctual times, though fictions, do possess respectively all the geometrical properties of total space and all the chronological properties of total time.

I must confess, however, that I am highly doubtful of the above interpretation, because there are statements that seem to imply and others that seem to conflict with it. We are told (I., 81) that 'in total S.-T. each point is in fact repeated through the whole of time, and each instant over the whole of space'. This certainly seems to mean that for any s there are e_{st} 's in which t ranges through all possible values, and *mutatis mutandis* for any t . But we also read on the same page that 'at any moment of its real history Space is not all of one date, and Time is not all at one point'. And on (I., 82-83) we learn that '... in their combination Space is always variously occupied by Time, and Time spread variously over Space'. This certainly seems to mean that if t be any moment the s values of the e_{st} 's do *not* range over all possible values. I take it that the odd statement that at any moment of its history Space is not all of one date must be

regarded as analytical. It simply tells us what Prof. Alexander intends the phrase *Space at such and such a date* to mean. It tells us that he means by it the spatial factors of the event-particles in a perspective taken from an event-particle with the assigned date. These factors of course belong to particles of various dates. The only way that I can see to reconcile the apparent flat contradiction between the quotations from I., 81, and I., 82-83 is to substitute in the latter for the words *Space* and *Time* the phrases: *The space of a perspective* and *The time of a perspective*. I may be very stupid, but I feel that more light is badly wanted here.

On I., 217 occurs the statement "... every point differs from any other by its instant, and every instant by its point". Such assertions are common, yet (a) the phrases *its point* and *its instant* seem to imply a one to one correlation between points and instants. This is elsewhere vigorously denied. Each point belongs to a plurality of instants and conversely. We might then (b) be tempted to substitute *its points* and *its instants*, and to suppose that what is meant is that if t_1 and t_2 be two different moments, then some at least of the s 's in the class of event-particles of the form e_{st_1} are different from the s 's in the class of particles of the form e_{st_2} . But this seems incompatible with the statement that each moment is at every point and each point at every moment. Again (c) we are repeatedly told that there are intrinsically contemporary points, i.e., that there are event-particles with the same time-factor and different space-factors. A pair of such points *cannot* differ from each other by 'their instants,' for 'their instants'—i.e., those of the event-particles of which they are the space-factors—are identical.

It seems to me then that the doctrine of S.-T. and its connexion with space and time is by no means clear, and that, as expounded, it contains inconsistencies. These *may* be merely verbal; they certainly need further elucidation from Prof. Alexander; and, until this be given, I do not feel certain that S.-T., as offered, is even a possible way of analysing the world. But our author thinks it not merely possible but necessary, because of the failure of all alternatives that try to do without it. Let us then consider his arguments for this view.

The argument substantially is that time without space and space without time involve contradictions which vanish only when the two are regarded as intimately linked factors of pure events. Before discussing this view in detail it is well to note that the time and space which are convicted of these

faults are *assumed* to be neither qualities of things or events nor relations between them. Now, it is at least possible that if the difficulties that arise be genuine, they are due not to the separation of time and space, but to the initial assumption that time and space are not merely relations between events.

Time is a continuous duration of successive instants. If time were alone this combination of attributes would be impossible; it is only because time is essentially connected with space that successive instants can form a continuous duration. The argument is that a duration involves some kind of togetherness. But the essence of successiveness is that, when one moment exists, all earlier moments have ceased and no later ones have begun to be. Hence time would be a series of isolated *nows*. This argument seems to me to be wholly invalid. All that has happened to the past moments is that they have ceased to be *present*—a purely psychological matter, as Prof. Alexander admits—not that they have ceased to *be*. Togetherness, as Prof. Alexander himself points out, means merely connexion and not simultaneity (I, 46). Nothing has been proved except the trivial proposition that successive moments cannot be together in the sense of being contemporary. It does not follow that they cannot be together in the sense of forming a whole of related terms, which whole is a duration. A tune is a whole of related notes, and these notes are successive; why cannot a duration be a whole of related but successive moments?

How is connexion with space supposed to heal the impermanence of time? This is explained in I, 44-49. Each moment must be correlated with several points, and each point with several moments. A point has permanence because correlated with many instants. And successive instants are 'together' as parts of a duration because they are correlated with these persistent points. It would, perhaps, be fair to put Prof. Alexander's argument as follows: There can be no duration unless something endures. The moments of time do not endure, therefore something is needed other than time to give a duration. This something is the point or points correlated with all the moments of a series. And these points endure because each of them is correlated with a number of moments. The argument rests on the fallacy that a complex of related terms cannot have a property not possessed by any of the terms. No instant endures; the terms of duration are instants; but it does not follow that a complex whose terms are instants related by the relation of succession is not just what we mean by a stretch of duration:

e.g., Trinity College has certain attributes which belong neither to the Master nor to any of the Fellows; yet it just is a complex composed of the Master and Fellows in certain mutual relations.

Space, according to Prof. Alexander, is under reciprocal obligations to time. Were it not for time space would be a blank undifferentiated unity, and consequently not a continuum at all. This argument seems to rest on some form of the Identity of Indiscernibles. It is assumed that if p_1 and p_2 be two different points there must be some qualitative difference between them. Pure space cannot supply these differences; we are not allowed to appeal to qualified things or events because of the preliminary rejection of the relative theory of space and time; hence time itself must be called in to provide the qualitative distinction. How does time perform this service for space? In I., 49-50 we learn that each instant must be correlated with several points of space if time is to differentiate space. This is apparently necessary in order that time should be successive; otherwise it would 'be infected with bare blank extendedness'. But once the successiveness of time is secured it is able to discriminate points of space, presumably because different points are correlated with different instants or sets of instants.

Now I confess that I find all this most difficult to follow and still more so to believe. It does look as if space and time were attempting, like the inhabitants of the Scilly Islands, 'to gain a precarious livelihood by taking in each other's washing'. For let us put together the various statements about the mutual services of time and space: (i) There are stretches of time, in spite of the fleeting character of instants, because each instant is connected with an enduring point; (ii) points endure because each point is connected with a plurality of different instants; (iii) instants differ because each is connected with a (partially or totally?) different set of points; (iv) points differ because each is connected with a (partially or totally?) different set of instants. To these propositions we have to add the puzzling statement, already quoted, that 'each point is in fact repeated throughout the whole of time, and each instant over the whole of space' (I., 81). How the first four statements can escape circularity and how the one just quoted can be reconciled with (iii) and (iv), passes my wits to understand.

I suppose Prof. Alexander would take the line that this circularity just shows the intimate connexion of time with space. But this seems to me to be no answer. We were given to understand that time *without* space and space *without*

time involved contradictions, but that these were healed when the two were *taken together*, and that this contradiction in the separate factors and its disappearance in their combination was the great argument in favour of the doctrine of S.-T. But it seems (a) that the contradictions do not exist and (b) that, if they do, they only vanish to make way for vicious circles.

Prof. Alexander is not content with the general connexion between space and time which is supposed to be established by the above arguments. He thinks he can prove the more detailed proposition that the characteristics of temporal order depend on the connexion of time with a space of three dimensions. If space had but one dimension time would not be irreversible; if space had but two dimensions there would be no betweenness in time. I cannot follow these arguments, in spite of the very kind and courteous help that Prof. Alexander has given me by letter. I shall try to give an account of his argument to prove the first point, and shall state the difficulties that I feel, although he holds that I ought not to feel them.

The argument begins on I., 52; I shall put it in my own words. If t_1 and t_2 be two instants and t_1 precedes t_2 then t_2 cannot precede t_1 . It is required to prove that if space had only one dimension t_2 might precede t_1 although t_1 precedes t_2 . Take two event-particles $e_{s_1 t_1}$ and $e_{s_2 t_2}$. Prof. Alexander says that 'the points s_1 and s_2 suffice to distinguish the instants . . . but not to determine whether t_1 is prior to t_2 as posterior'. (I have altered the notation, but made no other change.)

Before considering his proof there are two points to be noticed: (a) The statement that the points s_1 and s_2 suffice to distinguish t_1 and t_2 seems inconsistent with other statements that he makes. The same instant can be, and is, according to him, connected with a plurality of points. Hence the mere fact that the points s_1 and s_2 differ does not suffice to distinguish t_1 and t_2 . If he means that the difference of points would suffice to distinguish the moments if space had only one dimension, this is surely one of the things to be proved. (b) There is a defect in the conclusion of the argument, which is, I think, merely verbal. Prof. Alexander claims to prove that if space had only one dimension t_1 might be *either* before *or* after t_2 . This would be an irrelevant conclusion; what he wants to prove is that t_1 might be *both* before *and* after t_2 if space had only one dimension. The defect is only verbal, because if his argument proves anything at all it does prove the latter proposition. Let us now

consider the argument. It runs as follows: t_1 , like all instants, must be repeated in space. Hence there must be an event-particle e_{s_2, t_1} as well as e_{s_1, t_1} . Now, if space had only one dimension, and thus reduced to a line, s_1 might be on one side of s_2 —the point connected with t_2 —whilst s_3 was on the other side of it. Indeed this must be so, for 'if s_1 and s_3 were on the same side of s_2 their dates would be different,' whereas they are assumed to be both t_1 . And if s_1 and s_3 were on different sides of s_2, t_1 —which is connected with both s_1 and s_3 —would be both before and after t_2 , which is connected with s_2 . Put in terms of event-particles the argument is: There must be at least two event-particles in different places both with the date t_1 . If space be one-dimensional these places must be on the same line as any other event-particle e_{s_2, t_2} . They cannot both be on the same side of this particle, for, if so, their dates would differ. But if they were on opposite sides of it their identical date t_1 would be both before and after the date t_2 of e_{s_2, t_2} .

It is, of course, evident that this very obscure argument rests on the fact that event-particles are limits of pure motions. If space were of one dimension all motions would be in one line. If we conceive of s_1 and s_2 as being successive points in the course of a single pure motion from s_1 to s_2 , it is, of course, obvious that any point between s_1 and s_2 will be correlated with a date between t_1 and t_2 , and that any point s_3 on the opposite side of s_2 to s_1 will be correlated with a date later than s_1 . On this assumption it is no doubt true that t_1 cannot be connected with two different points; if there is only one motion there must be a one to one correlation between space and time, whilst it is of the essence of the theory that every point is connected with many instants and every instant with many points. But I do not understand why the one-dimensionality of space implies that the universe consists of a single motion. In the first place are there or are there not supposed to be intrinsic differences of velocity among pure motions? If so, the present difficulty does not arise. But if not, how can the doctrine of perspectives be—as it is apparently meant to be—a doctrine about *pure* S.-T.? Again, even if all pure motions were in one line and of one velocity what prevents some from traversing the line in one direction and others in the opposite direction? And what prevents a succession of pure motions with the same velocity from traversing the line in the same direction, and thus passing through the same point at different dates? Lastly, what prevents a plurality of pure motions of the same velocity from starting in the same direction at the same

moment from different points on the line and thus passing through different points at the same date? I conclude from the note on I., 53 that there is probably some objection to all these suggestions; but I find the whole conception of pure motions so radically obscure that I do not know what properties I may and what I may not ascribe to them.

(To be continued.)

III.—HUME'S ETHICAL THEORY AND ITS CRITICS (I.).

BY FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP.

A WELL-KNOWN professor of philosophy in a German university a generation ago used to advise the students in his course on Kant to read Locke's Essay by all means, but to read it "furchtbar schnell". There is reason to believe that many students of ethics read Hume's ethical treatises in conformity with this point of view. It would not be remarkable if this were the case. Hume's works on ethics, particularly the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, appear at first sight—like Locke's Essay—to be simplicity itself. One or two readings would seem to be sufficient for getting out of them everything of importance which they have to offer. Nothing, however, could be farther from the truth. The *Treatise on Human Nature* presents a special set of difficulties of interpretation which seem to be due largely to the fact that Hume's thought grew as he wrote, and its expression was not subjected to a sufficiently careful revision when the end had been reached. What has contributed to miscalculation of the difficulties of the subject and to many forms of misinterpretation is a false appearance of system in the treatment contained both in the *Treatise* and the *Enquiry*. There is indeed a well-conceived plan at the foundation of each of these works. But Hume's mind was too rich in material to be able to confine itself within the limits of the somewhat narrow programme which he drew up for himself. Things of the utmost importance are said by the way, sometimes in the form of mere passing suggestions, while discussing primarily another subject; and his entire thought on some of these matters can be found only by putting together a number of widely scattered statements. Finally, many misunderstandings have been caused by the fact that he has a habit of stating principles without giving formal recognition to their consequences; oftentimes, no doubt, because he failed to see them, and sometimes, apparently, in his later work because as a somewhat disillusioned philosopher desirous

of getting a popular hearing for ethical theories he was deliberately writing down to the "plain people".

The widespread failure to get from Hume all that he has to give is shown, among other ways, by criticisms which, in many cases, are based upon direct misinterpretation, and in others are due to the failure to penetrate to the real foundations of his system and discover its essential character. Any misunderstandings that tend to obscure Hume's position in the history of ethics are a very serious misfortune. Hume is the greatest representative of non-rationalistic theory in the classical period of British ethics. Those who are following him in this path to-day can learn more from him in the way of method, of concrete facts, and of principles than from any other writer of modern times. He has penetrated to the truths embodied in ethical rationalism more completely than any other of its critics, and is thus its most dangerous enemy,—an enemy who can be caricatured, as he commonly is by those representatives of this school who undertake to write about him, only at peril to their own cause. The following paper is an attempt to deal with a number of serious misinterpretations which have become current, and which are concealing the real Hume from the view of students of the moral life.

THE HISTORICAL SOURCES OF THE SYSTEM.

Hume got his fundamental point of view, many of his data, and his conception of what they involve from either Shaftesbury or Hutcheson. We must therefore begin our presentation with that map of the moral life which these two famous travellers unrolled before the inquiring eyes of our youthful explorer.

In the first place all three writers agree that the object of the moral judgment is not outer actions but inner purposes, whether by this is to be understood intentions, motives, or character. All left unanswered questions of very great importance concerning the exact point in the inner life at which the moral judgment is aimed. But the central fact that the moral judgment is a judgment passed on the human will, this was presented so clearly as to leave no room for misapprehension.¹

¹ In Hume this view was somewhat obscured by his attempts to introduce the Greek conception of *ἀρετή* into modern ethics. I have not treated this part of Hume's ethical theory because it was not demanded by the main purpose of the paper. Hume's errors in this matter lie open to the most superficial view. But it is a curious fact that its elements of truth, some of them at once very interesting and very significant, have never been

According to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson the source of moral distinctions is to be found in a reaction to motives or purposes on the part of our emotional nature. Such a view, we are sometimes told, identifies our attitude towards character with our like or dislike for mustard. It involves, as a matter of fact, the presence of an element which is nowhere found in the pleasures of gustatory sensations as such, namely thought, and this thought it is which arouses the corresponding emotion. For Shaftesbury the thought is that of the existence of such a balance between the agent's "affections toward the public good" and his "affections toward private good" as best "agrees with the good of his kind or of that system in which he is included and of which he constitutes a part".¹ The emotion aroused by this spectacle is the emotion of the beautiful. The moral judgment is one form of the æsthetic.

For Hutcheson, despite some differences in phraseology, the thought in question has at bottom the same object. The chief difference in treatment is the explicit statement that the object of approbation is the desire for the greatest happiness attainable for those who are within the range of influence of the action, including the happiness of the agent himself. In the earlier works, which were the ones that seriously influenced Hume, the emotion aroused is apparently sometimes regarded as æsthetic, sometimes as *sui generis*. The charm of balance or harmony is not explicitly ascribed to moral perfection; and probably Hutcheson's real thought is that the moral emotion, while possessing very important affinities with the æsthetic, is in the last resort different in content.

In essentials Hume agrees with what is common to these descriptions. But with regard to that fundamental problem, the source of the moral judgment, he saw a fact which his two predecessors had either failed to observe or had dismissed from consideration as without significance, the fact namely that for a being possessed of "social affections" the discovery of felicitic qualities in conduct or character must arouse direct satisfaction. Can this satisfaction play no part in the moral judgment? Shaftesbury and Hutcheson assert by implication that it does not. Hume on the contrary sees that it cannot be thrust aside or ignored. More than this, he believes he

systematically worked out by any of the large number of enthusiasts for Greek ethics, or, for that matter, by any one else.

¹See in particular *Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit*, bk. ii., pt. i., secs. i. and iii. "Best" is my gloss. It is required by the whole logic of Shaftesbury's thought, but is nowhere introduced into the formula in just so many words.

can describe and explain through it not indeed all phenomena, but "the most considerable part" of the phenomena of the moral judgment.

"THE BENEVOLENT PRINCIPLES OF OUR FRAME."

The preceding account is based upon an out and out denial of a view which has long been popular among British writers on ethics, the view namely that Hume's ethical theory is based upon an all-devouring egoism. *Prima facie*, the case is against these expositors, as they themselves would probably be prepared to admit in their moments of less intense excitement. For nothing could be more obvious to even the most superficial reading than the fact that Hume places the source of the moral judgment and of the conduct which it approves in what he calls "the benevolent principles of our frame". The only question open to discussion is therefore precisely what he meant by the "benevolent principles" in question.¹

The Treatise finds the stimuli which arouse these principles to action in the kindred emotions of love and esteem, and in sympathy. Love and esteem, in accordance with an original constitution of the mind, arouse a "calm desire" for the good of their object.² This desire is called benevolence, and in the Treatise the name is confined to the desire as thus aroused. Sympathy is the power of reflecting, as in a mirror, the feelings of others through the instrumentality of the imagination.³ Sympathy arouses what is called pity, defined as "the desire of happiness to another and aversion to his misery".⁴ In their nature and constitution there is no difference between the desire called benevolence and that called pity. The only difference is in the nature of the stimulus. The "benevolent principles of our frame" consist then in altruistic desires (to use the modern term) which may be aroused to activity, either by love or esteem, or by the picturing power of the imagination.

Most egoistic hedonists recognise the existence of sympathy. They could hardly overlook it, still less deny it. In denying,

¹ On this subject the reader should consult the very valuable study by Prof. McGilvary, entitled *Altruism in Hume's Treatise*, published in the *Philosophical Review*, vol. xii., p. 272. A summary of his conclusions will be found in *MIND*, N.S., vol. xiv., p. 336.

² *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. ii., sec. vi., last paragraph; G. (Green and Grose Edition), vol. ii., p. 154; S.-B. (Selby-Bigge Edition), p. 368; *ibid.*, bk. iii., pt. iii., sec. iv.; G., ii., 363 n.; S.-B., 608 n.

³ Bk. ii., pt. i., sec. xi.; G., ii., 111; S.-B. 316.

⁴ Bk. ii., pt. ii., sec. ix.; G., ii., 166; S.-B., 382.

however, the existence of a desire for another's good they have treated sympathy, whether in effect or explicitly, merely as so much personal discomfort of which the victim tries to rid himself in the most economical way possible. This point of view is expressed in Hobbes' well-known explanation to the "divine" as to why he gave sixpence to the beggar, and is reflected here and there in his books. According to the *Leviathan*, for instance, gift as distinguished from contract, is "when one of the parties transferreth [a right] . . . in hope . . . to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion".¹

It will appear from the preceding account that this position is as far removed as possible from that of Hume. Love and sympathy operate by arousing the desire for the good, not of self, but of their object. Hobbes' explanation of unselfish action is therein rejected.

There is indeed a single passage in the *Treatise* in which Hume seems to have lapsed into this view. "Benevolence is an original pleasure arising from the pleasure of the person belov'd, and a pain proceeding from his pain: From which correspondence of impressions there arises a subsequent desire of his pleasure, and aversion to his pain."² There are also several passages which taken in their most obvious interpretation declare pleasure and pain (apparently meaning the pleasure and pain of the agent) to be the sole ends capable of arousing human desire. One of them reads as follows: "The passions [in which are included the desires] . . . are founded on pain and pleasure, and in order to produce an affection of any kind 'tis only requisite to present some good or evil" [*i.e.*, pleasure or pain].³ But on the very next page we read the following: "Beside good and evil, or in other words pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends: hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections." Here is a denial not merely of egoism, but of psychological hedonism in any form. Two explanations for these anomalies present themselves. The first is that the passages which contradict the main drift of the system must be interpreted to mean something different from what on the surface they appear to maintain. Prof. McGilvary, in the

¹ Pt. i., ch. xiv.

² *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. ii., sec. ix.; G. ii., 170; S.-B. 387.

³ Bk. ii., pt. iii., sec. ix.; G. ii., 214; S.-B. 438.

article referred to above, argues for this alternative. But in the second place they may be regarded merely as lapses. The latter explanation, which for most of the passages seems to me to be the better, is readily believable if we accept an hypothesis also suggested by the same author which will appeal to every careful student of Hume as extremely plausible. "A higher criticism of the Treatise might try to distinguish between egoistic passages which were written first and non-egoistic passages which were afterwards inserted without proper re-writing of older passages in the interest of complete consistency."¹ This hypothesis becomes the more probable when it is noted that the passages which seem to teach egoistic psychological hedonism are all confined to Books I. and II. Book III., it may be remembered, was published a year after the preceding ones. Hume accordingly had more time in which to give it a thorough revision. Whatever explanation of these real or apparent inconsistencies may be adopted the fact remains that the recognition of altruism as the motive force in extensive fields of human action is unequivocal, repeated, and fundamental, and therefore cannot be interpreted away by any trick of exegesis.

T. H. Green's method of doing what we have just declared unpermissible possesses at least the charm of simplicity. He points out that in Book I. of the Treatise, Hume has announced and attempted to carry through a psychological theory of atomic sensationalism. But such a theory is incompatible with a doctrine of altruism. Therefore, any passages in which this doctrine appears, and any conclusions that rest upon it are intrusions of alien matter. They are the real lapses, and as such may properly be removed as excrescences. Unfortunately, however, the argument proves too much; and he who proves too much proves nothing. "A consistent sensationalism," writes Green in one place, "would be speechless". With this opinion I heartily concur. In my judgment the philosophical world owes Green a great debt of gratitude for having, in the course of a critical investigation which is, unfortunately, often grossly unfair to its opponents and not infrequently descends to pitiful pettifoggery, contributed very effectively to the demonstration of this fact. But what follows? Surely this, that Hume's fundamental inconsistency lay in writing his Treatise; indeed in thinking the first thought of which it is the record. For, as a matter of fact, a being possessing only impressions and ideas as Hume defines these terms is on the intellectual level of the barnyard fowl. When we have said this we have

¹ *Philosophical Review*, vol. xii., p. 277.

—like the man who prayed for the good of every creature—covered the entire field. Now observe the consequences for ethical theory. They are fatal not merely to the existence of altruism, but to that of egoism as well. There is no ego; there is no desire in any proper sense of the term, for desire implies the idea of an end to be obtained and this is impossible without conceptual thought. There is therefore no egoism properly so called. Green himself asserts this in denying Hume the right to use the concept “self-love”. Sensationalism, therefore, does not lead to egoistic hedonism in ethics; it leads to nothing. This is certainly the night in which (to use a hackneyed phrase) all cows are black.

What then is the student of the history of ethics to do with Hume's speculations in psychology and epistemology? The answer is that he is to set them forth insofar as they are the presuppositions upon which Hume's theory of the moral judgment actually depends. Otherwise he is to treat them as irrelevant to the inquiry, precisely as irrelevant as they are to Hume's theory of the balance of trade or his opinion of Charles I. These presuppositions are few, simple, and quite unmistakable. They are a certain view of human motives, including their dynamics as well as their nature; a conception of sympathy and its relation to these motives; a belief in the existence of conceptual thought in the ordinary sense of that term, as it is implied, for instance, in an essay on economics, but with no particular theory of its structure or origin; finally *at one point* a conception of the self related to that stated in Book I. of the *Treatise* as is genus to species. With these materials as data Hume attempts to work out a theory of the moral judgment that is in harmony with all the observable facts of the moral life. Whether he is to succeed will therefore depend solely upon whether the data upon which the argument immediately rests are sound and adequate, and whether his manipulation of them leads to conclusions consonant with the moral experience.

We must agree then, as it seems to me, that the attempt to read a purely egoistic theory of motives into Hume's *Treatise* must be set down as a failure. There is however one important defect or limitation in his doctrine of altruism as presented in this work which must not be passed over in silence. It appears in the following well-known passage. “In general, it may be affirmed, that there is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to ourself.”¹ Whether by love in this sentence is meant the

¹ Bk. iii., pt. ii., sec. i; G. ii., 255; S.-B. 481.

emotion of affection, or, as in the English translation of the New Testament, the desire to serve, is of no importance in interpreting the passage because its intent is clear from the conclusion which is drawn from it. "Public benevolence," or regard to the interests of mankind, cannot be the original motive to justice, because there is no such thing as "public benevolence." This statement appears to mean: there is no permanent desire for the good of another person for whom you do not feel some form of love or esteem. Sympathy works sporadically and, apparently, in the concrete, in the presence, that is, of a particular person or persons whose feelings at the time are above or below the zero line. When this particular situation is reflected in the imagination of the spectator it tends to arouse in him the desire to preserve or perpetuate the pleasure of the person sympathised with, or to remove his suffering. This is unsatisfactory as a complete description of altruism without love. It would not account, for example, for such action as that of the volunteers who faced the danger of serious illness and death, and, some of them, the certainty of a most loathsome and wearing experience, in order to enable Dr. Walter Reed and his colleagues to test their theories of the relation of mosquitoes to the spread of yellow fever.¹

It is likewise a much narrower view than is demanded by the premises of the system. Hume recognises that the idea of our own good as such, apart from any love (of course) and apart from the play of imagination in bringing pictures of our own future before our minds, has a tendency to arouse the desire for its realisation.² The logic of this position and of his general doctrine of the self, and the concrete facts of life which he himself observed and noted, alike urged his mind toward a recognition of the fact that the same principle holds for the idea of the good of others. Cumberland (if Hume ever read Cumberland) might have taught him that egoism and altruism are merely two different directions of the same force, the desire for the good as such, so that what is true of the mechanism of one is true of the other also. More than once Hume appears to be close to this discovery, but he never quite reaches it.

Hume's doctrine of altruism in the *Enquiry* seems to be identical, in most of the fundamentals, with that of the

¹ H. A. Kelly, *Walter Reed and Yellow Fever*, ch. vi.

² "The mind, by an original instinct, tends to unite itself with the good, and to avoid the evil, tho' they be conceiv'd merely in idea, and be consider'd as to exist in any future period of time." Bk. ii., pt. iii., sec. ix., G. ii., 214; S.-B. 438.

Treatise. Like its predecessor it omits that careful analysis of the nature and objects of desire which the student of ethics might wish to have. Wherever it exhibits any difference in treatment, however, it will be found to present the doctrine of the "benevolent principles" more clearly, more fully, and more consistently than does the Treatise. A lengthy argument seeks to prove that altruism is irreducible to egoism. Butler's conception of the psychology of benevolence is explicitly maintained.¹ And in one of the essays the fundamental fallacy of most egoistic theories is exhibited in Butler's manner.² Passing statements in considerable number place it beyond doubt that sympathy is regarded as affecting action through desire. These differences are all improvements. But the greatest and most important change in the treatment of the subject is the complete omission of the statement that there is no such thing as "a love of mankind as such". At one place,³ indeed, there appears to be a repetition of the doctrine that love and sympathy are the sole stimuli of altruism. On the other hand, language is habitually used throughout the essay which is without justification, and, in fact, without meaning except on the supposition that there is such a thing as the desire for the good of our fellowmen, individually and collectively, quite apart from the stimulation exercised by affection and esteem and the sympathetic play of the imagination.

In the light of the preceding exposition we may examine Sidgwick's argument in behalf of the egoistic interpretation of Hume's ethics. It is stated in the following words: "At any rate he recognises—in his later treatise at least—no 'obligation' to virtue except that of the agent's interest or happiness".⁴ This is a reference to the problem of section ix., part ii., formulated as "our interested obligation to [virtue]". In a paper in *MIND*,⁵ I have tried to show that obligation meant for Shaftesbury—as it demonstrably did for Cumberland—merely the sum of the motives arising from a view of the personal rewards and punishments which the agent may expect will come to him as the result of his actions. With Hutcheson another step was taken in the evolution of the term. According to him it may mean either (1) "a determination, without regard to our own interest, to approve actions and to perform them"; or (2) "a motive

¹ Appendix ii.; G. (Green and Grose Edition of the Essays), vol. ii., p. 271; S.-B. (Selby-Bigge, Hume's *Enquiries*, second edition), p. 301.

² Essay xi., *On the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature*, G. i., 155.

³ Appendix ii. G. ii., 268 n.; S.-B. 298 n.

⁴ *History of Ethics*, p. 206.

⁵ *N.S.*, vol. **xxi.**, no. 83, p. 395.

from self-interest, sufficient to determine all those who duly consider it, and pursue their own advantage wisely, to a certain course of action".¹ With Price begins the custom of using the term solely in the first of these two significations.² Hume's reference to *interested* obligation shows unmistakably that he is using it in the second. Be it farther remembered that there is not a single trace to be found anywhere in Hume's writings of the position taken by those redoubtable defenders of the faith, Clarke and Butler (and Sidgwick), expressed in the famous words of Butler: "When we sit down in a cool hour we can neither justify to ourselves this [the pursuit of virtue] or any other pursuit till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or, at least, not contrary to it".

Our presentation of this part of our subject would be incomplete at an important point if we omitted Hume's account of what we may call the dynamics of egoism and altruism. He finds the foundation of these phenomena in desires which are ultimate elements in human nature, the desire for our own good as such, the desire for the good of another or others. The latter, while it varies greatly in strength, exists in some degree in every human being, or, at least, in everyone who has not lost it by a long course of crime.

Given a person's native endowment, whatever it may be, either desire may be strengthened by certain agencies. One of these, as we have seen, is such emotions as love and esteem. Another stimulus of the greatest importance is the concreteness and fulness of the picture of the situation in the mind. This is determined partly by the native power of the person's imagination. It is farther determined by one's experience. "The prospect of any pleasure, with which we are acquainted, affects us more than any other pleasure, which we may own superior, but of whose nature we are *wholly* ignorant. Of the one we can form a particular and determinate idea: the other we conceive under the general notion of pleasure." Similarly, "Any satisfaction, which we lately enjoyed, and of which the memory is fresh and recent, operates on the will with more violence than another of which the traces are decayed and almost obliterated".³ Hume is here thinking

¹ *Inquiry Concerning the Original of our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good*. Fourth Edition, p. 267 f.

² *Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals*. Second Edition, pp. 173, 198 ff.

³ See *Dissertation on the Passions*, sec. vi., par. 9; G. ii., 165. Compare *Enquiry*, sec. v., pt. ii.; G. ii., 216; S.-B. 230.

particularly of stimuli of egoism. But he applies the same principle to altruism in the words: "We enter more readily into sentiments [he is speaking of the sentiments of others] which resemble those we feel every day".¹ It is these facts, as Hume points out in one place or another, that account for the effects upon the will of distance in time and space, of closeness of association in social and business intercourse, of eloquence, of vividness of style in any of its forms, and other similar phenomena.

But this is not the whole story. There is another important factor, namely, habit. We react most easily to those ideas which most frequently stimulate us to action. This is regarded as partly a matter of association,—repetition, within certain limits, increases the "facility" of the associated processes which supply the will with its aims. In addition, the tendency to react to the idea of the situation is itself strengthened by repetition and atrophied through disuse.²

These facts placed in Hume's hands the key to many phenomena of human life. They explain others which his mind grazed without hitting. First in importance among the latter is the fact already referred to. Altruism and egoism are not two distinct desires like the desire for fame and for knowledge, but rather parallel manifestations of the same motive force, the desire for good as such. The psychological mechanism above described further explains—in large part at least—why the egoistic desires are likely to be stronger than the altruistic, why we are commonly more interested in the welfare of our family and our intimate friends than in that of our acquaintances, and in the good of the latter rather than that of total strangers. Finally, they answer the question put by Prof. James in the words: "What self is loved in self-love?"³ The negative answer is: Egoism is not a desire for the good of a pure ego as such, whether a permanent self out of time, a metaphysical soul substance, or anything of the sort. Positively, egoism is a name for a great complex of ideas, varying enormously in range and concreteness, which arouse an extensive group of impulses to action of every conceivable degree of intensity and readiness of response. The idea of the good of self as a whole—that all-embracing end of which the egoistic hedonists and the school

¹ *Enquiry*, sec. v., pt. ii.; G. ii., 210; S.-B. 222.

² *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. iii., sec. v.; G. ii., 201; S.-B. 422. (Compare bk. iii., pt. ii., sec. x., fourth par.; G. ii., 319; S.-B. 556; bk. ii., pt. iii., sec. iv.; G. ii., 198; S.-B. 419.)

³ *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i., p. 317.

of Green talk so much—is on this view a product of a very considerable process of mental evolution, and as a really living force is a comparatively rare phenomenon. The bearing of these conclusions upon the often repeated question: What reason is there for sacrificing the interests of self to those of others, is not remote. We shall consider it immediately.

With Hume's account of the altruistic elements of human nature before us the insistence on the part of many British writers (I do not find it to the same extent among the continental historians of ethics) that Hume was at bottom an egoistic psychological hedonist seems difficult to explain. The most considerable single reason for the prevalence of this interpretation will be found, I think, not in anything Hume has said but rather in the general position taken by most of the British moralists of the last half century. Their theory of human conduct has been at bottom so completely egoistic that the possibility of any other kind of a view has never really penetrated their minds. It is of course a highly refined egoism. The object of the desire which lies at the foundation of the moral life is not pleasure but character or else all-round development of personality. But the *ultima ratio* of self-sacrifice is found in self-gain. This view motivates the question asked in one form or another, again and again: What reason is there for following the altruistic desire? To this the proper reply is: What reason is there for not doing so? The answer expected to this question in its turn is a reference to some egoistic interest, whether it be pleasure, or power, or the possession of a beautiful character, or what not. The assumption that my conduct must be irrational—whatever that may turn out to mean—unless there is something in it for me carries with it the corollary that Hume, as a man of sense, must have had some good of his own up his sleeve all the time; and since, according to him, ultimate good was unquestionably describable in terms of pleasure, he must have been some sort of an egoistic hedonist.

But now there is another way to look at this matter. It is stated by Sidgwick as follows: "Grant that the ego is merely a system of coherent phenomena, . . . as Hume and his followers maintain; why, then, should one part of the series of feelings into which the ego is resolved be concerned with another part of the same series, any more than with any other series?"¹

The implied answer represents a conclusion which Hume was not merely entitled to draw from his general view of the

¹ *The Methods of Ethics*, bk. iv., ch. ii.; seventh edition, p. 419.

self, it is a conclusion which follows directly and inevitably from one of his favourite and best known doctrines. For his famous statement, "Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chooses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it,"¹ while it contains several implications, contains among others this: if value is determined by desire we come finally in our search for a reason in conduct to an ultimate fact, the fact of the fundamental constitution of our desires. To certain profound minds, long fed on a diet of German metaphysics, this may perhaps sound very shallow. Nevertheless it makes it impossible to assert that Hume *must* have taken the road towards egoistic hedonism because, with his start, no other was open.

THE SOURCE OF THE MORAL JUDGMENT.

The preceding discussion prepares the way for an understanding of Hume's theory of the moral judgment. This has already, by implication, been sketched in outline. The source of the moral judgment, according to this view, may be described provisionally² as satisfaction or "delight" in another's good, and dissatisfaction or "uneasiness" in his evil. The simplest and in all respects most satisfactory way for Hume to have conceived the facts would have been to regard the satisfaction and dissatisfaction in question as feelings arising from the attainment or frustration respectively of the desire for the good of those affected. What he actually does in the *Treatise* without exception and in the *Enquiry* probably in most cases is to place their source in sympathy. This for Hume is the power of feeling the reflexion of other person's feelings. Properly speaking it gives us not merely the one set of emotions, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, joy and sorrow, but opens the door to the whole gamut of feelings with which our experience has made us acquainted. In other words to sympathise with the fear of another is properly speaking to fear, to sympathise with his anger is to be angry; with his love, to love; with his pride, to feel proud; with his hunger, to hunger; with his aches, to ache. Hume actually does define sympathy in this way in some places. But in his account of the moral judgment he ignores these forms of sympathy and confines himself to "delight" and "uneasiness"

¹ *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. iii., sec. iii.; G. ii., 195; S.-B. 416.

² This statement will be somewhat modified in the second instalment of this paper.

at the good or ill of others. To have done otherwise would have been to wander off into the byways in which Adam Smith was later to lose himself, byways which Hume, with his deeper insight, knew enough to avoid. The facts of the moral judgment, then, when properly examined, compel this limitation to joy and sorrow. But these same facts spoil the attempt to base the phenomena of moral approbation on sympathy, whether alone or principally. For I may sorrow or rejoice at the ill or good fortune of another though he is experiencing no similar feelings which my imagination can mirror. I may, for example, feel sorrow because of his physical suffering although he himself feels no sorrow but only a throbbing pain. And I may rejoice at that which is likely to be of advantage to an unborn child, or at the removal of a threatening evil of whose possibility the beneficiary does not even dream. As a matter of fact the emotions laid by Hume at the basis of the moral judgment have their ultimate source in desires for good, and sympathy can do no more than under certain circumstances to intensify them.

While this is in form a criticism levelled at a vital part of Hume's theory of the moral judgment, nevertheless the mistake, for such it appears to have been, was not a fatal mistake. For on any theory sympathy and benevolence are very intimately related. The former is the spur of the latter. Therefore, where the first is, the second will be present in some degree, as Hume's own theory of sympathy recognises. One of the facts which makes the distinction of chief importance is that benevolence may arise without sympathy, just as it may arise without love or any other stimulant whatever. This was apparently recognised in the *Enquiry*, though whether the proper conclusions for the theory of the moral judgment were drawn in this essay seems impossible to determine with certainty. In any event the satisfaction and dissatisfaction which Hume saw at the foundation of the moral judgment are intimately related in their origin with both sympathy and benevolence; and any mistake in the conception of the relationship of the judgment to the former or latter will not carry with it really serious consequences for other parts of the system.

THE MEANING OF RIGHT.

To this view of the source of moral distinctions there is an obvious objection. It is stated by Hume as follows: "As this sympathy is very variable, it may be thought, that our sentiments of morals must admit of all the same variations.

We sympathise more with persons contiguous to us than with persons remote from us: with our acquaintance than with strangers: with our countrymen, than with foreigners. But notwithstanding this variation of our sympathy, we give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England. They appear equally virtuous, and recommend themselves equally to the esteem of a judicious spectator. The sympathy varies without a variation in our esteem. Our esteem, therefore, proceeds not from sympathy."¹

The reply takes the form of a farther definition or limitation of the meaning of right. The predicate *right* does not cover everything that happens to appeal to the passing sympathy of the moment; nor does it fail to include forms of good that may happen to leave our feelings cold. The play of sympathy (and we may add, of altruism) is affected, as Hume has shown in various places, by our relationships to the persons concerned, our distance from them in time and space, the nature and limitations of our own past experience, the efficiency of the working of the imagination, familiarity, and the pre-occupations or humours of the hour. When we call an action right we suppose ourselves to have abstracted from these conditions, that is to say from all the accidental relationships of the action in question to self, whatever their nature. The moral judgment is the judgment of the impartial spectator.

The impartial spectator looks at the situation *as a whole*, for to ignore any part would be equivalent to an arbitrary turning of the back upon one set of interests or one side of the case.² He regards equal interests as of equal value whether they are past or future, near or distant, whether those of his enemy, his child, or himself.³ In other words the moral judgment claims to represent a judgment based upon equal concern for equal interests; a concern for *bona* proportionate to their "real and intrinsic value".⁴

In the section of the *Treatise* above quoted (bk. iii., pt. iii., sec. i.) the moral judgment (as just defined) and the vocabulary to which it gives rise is represented as a device whereby we find a common means of communication with others; just as we more or less arbitrarily fix upon one visual size or shape as the "real" one, and thereafter use this as a standard of reference. This point of view reappears in the

¹ *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. iii., sec. i.; G. ii., 340; S.-B. 580.

² *Enquiry*, Appendix i., under ii.; G. ii., 262; S.-B. 290.

³ *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. ii., sec. ii.; G. ii., 261-2; S.-B. 488-9; bk. ii., pt. iii., sec. i.; G. ii., 341-2; S.-B. 582-3.

⁴ *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. ii., sec. vii.; G. ii., 300; S.-B. 534.

Enquiry.¹ But the Enquiry also presents a far more adequate conception. "The distinction between these species of sentiments ['humanity' and egoism] being so great and evident, language must soon be moulded upon it, and must invent a peculiar set of terms, in order to express those universal sentiments of censure or approbation, which arise from humanity, or from views of general usefulness and its contrary."² In other words there being in fact two attitudes toward human conduct, the personal and the impersonal, the latter as well as the former will create forms for expressing itself in language.

From this account of the meaning of right, certain conclusions of the first importance follow directly and inevitably. As Hume points out again and again, impartiality is often a difficult position to attain. Affection creates preferences, and the imagination tends like a searchlight to light up one side of a situation and leave the rest of the field in just so much deeper darkness. Now, when we call conduct right we believe we have emancipated ourselves from the effects of this play of chance forces, and that we have reached real impartiality. As a matter of fact we may have failed to do so. It follows that in such a case the judgment which gives itself out as a moral judgment is not really what it claims or supposes itself to be. It is what in everyday life we call an incorrect moral judgment. Or since claims which cannot be substantiated are called invalid, we may pronounce such a judgment as invalid.³ The distinction accordingly between the valid and the invalid moral judgment is inseparably bound up with the fundamental features of Hume's ethical system.

It is true that this position appears to have been denied categorically in one or two striking passages. They have often been quoted by his rationalistic critics who are trying to brand him as a subjectivist. "The distinction of moral good and evil," he writes, "is founded on the pleasure or pain, which results from the view of any sentiment, or character; and, as that pleasure or pain cannot be unknown to the person who feels it, it follows, that there is just so much vice or virtue in any character, as everyone places in it, and that 'tis impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken."⁴

¹ Sec. v., pt. ii.; G. ii., 214 f.; S.-B. 227 f.

² Sec. ix., pt. i.; G. 248 ff.; S.-B. 271 ff.; Cf. *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. i., sec. ii.; G. ii., 248; S.-B. 472.

³ *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. ii., sec. ii.; G. ii., 262; S.-B. 489.

⁴ *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. ii., sec. viii.; G. ii., 311; S.-B. 546-547. Cf. pt. i., sec. ii.; G. ii., 247; S.-B. 471.

An examination of the context in which this statement appears will show that Hume did not intend it to represent his last word on the subject. What is far more important, however, it contradicts not merely a stray counter-statement or two, but the very foundations of the entire system. At the worst, then, Hume has been guilty in these passages of an inadvertence, for the joy and comfort of his enemies. It may be remarked, furthermore, that no similar passages can be found in the length and breadth of the *Enquiry*, a work which by its author's explicit and repeated declaration stands as the sole authoritative presentation of his position wherever there is any difference between his earlier and later formulations.

(To be continued.)

IV.—DISCUSSION.

PLATO'S 'MISCONCEPTION' OF MORALITY.

MIND No. 112 contains an article by Mr. Leon, in which is disclosed a defect in Plato's *Republic*, which has hitherto escaped the detection alike of his critics and of his admirers. The discovery is not only novel, but also leads to the somewhat startling and paradoxical conclusion that Plato was really a Nietzschean. To some of his readers Mr. Leon's argument has probably appeared to be based on insufficient grounds. Indeed the discovery of Plato's misconception of morality seems to issue from Mr. Leon's misconception of Plato. His views, at any rate, can hardly be accepted until they have been subjected to critical examination.

It will be in the interests of clearness to preface such examination with a brief résumé of Mr. Leon's main contentions. There is, he says, throughout the ethical part of the *Republic*, present, latently and implicitly at least, a fundamental misconception of the nature of morality: though by a sort of double language the 'more common sense and correct view' runs alongside of it. This misconception is said to consist of the 'heathen view of morality' as presented in the self-realisation moralists. This view of morality is assumed without further ado to be 'entirely false'. 'A man may have all his faculties developed and yet be a thorough blackguard.' Mr. Leon then refuses to speak of a moral faculty, because 'morality or character pervades the whole man and all his pursuits'. This is a manner of speaking which is hardly distinguishable from the self-realisation view: and what makes it stranger still is that the next moment he is taking Plato to task for having failed to distinguish the practical reason, *φρόνησις*, in other words the moral faculty, from the theoretic intellect, *σοφία*. In describing Plato's tripartite analysis of the soul, he says that *τὸ λογιστικόν* is (a) that *ὃ μανθάνει ἄνθρωπος* and (b) the 'moral conscience'. Each of these three elements performs a double function, being present to a certain extent in every human being, while as each predominates it forms a special type of character. In this second function Mr. Leon, who, it will be noticed, persists in making *τὸ λογιστικόν* mean *either* (a) *or* (b), urges that *τὸ λογιστικόν* means conscienceless intellect: for, he says, moral reason cannot be the source of special interests. It is on this ground that Plato is accused of holding the 'heathen' view of morality. In the definition of justice, as the state in which each part of the soul *τὸ ἐαυτοῦ πράττει, τὸ λογιστικόν*, it is urged,

cannot mean the practical reason which 'can never be deposed'. 'It is plain' that Plato 'is thinking of the parts of the soul as the sources of different tastes and interests.' 'Plato must be interpreted as telling us that morality consists in a harmony' between the various interests, those of theoretic intellect being given pre-eminence. This view of morality, he says, becomes even more prominent in Bks. viii. and ix., where '... his tendency is to look upon deterioration of character as a gradual declension from philosophic occupation to sensual licentiousness'. Again, the discussion of pleasure in Bk. ix. is said to show (1) that the moral life is identified with that of the scholar, though (2) the sense of τὸ λογιστικόν as φρόνησις reappears when we are told that other pleasures are best when pursued under the guidance of τὸ λογιστικόν, and (3) that the bad life is the sensual life. Against Plato's supposed view it is urged (1) that 'the difference between the just and the unjust life cannot consist in the difference of non-moral values,' and (2) that as causes of wickedness the desires of all the elements of the soul are on the same level. 'All this,' he concludes, 'is due to Plato's failure to make the distinction which Aristotle made between φρόνησις and σοφία. Hence it is that for Plato, apparently, the moral question is: "Shall I be intellectual, ambitious, or a miser?"'

It is certainly a paradox to accuse Plato, the founder of the Utopian state, the first intellectual advocate of communism, whose aim was to form the happy state 'not by selecting a few of its members and making them happy, but by making the whole so,' of anticipating Nietzsche, whose dominating superman was to crush the herd beneath his feet, and live for himself alone with a total disregard for social duty. Plato is a philosopher whose work glistens with so many facets that especial care is needed if any selection of statements is to be made and put forward as the central doctrine. Mr. Leon is himself alive to the danger of misrepresentation: 'It is,' he says, 'fair to say that it would be a misrepresentation of the *Republic* if we did not remember that this error (i.e. Plato's alleged conception of morals as self-development) was only one side of the whole contention of the *Republic*'. What Mr. Leon does not consider is that a conception which might by itself be erroneous, a view of morality which in isolation might be inadequate, is justified and transformed by being used as subservient to a greater conception. Plato considered a full self-development to be a necessary and essential feature in the attainment of morality in its highest sense: he was convinced that in order to reach the highest perfection of moral goodness, in the Christian sense, it was necessary to combine it with what Mr. Leon is pleased to call 'the Oxford use of the term'. To construe Plato as holding up self-realisation as an end in itself and the sum total of morality is a misrepresentation of the whole, and not only of one side, of the *Republic*.

Mr. Leon's article starts with two very considerable assumptions.

In the first place (1) he begs the question that the morality of the well-meaning fool is higher than the morality of self-realisation, although he later makes the inconsequent admission that 'there is much to be said for the view that an all-round development of the faculties is essential for the perfect man'. There is: and until such a development has been shown to be unessential, Mr. Leon should not have assumed (2) that the conception of morality as self-development and his own conception (whatever that may be—it is nowhere made explicit) are mutually exclusive alternatives. That they are thus exclusive is never stated in so many words: but the whole argument rests upon the assumption. The claim of self-realisation to be the sum total of Ethics being rebutted, it is assumed that self-development is ethically irrelevant, and any attempt to treat it as relevant is regarded as an attempt to reinstate it as the sole aim and object of morality. Such an assumption as this leads to a complete misunderstanding of the Platonic conception of *ἀρετή* and *τὸ ἀγαθόν*, a conception which did not only not regard self-realisation and the performance of social function (or, in modern phraseology, 'duty') as mutually repugnant, but even as inseparable. All-round efficiency and harmony of character, together with what we now call moral goodness, were as yet undifferentiated parts of 'excellence'. The excellence of the individual as an individual was not considered separable from his excellence as a member of society. That a man might be good but inefficient or again efficient but evil were possibilities as yet included in the general antithesis of good and bad. To-day we have distinguished the antithesis of good and inefficient from the antithesis of good and evil, and have thereby rendered the word 'good' ambiguous. But the word was formerly all-embracing rather than ambiguous, and to call it ambiguous is an anachronism; for you cannot have an ambiguity without the possibility of various meanings. In Plato's day the various meanings of 'good' had not been distinguished: so that in using the word 'good' he could not have had in his mind any alternative meanings, and so was not ambiguous. When Plato uses the word *ἀρετή* he does not mean either 'moral' virtue or fullness of self-development or again sometimes one and sometimes the other: he means undifferentiated excellence of which every particular kind of excellence is an inseparable part. Is there not much to be said for such a wide conception of human goodness? Should not the ideal of morals be a perfect human being in a perfect society? Could it be said that to such perfection any form of excellence is irrelevant? A man who has 'all his faculties developed and yet is a thorough blackguard' may be a dangerous criminal: yet the social consequences of his actions may be less disastrous than of those of the well-meaning fool who ruins everything by his ineptitude. The qualities of intellect are not irrelevant to any tenable view of morality; and we should only be justified in quarrelling with Plato if he had made pure intellect the *summum bonum* regardless of the attitude of his sage towards his social duty.

Mr. Leon's treatment of τὸ λογιστικόν is very near akin to his treatment of ἀρετή. Just as he takes ἀρετή to mean *either* completeness of self-development *or* 'moral' goodness so he takes τὸ λογιστικόν, wherever it appears, as meaning *either* theoretic intellect *or* practical reason. Actually, however, τὸ λογιστικόν is the ground of *both* σοφία and φρόνησις. Had the distinction between theoretic and practical wisdom been recognised by Plato, he would not have maintained his contention that the best ruler must be a true philosopher. Actually Plato considered that true philosophy involved both the highest possible development of the theoretic intellect and the greatest possible quickening of the moral nature. The philosophic nature implies not only intellectual power but an ardent love of truth, together with such qualities as temperance, sincerity, absence of covetousness and meanness, courage, modesty, sociability and gentleness (485 b, *seq.*). It may of course be objected that philosophy does not have the moral effect which Plato was trying to vindicate for it, and that it does not lead the soul to a passionate love of true moral values. No one was more alive to this defect of current philosophy than Plato himself, who delivers a pungent attack on popular philosophers, not on the ground that they were stupid, as he would have done had he held the views attributed to him, but because they were, morally speaking, a corrupting influence. Plato's conception of true philosophy is intensely ethical. The supreme object of philosophic contemplation is the Idea of Good or concept of end, the supreme principle on which all values whether moral or 'non-moral,' depend, and which showed the entire rationality of the system of Ethics which Plato regarded as ideal. Plato and Aristotle alike interpreted the universe teleologically, and held that the most hopeful solution for the problem of Ethics lay in a search for the true end. To see this true end is the aim of the dialectical education of the guardians. Wisdom is not an end in itself. Knowledge is only good when and because it is of the good. With these views, how could Plato subdivide the highest principle in the soul, or admit the separability of σοφία and φρόνησις? The surprising thing is that Mr. Leon should demand it after his entirely justifiable protests that 'it does not seem right to speak of a moral faculty as something co-ordinate and competing with the rest and like them capable of being the source of special interests. Morality or character pervades the whole man and all his pursuits, and transfuses and gives them value.' This is just what Plato urges when he speaks of spirit and desire showing their truest usefulness and winning their truest pleasure when they follow the guidance of reason (586 b).

Again, in analysing the definition of justice, Mr. Leon makes the same error of insisting that τὸ λογιστικόν must be *either* practical reason *or* theoretic intellect. He argues (1) that the definition of δικαιοσύνη cannot mean the supremacy of practical reason, because practical reason 'regulates' the conduct of every man good and bad, and can never be 'deposed'. The sense of 'regulates,' how-

ever, is not the same as that in which Plato used 'rule'. In Plato's sense reason is deposed whenever the *τέλος* aimed at is the *τέλος* of *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*—bodily indulgence. The practical reason of course still regulates conduct, but does so as the slave of passion. For Greek thought, good morality means aiming at the right end, and this is why *τὸ λογιστικόν*, which has a vision of and a love for the true good, must rule in the moral man: *τὸ λογιστικόν* is the governor of the soul because it has the true standard of value. This argument then rests on an ambiguity in the use of the word 'regulate'. But even had it been sound, it does not follow (2) that *δικαιοσύνη* means the supremacy of theoretic intellect alone. *τὸ λογιστικόν* never means this: it means reason, which sees what is noble and just and good, and which must for this reason be the guiding element in the good man. The argument is summed up by saying that, according to Plato, 'morality consists in a harmony or balance between sensuous enjoyment, the pleasures of ambition and an active life, and those of study or theorising'. It is not observed that this is a description, not of Plato's ideal, but of the 'democratic man,' who is placed lowest but one in the scale, and who says that all his desires are equally to be honoured, and consequently figures now as the *bon vivant*, now as the athlete, or again is at one time an idle trifter, at another a serious student (561 c). This kind of balance is not what Plato meant. The only true harmony for him is when reason sees the true *τέλος*, and all the elements of the soul find their truest pleasure in seeking it in conformity with the true aim.

The discussion on pleasure is next summarised, and the conclusion drawn that Plato identifies the moral life with that of the scholar, and the immoral with that of sensuous enjoyment. To this Mr. Leon rejoins (a) that the content of the unjust life may be highly intellectual pursuits, and (b) that as causes of wickedness the desires of all the elements of the soul are on the same level. But (a) Plato would not have denied that the intellectual may be a blackguard. Indeed, there is nothing he fears more than the corruption of the naturally gifted (494 b), or the ruin of the state through the pursuit of philosophy in the wrong spirit (497 e). The philosophy student is to be carefully selected, for dialectic may be a cause of lawlessness, if the irresponsible young are allowed to use it as a plaything, before their moral characters are firmly established (536 c-529 b). If Plato's end had been intellectual development for its own sake, these scruples would not have been present. Only a firm conviction that philosophy was necessary in order to enable the rulers to see the true *τέλος* and the eternal meaning of the moral code they were to enforce, could have induced Plato to allow so dangerous an implement into his state. Other pursuits of intellectual appeal, such as drama and certain kinds of music, are ruthlessly banned, and all the intellectual studies are chosen with a view to turning the eye of the soul to the true good. As to the second argument (b) that as causes of wicked-

ness the desires of all the elements of the soul are on the same level, this would hold if the desire of τὸ λογιστικόν were for mere intellectual development: but it is not: it is for truth and beauty and goodness, and for all that is akin to it in the world: it is in fact the nearest analogue in Greek philosophy to the Christian love of God and Humanity; and this can never be a cause of wickedness.

It is then a travesty of the *Republic* to say that 'for Plato the moral question is: "Shall I be intellectual, ambitious, or a miser?"' Mr. Leon reaches the conclusion he draws because he does not realise (1) that ἀρετή does not mean *either* perfect self-development or 'moral' virtue, but *both*, and that these were not conceived by Plato as irreconcilable ideals, but as mutually dependent aspects of human perfection: or (2) that τὸ λογιστικόν does not mean *either* theoretic intellect or practical reason but *both*: and that these were to Plato inseparable when developed aright. For Plato saw that the highest morality is not blind blundering obedience to the dictates of the herd, but conscious striving for a clearly seen vision of divine perfection. Mr. Leon lastly does not see (3) that Plato did not consider that indulgence in theorising was the *summum bonum*. This was the Aristotelian ideal. For Plato philosophy was a necessary means for producing the best rulers for the best state, and subserved the ends of the community. Plato was aiming at the ideal state and not at the superman, and the resemblance between him and Nietzsche is merely superficial.

E. HALE.

V.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology with some attempt to apply them to the Interpretation of National Life and Character. By WILLIAM McDUGALL, F.R.S., late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; Fellow of Corpus Christi College and Wilde Reader of Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1920. Pp. xvi, 300. 21s. net.

1. It is a pleasure in these days to meet with a work, which, like the present, affirms unreservedly at once the reality of the group mind and its value. In the Preface and the Introduction the author expresses his position through quotations from Mr. F. H. Bradley's Essay on "My Station and its Duties," and also from Mr. Ernest Barker where he very closely follows Mr. Bradley, and further where he adopts the account of the group-person¹ as received by Maitland and other jurists. The Preface, too, refers with approval to Miss Follett's *The New State*. Moreover, in a discussion with Mr. Maciver, where he skilfully turns against him that writer's own presentation of the case, he insists on the actuality of the group mind as of the stuff of mind and "surpassing the measure of any individual mind". And he defends its collective reality more especially against objections drawn from the plurality and intersection of groups within it (cf. pp. 11, 14, 80, 180), pointing out how the individual minds reciprocally imply and complement one another, "and together make up the system which consists wholly of them". To complete the initial view of his position, we may mention in anticipation the all-important conclusion arrived at after a discussion of the crowd theory and the more elementary types of group, that in the highly organised group—an army is the primary example considered—the whole is raised above the level of its average member (p. 53)—a fact which Green has noted as tending to appear in the civic community.

2. It will help to discriminate Mr. McDougall's view more precisely, and to lead up to its further features, if some mention is made, at this point, of his declaration of war on the present writer. After reading the citations and discussions above referred to, one is apt to wonder what it is in my particular presentation of

¹Of course Mr. Barker is here partly emphasising the point that the group, as real in itself, is not State-created.

"German 'Idealism'" which especially meets with his censure. It is not the acceptance of the group mind as a real system which is greater than its members who exist at any time, and which thinks and wills and feels and acts. This, in discussion with Mr. Maciver, the author unreservedly accepts and defends. But I think I see what he does object to more particularly in my statement as contrasted, *e.g.*, with Green and Bradley, though in my opinion there is no appreciable opposition. I am glad, of course, that he is able to go with them and with me so far as he does. But his language suggests that he finds in my ideas (a) too much collective consciousness, and (b) too little consciousness of collectivity; with, as a corollary from the former; (c) too lofty a notion of the rights and authority of the State.

To the first of these (a) I do not plead guilty. The collective or super-individual consciousness, in any sense other than that which the author defends against Maciver, I do not accept. So far as I know, it is a mare's nest; I do not know of any philosopher who believes in telepathic or magical unity in normal groups, but I am not acquainted with the views of Schäffle and Espenäs (p. 36). There is, I think, nothing resembling it in Hegel; (b) is the important point, referring to the sense in which the idea of self with the self-regarding sentiment is a *sine qua non* of volition in individuals and in groups. I think more of the substantial system of interests and dispositions; the author thinks rather of the explicit reflective self-consciousness. I must return to this below; (c), the question of rights, I must also recur to later.

3. Thus for the author "it is the extension of the self-regarding sentiment of each member of the group to the group as a whole, that binds the group together and renders it a collective individual capable of collective volition" (p. 56). This is the introductory condition to the study of highly organised groups, after the character of simple crowds has been analysed. It is noticeable that though not organised, nor continuous in existence or tradition, a crowd needs to be constituted by a common interest. A number of people in the street, moving about on their normal affairs, is not a psychological crowd. Yet a psychological crowd, though it has a certain degree of unity, has not a collective mind. For, though a collective mind does not involve a collective consciousness, it does involve an organised system of relations which accounts for the interplay of its mental forces; and a mere crowd has no such system (p. 47). But passing through the preliminary stage of highly organised groups, illustrated by the example of an army, in which we approach a group whose collective volition is at a higher moral level than that of its members taken apart, we come to consider, in Part II. of the book, "the most interesting, most complex and most important kind of group-mind, namely the mind of a nation state" (p. 96).

What is a nation? The answer of Prof. Ramsay Muir, that the essential condition is a belief (compare the "splendid falsehood"

of the Republic) on the nation's part that it is one, and his view that the essence of nationality is a sentiment, does not satisfy Mr. McDougall, for whom the answer to the riddle is as we have seen in the conception of the group mind. It would be hyper-critical perhaps to object to his inserting (p. 100) the phrase "national mind and character" in the definition of a nation, as he proposes to examine these terms at length, and he has in fact told us, in the words cited at the beginning of this paragraph, what they are going to mean. "The group mind of a nation is an organised system of mental or psychological forces" he repeats on page 101. "A system of forces" I take it, very much because the influence of the past bulks so largely in it; the national character is not the national type, like a Galton photograph (Fouillée quoted, p. 107), but "that particular combination of mental forces of which the national life is the external manifestation". I find this a little in need of explanation. The traditions, I suppose, can only operate through the living minds. The definition must mean, the individual minds in full energy and co-operation, armed with all their resources. We need not enter upon the elaborate and interesting discussion, in the four following chapters (vii.-x.) of the basal conditions necessary to a national mind—a certain racial homogeneity though not "purity"; good means of communication; the influence of great men, war and national responsibility; but we may now return to the direct problem, what it is that makes a collective will. And here I must for a moment recur to the difference between Mr. McDougall and myself.

4. He finds in my interpretation of Rousseau's general will (155, cf. above 53—he refers to nothing of Rousseau but the same two sentences twice over) the *laissez faire* doctrine—pursue your private ends honestly, and the welfare of the State somehow results. I will go at once to the best explanation I can give of this notion of his, which seems to me wholly without foundation either in Rousseau's views or mine, and really not to justify me in occupying the reader with a detailed refutation of it by chapter and verse.¹

It is true however that I attribute, as I said above, in a way, less consciousness of collectivity than he does to the group mind as a collective will. The problem which fascinates and will always fascinate me is such as this. Law is sustained by will. If will fails, law withers. By what analysis, by what tracing of social and ethical roots, can we justify such a statement? The nation wants houses to be built, Poland to be reasonably supported, but not rashly and to the destruction of East Europe. I need not go on with examples. How, where, in what responses of minds, do we find guarantees that these things or others in their place are so?

¹ Mr. McDougall's statement, on page 171, that Rousseau did not draw the distinction between the good of all and the good of the whole, seems to me quite incompatible with Rousseau's text, and the author's examples of the distinction are essentially on the same lines as that which I have given (*Theory of State*, p. 105 ff.).

Or must we say that we cannot at all tell, and nothing is collective will but, perhaps, a loudly patriotic war programme backed by a plebiscite? For my part, I should say that if you confine it to that, the interest and importance of the problem drop dead. It is the case then, that I regard the self, identification with which makes the collective will, rather as the substantive predominant and coherent system of interests and values, than as a special sentiment, originally egoistic, and expanded to become again a special sentiment referring to the group as a whole; no longer indeed egoistic, but an egoism expanded into altruism and bearing traces of its origin. This antiquated opposition of egoism to altruism, of the self-regarding sentiment as such to a feeling concerned with other objects wider than the individual self, is the framework in which Mr. McDougall's collective will slides beyond our native egoistic attitude (pp. 54, 79, 84, 263). And so with patriotism. There are two types of patriotism which are divergent in character. One is the daily simple spirit of communal labour, and duty; the other is the spirit of romantic and occasional glorification of the group, and reflective self-sacrifice on its behalf. Hegel has warned us of the difference and I think the warning is wise. I am speaking, of course, only of tendencies, and, on the whole, I quite think that Mr. McDougall's cases may be genuine, *i.e.*, you have formally a collective will when you will in the full light of the national consciousness and form the volition through the traditional collective institutions. But I think if you stop there you miss both the interest of the problem and the solid reality of the fact, and you run near to the more showy and less genuine patriotism, which is also morally the less trustworthy as not being identified with the sovereign human values which are not diminished by sharing.¹

5. In the two closing chapters of Part II. (whose subject in general is the National Mind and Character) we find further emphasis on the importance of the self-conscious idea of the nation as a force in national life. It is a valuable recognition that "the nation, as an object of sentiment, includes all smaller groups within it" (p. 180), and also that more widely inclusive group sentiments "can only be realised by a further extension of true patriotism" (p. 181). And attention is rightly drawn to the power of ideas generally upon national life, when they become widely entertained and the objects of collective emotion. Such are the ideas of liberty, equality, progress, and human solidarity, which, more than any other, are fashioning the future of the world (p. 185).

Now, in connexion with this subject of the collective adoption

¹ Mr. McDougall hardly gives me credit for my continued efforts to elucidate the connexion of patriotism and the higher collective will. See Introduction to *Theory of State and reff.*, p. lxii. And I do not accept his interpretation of my use and Mr. Bradley's of the doctrine of ideomotor action (*Social Psychology*, additional chapter, *cf.* this book, p. 164). He should at least have noted Mr. Bradley's definite repudiation of the doctrine in *MIND*, xiii, p. 19.

and development of ideas, the author insists on something which in general is acceptable but which may readily be given a dangerous implication. This is the general tendency to freedom and a voluntary character in the commonwealth which is highly developed under the influence of collective ideas, and more particularly the question of correlative rights as between the individual and the community. There is no question that a civilised and reasonable commonwealth presents an aspect of convention, contract, determinate agreement. The whole conception of law involves intention and loyalty. Thus the author is led to revive Fouillée's suggestion of the "contractual organism" (p. 175), which rightly affirms as an ideal what as a historical doctrine (the social contract) was false. What we further need, however, is to be clear whether the contract is the basis of the community, or the community the basis of the contract; and the author, at a later point, commits himself rather seriously in the former direction, as here, I think, he contradicts himself on the subject (pp. 175-176). His fluctuation about the wicked idealist philosopher, as between 156-157 and this place, is comic. I must quote the later passage, "His position [*i.e.*, the citizen's to-day] is one of extreme liberty as compared with that of any member of the ancient nations. He has definite rights as against the State. The State claims only a minimum of rights over him, the right to prevent him interfering with the rights of his fellow-citizens, the right to make him pay for his share of the privileges conveyed by its activities. And these rights it claims in virtue of contract between each citizen and all the rest. For each citizen is free to throw off his allegiance to the State and to leave it at will, and his continuance as a citizen of the State implies his acceptance of the contract" (p. 287).

First, it rushes of course upon all our minds as we read this passage that the contrast drawn seems upside-down, when the argument of Socrates to Crito rings in our ears (Plato's *Crito*, 51 D). "We, the laws of Athens, tell every man, when he has arrived at years of discretion, if he does not like us, he may take his property and depart whither he pleases," whereas in the modern world, is there a process by which, as such, a man can divest himself of his allegiance? He may adopt another allegiance, and in some cases, I believe, this annuls his previous allegiance, and in some does not. But the author's sentence is inaccurate, I think, in fact; and in spirit is more inaccurate still. For certainly a man cannot rapidly or readily rid himself of his allegiance just when its obligations come upon him.

And as to the general limitation of rights approved in the passage, would the author really maintain it to-day? The substance of his book was written down before the war (p. viii.), and I agree that the war has not revolutionised all our ideas. But I think it has refreshed our view of some things; and the truth that contract is based on community rather than community on contract, seems to be one of them. Progress is not, as used to be said, "from status to contract,"

but rather "from contract to community". The author might have learned something from the chapter with this title in "The New State". Contract is being standardised on the basis which relations, inherent in the community, demand, as Durkheim long ago pointed out. The individual's will is presupposed to be communally determined. That is no reason against the ideal of voluntary service. But it is a reason against the affirmation of a claim to withdraw from service or modify it at the individual's will and pleasure. The individual is really not constituted till his will is socialised. A Scottish professor is compelled by Act of Parliament to join the Scottish Widows' Fund. It is assumed that his will will recognise the communal relation involved. But he chooses his own rate of contribution, and so makes his own contract.

6. Part III. seems to me the most instructive portion of the book. It discusses the influence of race and of other factors on the development of national mind and character, beginning with the formation of race itself. The main suggestions are ; that civilisation does not progress by natural selection in the ordinary sense ; that races are formed by such selection in a period prior to civilisation ; that a very considerable element in the formation of race is the influence of occupations—the account of the Le Play school's work is extraordinarily interesting, and parallel to suggestions to be found in that despised volume, Hegel's *Philosophy of History* ; that in the historic or civilised period, in the absence of natural selection, the effect of social selection is mostly negative ; that progress is rare and difficult to account for, and only becomes a normal feature in the later ages of Western civilisation, and is mainly due in this maturity of nations to the spread of a social organisation based upon the principle "from status to contract," and the abolition of the caste system—the statement here is lax, I think—leading to that form of the struggle for existence which operates not on individuals but on ideas and institutions, in a constantly widening area of knowledge and imaginative sympathy. Ultimately, the national self-consciousness, enriched by such a process, will become the guiding factor of the national will, and may even react, by better methods of social selection, on the influences now alleged to be making for race deterioration.

All this seems plausible, and I trust that the basis of hope which it contains is sound. I will add one or two remarks, not to controvert it, but rather as an aid to removing a certain looseness of texture which I seem to note in the argument.

It is quite well to be warned against assuming that progress is universal, and to be reminded that it may depend on special conditions, perhaps even on rare ones. Still I am not satisfied that here we have the facts precisely and comprehensively given. I shrink from the division of capacities and results into moral and intellectual (pp. 206, 273). It seems to me a bad principle of division, and one that operates as an imperfect disjunction, excluding dozens of things which ought to be considered. There is the

advance in æsthetic achievement in Egypt, say, or in China or Japan. I do not know what stopped it or when; but I suppose it was one of the great achievements of the world. There was the rapid growth of science and of moral ideas—here, surely, together—under the sway of the Greek mind, and the advance of the Hellenistic age which led up to Christianity. Was it moral or intellectual progress when a man first said “Homo Sum”—and the rest? Rome progressed in nothing but law; but that is a good deal is it not? The peoples of the Roman name invented nothing, we hear. Yet some say they invented modern architecture, and that the unprogressive period from 500 to 1500 A.D. was “the building-age of the world”. Christianity and religion generally are a conservative force, and their prevalence makes society hide-bound. Yet an important thinker of to-day writes: “Christianity discovers the reality which *is* not, but creates itself—a reality which belongs to us to construct, etc.”¹ *i.e.*, is the very ferment of progress. Things grew slowly from Christ’s coming to the Reformation. But I suppose there was a good deal doing all the time, including some of the very greatest of Greek philosophy, a high-water mark of poetry, and the conversion of the Teutonic nations.

All this is what every one knows; but it does a little raise the question (and any one who is much of a student could multiply the facts a hundred times) whether progress may not be the rule of the human mind, though retrogression, destruction, reaction perpetually produce a superficial appearance of stagnation. In saying this, I do not throw doubt on the need of certain simple *sine quibus non*, in whose absence human life does hardly get a start. But I doubt whether the facts justify the denial of progress as an inherent character of humanity as such.

I insist on the case of China, to which, as we know to-day, the debt of the human mind is incalculable. Yet the author still takes it as the type of stagnation and futility. It is not merely that he thinks its progress arrested. As I gather, he does not realise that it ever made any advance of supreme value.

Points like these prepare us for the possibility that the author’s fundamental paradox in these later pages, though it calls attention to important facts, is presented with a distorted perspective.

The paradox is that of the fundamental opposition between our real evolutionary achievement and the position which we *prima facie* have attained. Since the beginnings of civilisation, in spite of our immense apparent progress, we have been wasting the first-rate human stock which the race-making period of severe natural selection bequeathed to us. There has been no progress of the individual mind parallel to the development of civilisation and of nations (p. 203). Our progress has not been, in a phrase frequently repeated, a progress in our nature, in our innate qualities. It has often been arrested by the local attrition of the best

¹ Gentile, *Spirito*, 231.

stocks through negative selection, and it is threatened as a whole by similar influences operating in modern society.

Some difficulties present themselves to my mind. The absolute distinction between individual minds and the tradition of knowledge and conduct which they progress by assimilating and extending, is not easy to understand. On page 210 we are told, "Now this traditional stock of knowledge and morality has been very slowly accumulated, bit by bit; and every bit, every least new addition to it, has been a difficult acquisition, due in the first instance to some spontaneous variation of some individual's mental structure from the ancestral type of mental structure". And on page 212 "the greater and more valuable the stock of traditional knowledge and morality becomes, the more does fitness to survive consist in the capacity to assimilate this knowledge and to conform to these higher moral precepts" and the less in quickness of eye and ear and the like. Here both the growth and the assimilation of the tradition seem to depend on inheritable variations. *On this basis*, can the dissociation of the mind's nature from the progress of the tradition be maintained? Not that I am urging either the continued operation of natural selection, or the claims of use-inheritance. I believe indeed that selection through maintenance of a social standard is a safe method on any hypothesis;¹ but my present question is narrower; it is merely what the author wishes us to understand about the mind's relation to the tradition. I do not quite see how on his own ground he maintains the distinction.²

My own tentative suggestion would not depend on convicting the author of self-contradiction in denying the continuance of natural selection. It would be quite compatible with the doctrine that natural selection has practically ceased during historical times. It would rather call attention to the point which I think Dr. Archdall Reid has well insisted on, that innate qualities are after all (I use my own language) hypothetical on the environment. A man cannot grow up without food and relevant exercise, however fine a germ plasm he may inherit. Now this suggests that what we have, we really have; it is all of it germ plasm plus conditions. How far germinal variations help or hinder we could only know if we knew the limits of variation possible within a Mendelian unit, and more especially, the relation of Mendelian units to the general gift or capacity of thought. For this is what a truer and more appreciative account of progress seems to me to suggest. You have progress wherever you have thought, except where special conditions relatively arrest it. The variation or variations which give us thought, are the essence of humanity. The passage cited above from page 210, which is inconsistent with this idea, looks to

¹ Cf. *Selection by Maintenance of a Social Standard in Social International Ideas*. Macmillan, 1917.

² Cf. such phrases as "the innate moral disposition" (p. 266) most superficially defined, and "our seeming intellectual superiority" (p. 263).

me, as I said, inconsistent with the author's own distinction between the mind and the tradition. If we could see history and human life microscopically—and we can so see, very much more than the author admits—we should see, I suggest, not great plains of stagnation with here and there a stream of progress; but an ocean full of springs and currents, constantly no doubt turned back into eddies which remain in their place; but everywhere relatively pressing upon the elements which oppose them, and often breaking through for a space. In short, so far from believing progress exceptional, I do not believe that thought can possibly stand still; and to distinguish thought fundamentally from conduct seems to me ridiculous. Thus, to return to the group-mind; I see in the future as in the past the two tendencies, the reflective opposition of egoism and altruism and the association of progress with the sentiment which unites them;¹ and what seems to me the more solid advance, by which thought develops, on all sides and in all occasions and opportunities, the great values which do not decrease by sharing, and which alone are the sound criterion of national conduct and human solidarity. I recognise both, but I hold the true root of progress and guide of the will to be in the latter.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics. By R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ.
New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe; London: Kegan Paul,
Trubner & Co. Pp. x, 314.

Mr. HOERNLÉ sets out with very great advantages for the task he has undertaken in this book. Trained at Oxford, he has also had considerable experience in the teaching of philosophy in other universities in Great Britain, and he wrote this book in Harvard after some years of teaching there. He has had quite exceptional opportunities, therefore, for seeing contemporary philosophies in the making, and for understanding, from personal experience, how far a set of philosophical opinions can bear transplanting from one country to another.

The use which Mr. Hoernlé has made of these opportunities is most instructive. In changing skies he has kept his faith, and he remains a very staunch believer in the truth of the philosophical tradition which he finds expressed "at its best" in the works of Dr. Bosanquet. On the other hand, his flexible and assimilative mind has enabled him to incorporate much of the spirit of transatlantic philosophy. His book, then, while

¹ See page 287. The conception of progress here is so superficial that, by a meeting of extremes, it almost joins hands with the vaguest "progress of the species" enthusiasm.

not at all eclectic, has an international smack in it, and this is the more stimulating in view of the fact that British philosophy, in these days, is fully aware of the dangers of insularity, and knows that there is a New World as well as an old Europe. In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that Mr. Hoernlé's survey is restricted to Oxford and the United States. As the reader will shortly see, he has a very intimate and precise acquaintance with all the most important contemporary theories of metaphysics in English-speaking countries.

The various studies in the book deal with highly representative topics, and are carefully chosen with a view to eliciting Mr. Hoernlé's characteristic type of response on the most critical points in his philosophy. Still, they are relatively detached, and the best thing I can do, I think, is to deal with them *seriatim*, indicating their character as well as I can, and making a few running comments.

The prologue tells us that philosophy is the quest of wisdom and of the good life in the spirit of totality, and that it endeavours "to employ all the resources of experience in this task, taking each type of experience at its best, when its lesson is clearest, and learning most from those experiences which in range and organisation emancipate us most from superficial first impressions, and lead us deepest into the heart of reality" (p. 16).

The second chapter deals with the idol of scientific method in philosophy, and maintains that philosophers have too much insight for this species of idolatry (pp. 25 *sqq.*) and too much experience to be satisfied with merely formal argument (pp. 27 *sqq.*). Mr. Russell's theories, it contends, banish values from the world except for the single supreme value of austere contemplation, and its consequence, the renunciation of desire. According to our author (who has taken great pains with his documentary evidence), Russell's choice of this one value is eminently arbitrary, and yet his theory is superior to Dewey's instrumentalism precisely because contemplation really *is* one of the supreme values. Instrumentalism, indeed, ought to become 'dialectic' (pp. 45 *sqq.*). The only comment I shall make on this chapter is that, in some passages at least, our author seems only to pit his own temperamental many-sidedness against what he considers the temperamental one-sidedness of his opponents. I cannot see that he is the less temperamental on this account, but he would reply, I suppose, that his book as a whole justifies him in this particular.

Mr. Hoernlé's third chapter continues the work of his second. "Philosophical choices turn on total impressions" (p. 59), and science is far too "abstract" (pp. 68 *sq.*). The crucial instance of the philosophy of nature compels us either to endeavour after a synthesis of fact and value (value is 'objective') or else to seek to banish values under the specious guise of 'ethical neutrality'. Our author shows quite easily that Mr. Russell's 'ethical neutrality' in *A Free Man's Worship* is not neutral at all.

Thereafter Mr. Hoernlé sets out to "save the appearances," and offers us, in the first instance, a *liaison* chapter which admittedly (p. 82) gathers a great many fragments into its argumentative basket. It deals in part with the meaning of salvation as applied to appearances. We save appearances when we attain a true theory of them, or when we reach "the best total interpretation," where "best" means "the most comprehensive and inclusive, and the most systematic and organising" (p. 93). The chapter, however, deals more directly with its nominal subject (the world of sense) when it argues that sense is nothing without interpretation (pp. 76 *sqq.*), and that the 'reality' of things needs interpretation too. On the latter point, we are told that a thing is "really" what it is "truly". I must confess, however, that the accounts of the meaning of 'reality' and of 'unreality' on page 83 seem to me to treat a large number of distinctly different conceptions as if they were indistinguishable.

The fifth chapter sets out to "save" the physical world, but is also constrained in its turn to ask "How saving is possible?" as well as "What is saved?" "Saving" is possible because transcendence is possible, and although the passage from the 'this' of perception to its 'what' is difficult, the difficulty of transition is much alleviated by the fact that we never perceive a pure 'this' (pp. 131 *sqq.*) since perception is always judgment (p. 99) and even theory (p. 133). This general discussion is illustrated from the concrete case of colour and Mr. Hoernlé (with a great deal of excellent and pertinent criticism in the course of his argument) concludes that colour is a recognisable fact in the physical world (p. 108), that things are coloured under conditions (*e.g.*, illumination) and not otherwise, and that such conditions probably ought to include "the presence of a properly functioning physiological organism" (pp. 114 *sqq.*). It is a little hard to see why the presence of a mind should not also be included, and I confess I cannot see what precisely is saved.

We pass next to Mechanism and Vitalism (in two chapters). Here, our author pleads for the "autonomy of biology" (p. 146), and contends that biology is teleological as well as mechanical, and that teleology is logically dominant in this science (p. 144). Mechanism, in other words, is part but not the whole of an adequate description of life (p. 150). In all this, Mr. Hoernlé, to be sure, is quite logical and scientific. He is not at all "romantic" (pp. 174-186), but his proofs, I think, are dubious. As he points out, very truly, the real problem is "what in nature can and what cannot be explained in terms of the concepts of physics and chemistry" (p. 171). *Because* that is so, surely it is absolutely incumbent upon him to define these concepts with the utmost rigour. This he never does, and consequently I find it quite impossible to decide whether or not teleology, as he describes it, could or could not be a special case of physico-chemical combination. If it were, teleological terms, while legitimate, could scarcely be logically

dominant. To put it otherwise, Mr. Hoernlé denies that teleology includes conscious purpose or anything analogous thereto (p. 159), and defines it instead by the regulation, structure, organisation, and pattern which appears when parts and whole are reciprocally means and end (p. 160). Is it wholly impossible, then, that a "mechanical" collocation could exhibit an orderly pattern of this kind?

The next pair of essays set out to "save" the mind and the self. According to our author, the truth in these matters should be reached by a synthesis of the Cartesian and of the Aristotelian points of view. In a word, he offers us Behaviourism with a dash of *vous*. If this statement appears cryptic and elliptical, I invite the reader to supplement it (if he can) by pondering over the rather meagre summary of his conclusion which Mr. Hoernlé gives us in a couple of somewhat rhetorical pages (pp. 242-243).

Mr. Hoernlé, of course, claims that he is able to displace most of the obstacles which stand in the way of this conclusion, but some may think that his task is less simple than he supposes, and even that, like Nelson in the Baltic, he is most conveniently blind to many pertinent signals. For example, he warns us that anyone who distinguishes act from object, must go on to distinguish the subject from nature, the soul from the body, the 'inner world' from the 'outer world,' that to distinguish in these matters is always to divorce, and that "if the bull be permitted, the best way to get out of these coils is never to get into them" (p. 206). None the less, despite this Gordian procedure upon 'coils' which he has made himself by treating distinct issues as if they were identical, he admits, in controversy, that "the English thinkers' emphasis on acts and awareness seems much more like what we mean, or think we mean, when we talk of being conscious of something" (p. 230). Here then is an appearance. Why should it not be saved? "Because," says our author, "I am in a position to set forth the 'genuine problem of the theory of knowledge'" (p. 206 n.). He knows, indeed, that we always ought to ask, "What does X perceive, remember, etc.?" and never, "What is X's perceiving, remembering, etc." (e.g., p. 245, as I gather the sense of it). Why?

To take another point, it seems to me that Mr. Hoernlé's elaborate discussion concerning a mind's acquaintance with itself and with other minds (pp. 211 *sqq.*) ignores relevant points in the controversy. Believing, as he does, that all knowledge is interpretation, Mr. Hoernlé seems to think that it can never make any conceivable difference whether the interpretation is based upon direct or upon inferential evidence. He seems to think, even (p. 224 n.), that there is a fallacy in believing that we can observe parts of our own minds directly although we never observe any part of anyone else's mind directly, and his reason is simply that any belief in the proposition, "This is mine and no one else's" implies a reference to propositions concerning other people. How could anything be more perverse? If, in fact, we are acquainted with our own ex-

periences and not with other people's, where is the absurdity? And if the facts were so, how would there be a fallacy in *defining* our beliefs about ourselves by contrast with our beliefs concerning other people?

Indeed, I should have thought this part of Mr. Hoernlé's discussion irrelevant, if it did not seem to be connected in his mind with another view which I think equally perverse. As I think, Mr. Hoernlé is desperately and most unreasonably anxious to deny the possibility of any sort of private being in the universe, even if the 'privacy' simply means that something or other is itself and is not some other thing. He maintains, for example, that if my processes of knowing are really parts of me and of nothing else they are therefore "divorced" from everything else, so that they cannot even refer to anything else without a miracle, and cannot be functionally connected with anything else in the way of action, reaction, or interest, without lamentable (and, indeed, insurmountable) difficulty. I cannot see the difficulty. X, let us say, is related to Y. Let us also admit, for the sake of argument, that it would not be X were it not so related. Does it follow, on that account, that it *is* Y when so related, or that it *could* be X if it were Y? I am loth to suppose that Mr. Hoernlé seriously means to say this; and yet, without supposing so, I cannot understand much that he says in his most interesting ninth chapter on "The Self in Self-consciousness". According to him, "the truth is that, concretely, what I am is expressed, for me as well as for others, in my attitudes and behaviour towards the world in which I exist. Every such attitude or behaviour, considered now from the point of view of self-consciousness, is seen to be an act of identifying myself—yes, quite literally my self—with something, or turning away from it". Quite literally my "self," I daresay, but is the *identification* quite literal? Mr. Hoernlé, as I understand him, agrees with James that I literally *am* my wife and child and bank-account, and thence he infers that anyone who denies this, and yet supposes that he can learn a good deal about himself indirectly, by distinguishing between the things that interest him and the things he neglects, "almost against his will becomes a witness to the necessity of the view which his explicit theory compels him to reject" (p. 280). Apparently Mr. Hoernlé can *sub-pana* any witnesses he likes, but his theory is surely most surprising when he holds, as he does, that a self is a sort of noetical body. Is a man's *body* identified with a door when, as we say, he turns towards it? Could it not be "saved" if it were not a door? And what is it, on the theory, when it turns away from the door? I suppose I should divorce my body (in its logical aspect) from the door if I denied literal identity with the door, just as I should certainly annihilate it (in its physical aspect) if the identification happened. Moreover, where is the identification, even in an intellectual aspect, when I deny?

Mr. Hoernlé concludes with an epilogue concerning religion and the philosophy of it. In this, he sees the universe "fired with the

presence of God," or perhaps (I am not sure) is more concerned to tell us what such enthusiasm means to a true philosopher. In any case, he bids us note that the essence of religion is the conviction that the whole of things is worth while. It may be so; but when I read Mr. Hoernlé's repeated excursions into the theory of value I cannot see why anyone should be stirred to his marrow by the value of the universe in any sense of value which Mr. Hoernlé defines with an approach to precision. Often, indeed, he seems to mean by 'value' neither more nor less than order and adaptation. In that case, there is no peculiar problem (although he frequently says so) in the relation of value to fact; and even when he interprets value in a larger (although highly indefinite) sense, it is very hard to believe that any appreciable trickle of human passion could ooze from Mr. Hoernlé's "value," and almost impossible to imagine that human history should foam and eddy with this dispute, and be flecked with the high courage of martyrs, the blessedness of serene communion, the wreck of empires and the awful barrenness of despairing hearts.

I do not know how far these remarks will enable the reader to understand the scope of Mr. Hoernlé's enquiry or the outlines of his answer, and this uncertainty would give me serious concern if the remedy were not in the reader's hands. Let him turn to Mr. Hoernlé. I have said enough, I hope, to show that Mr. Hoernlé has given us a very careful review of a great company of contemporary theories. There is, perhaps, a tinge of unmerited complacency in some of his statements as when (speaking of 'the standpoint of the whole') he tells us that "those who have never tried have no right to say that 'it can't be done,' and those who have tried and failed should not stand in the way of those who want to try again" (p. 247 n.). According to the spirit of this remark, I suspect, a whole troop of us ought to slip quietly away into outer darkness. For the most part, however, Mr. Hoernlé is manifestly anxious to be fair, and these "chips and rough modellings from a metaphysician's workshop," as he modestly calls them in his preface, make one think very highly of the establishment.

JOHN LAIRD.

Relativity, the Special and the General Theory: A Popular Exposition. By ALBERT EINSTEIN. Translated by ROBERT W. LAWSON. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1920. Pp. xiii, 138.

Space, Time, and Gravitation: An Outline of the General Theory of Relativity. By A. S. EDDINGTON. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1920. Pp. vi, 218.

The Concept of Nature: Tarnier lectures delivered in Trinity College, November, 1919. By A. N. WHITEHEAD. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1920. Pp. viii, 202.

It can hardly be expected that any man should produce an adequate review of three such books as these in the compass of a MIND

notice. If the thing could be done at all I am not the proper man to do it. For the first two works named are primarily concerned with the direct significance of the now famous theory for the specialist in physics. Except where the authors occasionally digress into the consideration of the wider issues of the theory of knowledge, it would be, in the proper sense of the word, an impertinence for the mere 'philosopher' to offer criticism. Prof. Whitehead's book, on the other hand, is directly concerned with *Naturphilosophie*, and is, in fact, far the most illuminating work I have read on the whole subject. He is concerned primarily to propound a general theory of the character of the object of knowledge we call Nature and the methods available for the study of it. The 'general theory of relativity' issues indeed in its main outlines from his theory of the character of Nature, but it appears in a form which is not identical with that given to it in Einstein's own exposition, and, so far as I can judge, Dr. Whitehead is fully justified in his contention that his version of the theory is far more consistent and philosophical than any which the physicists *pur sang* have produced. Dr. Whitehead's work would thus offer matter for a very full and searching criticism from the purely philosophical point of view, if I were really competent to undertake the task, as I am not. As it happens, however, the argument of the *Concept of Nature* is very closely parallel with that of the author's remarkable work on *The Principles of Natural Knowledge*, except that the more strictly mathematical part of that volume has nothing to correspond to it in its successor, perhaps a doubtful improvement. The *Principles* has already been carefully discussed in *MIND* by Prof. Broad in a way which leaves me very little to add except to express my admiration and concurrence.

I propose, therefore, to confine myself in the main to making some very general remarks on the significance of the general Theory of Relativity regarded as a contribution to the strictly philosophical problem of the character of that which we call Nature and the relation of the Nature studied in physics to the 'actual world' in which we live out our daily lives. Even apart from the really wonderful unification effected by the theory in physics itself by its reduction of the law of gravitation to the more general laws of motion,—a matter on which Mr. Broad speaks with proper emphasis in the issue of *MIND* for October 1920, there seem to be still more general reasons for holding that the theory in much the form in which Prof. Whitehead expounds it, or something very much like it, must be true. For my own part, I believe it to be true not merely because it has "scored" heavily in the verification of predictions made from it about the deflexion of light from circum-solar stars during eclipse of the sun or about the perihelion of Mercury, nor even merely because eminent physicists regard it as unificatory of the fundamental principles of their science, but because I find in it for the first time a complete solution of certain difficulties, unconnected with any particular

physical doctrine, which had long seemed to me to make it impossible to frame any intelligible theory of space and time themselves. Others besides myself have probably felt these difficulties, and may be glad to have their attention called to what at least promises to afford the solution of them. In the remarks I propose to make I shall necessarily have Dr. Whitehead's work primarily in view. But I may perhaps be allowed to say a word or two first about the other two books.

Prof. Einstein's own work ought to be carefully studied by any reader who wishes to know what exactly the Theory of Relativity asserts, and what, in spite of sensation-mongering journalists, it does not, what special outstanding difficulties in physics first led to its formulation in the more restricted form and how it came to be generalised. The whole story is told directly and simply, and with no introduction of any mathematics or mathematical physics which ought to be beyond the grasp of a fairly intelligent Board School boy. The little work,—excellently translated by Dr. Lawson—is strictly business-like, and keeps wholly to the concrete problems of physics, except for the last half score of pages which discuss “the Universe as a whole”. It is just with these pages that I find my doubts about the distinguished author's treatment of his subject beginning. As is generally known, Einstein allows himself to speculate, as W. K. Clifford had done before him, on the possibility of a “difference of curvature” in different regions of space. The speculation is no integral part of the Theory of Relativity itself, but unfortunately has somehow attracted much more attention from the general public than anything which is really fundamental in Einstein's work, and unless it is clearly pointed out that there is really no logical connexion between the theory and the speculation, the former is likely to have to suffer for the sins of the latter. Hence I regard it as fortunate that Prof. Whitehead has protested emphatically against the confusion of the two. I think he is clearly right in saying that Einstein is standing in the light of his own theory by grafting on it speculations which that theory itself shows to be peculiarly meaningless. If a man believes in “space” as a sort of pre-existing framework into which “matter” is somehow fitted, he may be excused for the suggestion that peculiarities in the behaviour of the “matter” may possibly be due to local irregularities in the structure of the framework. But since it is just the great philosophical merit of the Einstein ideas that when you think them out you are finally rid both of the “framework” and of the “matter,” this kind of speculation can only be excused in Einstein or in Prof. Eddington—who, however, has the merit of making the speculation highly amusing—by the reflexion that it is not after all so unusual for an original genius to miss the full significance of his own suggestions. Some day, I fancy, our descendants will compare Einstein's failure to reap the full fruit of his own ideas with Galileo's curious adherence to the mistaken Aristotelian explanation of comets as

exhalations. I should say that Prof. Whitehead also seems to me right in deprecating what appears to be the view of Einstein and others about the unique significance of light-signals and the velocity of light. It is true, of course, that when we try to imagine a way of intercommunication between denizens of distant worlds trying to compare their respective time-systems, light-signals at once suggest themselves as the best resource. It is also true that experiment shows that the velocity of light *in vacuo* must be a near approximation to the constant velocity c which plays so fundamental a part in the "Lorentz transformation" and consequently in the whole Relativity Theory. But I do not see that this approximation is more than a fact which we have to accept as empirically given, an "accident" in the proper sense of the word. I do not understand, any more than Prof. Whitehead, why this accident should be supposed to confer a unique position on light-waves in the system of Nature. Suppose we had been rational beings without retinas sensitive to light, a supposition which does not seem intrinsically absurd. Is it meant that the mere lack of retinas would have necessarily prevented an Einstein from putting the coping-stone on our system of mathematical physics?

Prof. Eddington's work covers in the main the same ground as Einstein's own exposition, though with more illustrative detail and a freer use of imaginative speculation about the Universe as a whole in the closing chapters. Readers who are not themselves specialists in natural science owe him a special debt of thanks for the very full and clear account of the actual work done by the scientific expeditions sent out to test the theory by observations during the solar eclipse of 29th May, 1919. As a non-expert I may also perhaps be allowed to express my high admiration for the pains which have been taken to make Einstein's mathematical methods,—a subject of which Einstein himself modestly says nothing in his own popular statement—intelligible in their main character. I should strongly recommend every reader of Einstein's own booklet to go on to read Prof. Eddington; the account of the relation of the "general theory" to the classical Newtonian dynamics seems to me to become decidedly easier to follow when it is less severely restricted to the necessary minimum of words than it is by Einstein himself. At the same time, from my own philosophical standpoint, which, so far as the knowledge of Nature is concerned, is pretty much that of Prof. Whitehead, I feel that Prof. Eddington is beset, still more than Einstein, by the ghosts of metaphysical superstitions from which his own theory should have delivered him. For example, I seem all through his book, to be uncomfortably pulled up every now and then by "materialism" in Whitehead's sense of the word, the false doctrine of the object studied in physics as a something "behind the veil" of our sense-experience. I note also the curious persistence with which the mind apprehending the "space-time continuum" of Nature is regularly confused with the brain—a portion of that continuum—

and it puzzles me to discover that Prof. Eddington apparently regards the "Fitzgerald" contraction as something which really happens in Nature. It seems clear to me, on Prof. Eddington's own showing, that the occurrence of the contraction is not a real event. It is an hypothetical event assumed in order to avoid accepting that plurality of space-time systems which the Theory of Relativity asserts. We may try to account for the failure of the Michelson-Morley experiment to detect motion relative to the 'æther' by assuming the 'Fitzgerald' contraction *or* by accepting the (special) Theory of Relativity, but it is surely impossible to combine the two devices.

I proceed now to speak of topics of more general philosophical interest suggested by study of Prof. Whitehead's book. As I say, I cannot attempt anything like a full critical estimate of *The Concept of Nature*. But I am glad to have the opportunity of expressing my unbounded admiration for the work and declaring my deliberate opinion that no writer on philosophy who has not given it patient and attentive study will henceforth have any right to be heard in any question about the general character and fundamental principles of natural science. It is one of the great merits of the work that it puts us from the first in the right position for the understanding of the real problem. Ever since Aristotle in his *Physics* took the fatal step of bringing into natural science from logic the notion of a "subject of predicates" in the new form of a "substrate" of which the known colours and odours and explosions and so forth are "qualities," the way, as I quite agree with Dr. Whitehead, to a true understanding of the purpose of physics has been lost. To regain it, we need to insist with all the emphasis we can that the world with which physical science deals is just the world of the colours, temperatures, pressures, smells, etc., with which we are daily conversant. I have never seen this fundamental thesis (it is, of course, the true and valuable element in Berkeley's miscalled 'idealism'), argued with more power than in Dr. Whitehead's admirable chapter on what he calls the 'Bifurcation of Nature'. He is there concerned more particularly with two forms of the unhappy doctrine of the "substrate," the attempt to distinguish between a 'causal nature' (made up of "primary qualities") and nature as an "effect" (the system of "secondary" qualities), or again, between Nature as it *is* "outside the mind" and as it *appears* to the mind (with alleged "psychical additions"). I presume he would be willing to add, as a third and no less disastrous form of "bifurcation," the theory which reduces physics to the study of mere "symbols" which, as it is said, we have "substituted" for the realities of Nature.

If we once get back to the right point of departure, then, what we have to start with is a mind (which is not itself one of the 'objects' making up Nature, and of which it is no part of Dr. Whitehead's task to give any further account), knowing a complex of events which is Nature. And this complex is four-dimensional.

Every event fills a volume, and lasts through an interval. (There is the further complication, which I need not deal with here, that each of the minds which know Nature knows it through a peculiar relation to *one* of the events which compose nature, its one 'percipient event'. This 'percipient event' plays the same sort of part in the theory which the 'system C' does with Avenarius, and, as with the 'system C,' there is a little difficulty in saying whether it is quite, or only approximately, what we mean in common parlance by the 'nervous system' of a given man.) The Nature known is thus just the four-dimensional complex of events. The one fundamental thing about it is that it "passes"; as Plato puts it, it is a *γυγνόμενον*. Every event is a 'here-now' and different 'here-nows' overlap. It is the fourfold continuum of overlapping events which is our whole "given" datum in the study of Nature, our real world, and all advance in physical knowledge is advance in knowledge of the structure and contents of this continuum. If this is true, it carries us very far. With the disappearance of the "bifurcation" of Nature into a "reality" which does not appear and appearances which are not "real," of course the supposed supra-sensibles "matter" and "æther" disappear for ever, to the great advantage of philosophical thinking, to which both have long been open scandals. For "æther" we have left what Dr. Whitehead calls the "æther of events," the fact that "something is always going on everywhere," and for the distinction between space which is "occupied" and space which is "empty" we have simply a distinction in the character of that which is "going on". We get back, with a richer insight, to the position which Berkeley was trying to occupy, and from which he was only kept by his unfortunate grafting on the denial of Locke's "substrate" of the very dubious affirmation that the *esse* of Nature is *percipi*.

Next, as to space and time themselves. Until very recently one had to choose between two conflicting theories, each of which seemed hopeless. On the one side, it seemed quite clear that whatever we know about position in either has been learned from our awareness of the relations between events filling volumes. It must be out of this knowledge that we have in some way built up the conceptions, with which we work in our pure mathematics, of points and moments and the relations between them, and so far the relational theory of space and time seems manifestly in the right. But there was the fundamental difficulty, discerned long ago by some of us, that the traditional relational theory has not the courage of its own convictions. Every one who wished to be thought scientific talked it, but unfortunately when the relationist went on to talk, *e.g.*, about causality, he regularly assumed that somehow, out of the "here-nows" of our "given" we can build up a single unique space-order and a single unique time-order, the same for observers on any body in the Universe, a timeless space and a spaceless time such that if A and B are simultaneous for an

observer, say, on the earth, they will also be simultaneous for an observer who is revolving round Arcturus, and for a third who is revolving round Sirius. The writer of the present lines well remembers the distress caused to him in 1896 or 1897, when it dawned on him that this assumption was latent in the current language about "the whole state of the physical Universe at the time t ," and that the assumption seemed highly precarious and in all probability false, since it appeared impossible to build up a time-order without reference to the particular space-order of the observer. If one took refuge, on the other hand, in the traditional Newtonian account of space and time, there seemed to be the difficulty that even if there are "absolute" positions, we can never know them, and thus there is the double unintelligibility of understanding how we can ever have come to be aware of their existence, and what use our awareness of that existence has when and if we do come by it. Now the beauty of Prof. Whitehead's "deduction of space and time," as it seems to me, is that it for the first time gives both the relationist and the absolute theories a fully definite meaning, and, in doing so, removes all incompatibility between them. By following out the relationist theory—the theory which makes space and time characters of events themselves, not of a framework in which events are enclosed, it is shown in detail how we can pass from the individual here-now of the pulse of actual experience to a plurality of 'scientific' spaces and times, each time-order definitely correlated with its own appropriate space-order. And when this has been done, it can be further shown how "absolute position" itself gets a real meaning as position in the "timeless space" of a single "time-system". It is not my business nor my intention here to discuss the details of Prof. Whitehead's subtle deduction. But I do wish to urge it as a strong argument in favour of a space-time theory like his, of which the main principles of the general Theory of Relativity form an integral part, that it succeeds in making the 'Leibnitzian' and 'Newtonian' theories compatible in the very act of giving each of them a fully definite meaning.

I will make but one or two more very general observations. As I have said, *The Concept of Nature* is a great contribution to *Naturphilosophie*, far the finest contribution, in my own judgement, yet made by any man. But *Naturphilosophie* is not the whole of philosophy and there are therefore some important questions suggested by Prof. Whitehead which he properly does not regard it as his business to solve. The most important of them all to my own mind is this. "Passage," as he says, is *the* fundamental fact about Nature. Also, as he says, the mind itself, in some sense, exhibits "passage". It is clear, of course, that there must be some important difference between the way in which Nature exhibits passage and the way in which the mind exhibits it, since the mind is itself no part of the fourfold continuum. The relation of mind to "passage" could not have been discussed with relevance in a course of lectures on *The Concept of Nature*, but the matter is one

of immense importance and requires to be examined very thoroughly before Prof. Whitehead's *Naturphilosophie* finally takes its place in a completed philosophy of all that is. On one or two points I am not sure that I have quite apprehended the author's meaning. I think he sometimes talks rather unguardedly of the "homogeneity" of the time-dimension with the space-dimensions of Nature. I am afraid his words might suggest something which I am sure he does not mean to convey. There is, of course, no getting over the fact that as you come to elaborate science and in the course of doing so to distinguish before-after from up-down, left-right, before-behind, you can only make the separation in one way. You must separate your original dimensions into $3 + 1$, not into $2 + 2$. No possible scientific manipulation of your "given" will split it up into a two-dimensional "space" and a two-dimensional "time". In other words, it is a real characteristic of Nature that there is a "spatial *quale*" which is different from the "temporal *quale*," though what the difference is can only be indicated by pointing to a fully articulated space-system and a fully articulated time-system.

I am also not sure whether I quite follow the emphatic denial that Nature—the fourfold continuum—has a "serial order". Of course, it follows from the principles of the doctrine that none of the special "serial orders" worked out by dwellers on different moving bodies can be "the" order of events. But, I take it, the "interval" in the fourfold continuum from A to B is something quite definite, though, as its parameters are not all space-distances, it is neither a "spatial" nor a "temporal" interval. And since each different "point," so to say, of the fourfold continuum has its own interval from whatever you take as origin, have we not all the conditions required for an order of the points? But probably I am falling into some misconception due to mere ignorance.

If I might recur for a moment to my former point, I should like to ask whether the reality of the difference between the "spatial *quale*" and the "temporal *quale*" is not indicated by the simple consideration that Prof. Whitehead has to get at the definition of "moments" through " σ -antiprimes" but at that of "event-particles" through " σ -primes"?

A. E. TAYLOR.

Spiritual Pluralism and Recent Philosophy. By C. A. RICHARDSON, M.A. (Cantab.). Cambridge University Press. Pp. xxi, 335.

"THE pluralistic hypothesis," says our author, "is briefly as follows: 'Reality comprises selves (*i.e.*, active subjects of experience) alone, differing simply in degree or in kind of mental development, though the diversity is infinitely various. Experience, then, consists in action and reaction between self and other selves, described by Prof. James Ward in the expressive phrase '*mutuum commercium*'" (p. 9). In his final summary, he speaks of pluralism

as "the hypothesis that reality is made up of interacting subjects, the object of experience for each subject being the manifestation to him of the form to which his activity is determined by his interaction with others" (p. 329). The hypothesis throughout expressly challenges comparison with realism of the kind represented "in America by the neo-realists, and in this country by logical atomists of the type of Mr. Bertrand Russell," by whose teachings the author admits that he has been considerably influenced (Preface, p. vi).

The author's argument, on his own showing, stands or falls with his conception of the nature and function of 'explanation'. Scientific hypotheses are not "really explanatory," but are "merely descriptive. . . . They are attempts to describe the facts of existence in simpler terms than the immediately given data. It might therefore be urged that pluralism is also a merely descriptive hypothesis, the 'explanation' being simply taken back one step, and expressed in terms of different things. Yet it is just in this difference of terms that the root of the essential disparity between pluralism and other hypotheses is to be found. It implies a difference of type. For pluralism is expressed in terms of active selves. We all *realise* what it is to be active—it is just living and doing. We all *realise* what a self is. This realisation is far more than knowledge in the ordinary sense. . . . Pluralism, being expressed in terms of active selves, is truly explanatory *for such active selves, i.e., for us*" (pp. 13-14). It would apparently, however, be more accurate to say that 'realisation' is not 'knowledge' at all: for "evidently the subject or knower cannot be an object of knowledge" (p. 14 n.).¹ Later he claims that pluralism "where it is successfully applied" provides a "final explanation—an explanation which is capable of fully satisfying such beings as ourselves in the search for the true nature and meaning of reality" (p. 64).

In the end, however, Mr. Richardson admits that pluralism does not afford a final explanation of the universe, since it involves, without solving, "the problem of the interaction of monads. We seek further for the concrete ground of this interaction, and are thus led to realise that some all-pervading principle, if it may be so called, is necessary to explain the unity of what in another aspect is a manifest plurality" (p. 82). In the last paragraph of his book he lays down that the final answer to "such time-honoured problems as freedom, immortality, creation, and the existence of God . . . must somehow lie in the determination of the nature of that concrete universal entity, in virtue of whose immanence the plurality of selves is no mere plurality, but a universe". In the end, then, pluralism, so far as it is provisionally

¹ Cf., e.g., p. 19: "Knowing is a relation between two entities, so that evidently the subject cannot know itself. It simply realises its own existence. . . ."

admissible, appears to partake of the nature of 'description' rather than of 'explanation'. But the description given by the author does not carry us very far. For though we are assured that the monads 'interact,' we are not told either *how* they do it, or *why* they do it. Nor does there appear to be any possibility of discovering "the noumenal conditions necessary in general for that type of interaction between certain subjects which is the ground of perception" (p. 285).

So much for the general results which 'spiritual pluralism' seeks to establish. As regards, now, the method of Mr. Richardson's argument, the chief difficulty which he has imposed on himself, and which he never overcomes, is that of reconciling his contention that the 'subject' or 'self' cannot be an 'object of knowledge' with his utilisation of the self as a principle of philosophic 'explanation'. The vacillation which this unstable position necessarily entails is reflected in his fluctuating conception of that activity which, it would seem, specially characterises the true, as opposed to the merely empirical, self (see *e.g.*, p. 194). We are told that "activity is fundamental" (p. 32), and that it is "just living and doing" (p. 13). Further: "The true meaning which causality has for us is rooted in the realisation of our own efficiency as active individuals. The active individual is the 'cause'. The end which his (generally purposive) activity accomplishes is the 'effect'" (p. 37). And "the self is purposive" (p. 146).

But we are also told that "the concrete self is the *knower*" (p. 19); that all subjective modes of activity "may probably be reduced to the single activity of attention" (p. 138); that "subjects of experience cannot be considered to be in any sense 'in space and time'" (p. 43¹); and that "any spatial or temporal reference is to elements in the object of experience alone" (p. 45¹).

Now, apart from *changes* in attention—apart, that is, from the process of concentrating attention first on one thing (or portion of the field of consciousness) and then on another—attention itself is meaningless.² When, therefore, we have intellectualised and minimised purposive activity to the utmost, by *reducing* it to "the single activity of attention"; we must, in deference to the principle of the timeless self, then proceed either (1) to deny that there is, in the last resort, any such thing as attention, or (2) to assert that so-called differences in attention are really differences "in the object

¹ Cf. *inter alia*, pp. 138-139.

² Cf. *e.g.* *op. cit.*, pp. 248-249: "The distinctive difference between the fields of consciousness and sub-consciousness respectively *at any instant*" [italics mine] "is that while any part of the former is capable at that instant of becoming the focus of consciousness, parts of the latter are not. But it should be noted . . . that regions of the presented whole which at one time form portions of the field of sub-consciousness, may at another time [italics mine] form portions of the field of consciousness, and *vice versa*".

of experience alone".¹ The attention-process, in short, forms no exception to the general principle that we have to choose between timelessness and activity: we cannot have both.

Thus, in place of the living self, which believes itself somehow to transcend the antithesis of 'subject' and 'object,' we are finally brought back, by the doctrine of the timeless self, to something indistinguishable from Kant's Synthetic Unity of Apperception. The self, which in Mr. Richardson's philosophy was to explain everything, seems to become merely an element in a purely formal analysis of 'experience'—and a remarkably elusive element at that. Everything *knowable* about it is included in the 'Me'; the 'I' is left *unknowable*, and in place of knowledge we are offered a process of 'realisation' which is never explained, and would seem to be inexplicable. While, on the one hand, there is no trace of any *trait d'union* between the 'I' and the 'Me,' on the other hand our "sensations, feelings, desires, thoughts, and acts" all appear to be impartially included in the 'object' (*cf.* p. 187). What is here to prevent any monist from overthrowing Mr. Richardson's 'pluralism' by simply suggesting that *all* the individual experiences are in fact manifestations of one and the same Universal Self?

Furthermore, the 'individual experience' 'explained' by the 'interaction' of such defecated selves is said to be *absolutely* "one and indivisible" (p. 23). As such, however, it affords no excuse for demanding a pluralistic interpretation. The unity of the individual experience is indeed so unitary that our author will not even allow us to speak of that experience as "continuous" (*ibid.*).

And this brings up yet another difficulty in the way of defining the author's standpoint. A unity so absolute as to preclude continuity must preclude the idea of *growth of experience*—and with it the distinction between past and future (*cf.* p. 174). Doubtless, the logical complement of the timeless individual self must be a timeless experience (*cf.* pp. 138-139 and 177). But that is just what makes the conception of the timeless individual self so fatally obscure—not to say unintelligible. To add to our perplexity, Mr. Richardson claims that the method of his pluralism, as opposed to the analytic method of Mr. Bertrand Russell, is *genetic*; and that "in the first stage the investigation takes the form, for the

¹ Mr. Richardson lays special stress on the assertion that "one subject implies in the presented object one, and only one, focus of attention, and *vice versa*" (p. 259). If we accept this assertion *without any temporal qualification*, we cannot escape the conclusion that every time the focus shifts, a fresh (atomistic) subject is introduced on the scene. And what then becomes of the 'self' as Synthetic Unity? If, on the other hand, we attribute the *successive* acts of attention within the life-history of the human individual to a unitary 'self'—if, that is to say, we consider that the attentive 'self' is *at the very least* also a principle of Synthetic Unity—then the very unity of that 'self' compels us to regard the 'self' as being 'in time' even if the 'object' is not. Thus, the conception of the 'self' as that which attends is hopelessly irreconcilable with the idea of the 'self' as both unitary for each individual experience and timeless.

most part, of an analysis of the *growth* of individual experience and of the transition by inter-subjective intercourse to universal conceptual experience" (p. 12). And that nothing may be wanting to complete our bewilderment, while he rejects the idea of "duration" as applied to the self (p. 44) he admits in relation thereto the idea of permanence through change (p. 40).¹

If, however, disregarding these difficulties, we accept Mr. Richardson's theory of the absolute unity of the individual experience, the promised land of pluralism, as has been already hinted, still eludes us. For what pre-eminently stands in need of philosophic explanation is the possibility of analysing at all what is called an 'indivisible' experience. Mr. Richardson admits, indeed, that "Analysis of experience is by no means entirely invalid" (p. 176). It is not, however, an admission, but an explanation, of this fact that we are constrained to seek. On the face of it, if analysis of experience is possible in any sense that is relevant to philosophy, then the very foundation of Mr. Richardson's philosophy is destroyed; and if it is not possible, then the pluralistic superstructure is destroyed.

Now, such 'validity' as analysis is said to possess appears to be purely relative to the purpose of practical calculation, and is achieved in the teeth of its theoretic 'inadequacy' (see esp. pp. 176 and 29). The situation, then, appears to be this: that though analysis is theoretically impossible and philosophically irrelevant, its results may, for practical or scientific purposes, be both true and useful. And how out of such a situation a coherent pluralistic philosophy is to arise, passes all understanding.

At this point it seems clear that Mr. Richardson should have dealt more faithfully with Solipsism. For Solipsism counters the demand for an explanation of individual experience by blandly accepting, as literally true, Mr. Richardson's fundamental contention: "Strictly speaking, there is only one fact about such an experience in its actuality, which fact may be stated in the proposition 'It exists'. The 'it' of this proposition is the *totum objectivum*, or presented whole, of individual experience" (p. 28).

In truth, Solipsism seems to afford the ideal fulfilment of Mr. Richardson's aspirations for a 'truly explanatory' hypothesis. Unlike 'Spiritual Pluralism' it has the courage of its aspirations. It is an 'explanation' strictly in terms of the self. It secures absolute unity at the outset, instead of leaving it, at the end of a long

¹ "From the subjective point of view, if I have first *A* and then *B* before me, I can, in no significant sense, be said to have apprehended a process of change; at most there has been a change in myself, and this, since it is I who have perceived both *A* and *B*, assumes *my* permanence" (*op. cit.*, p. 40). With Mr. Richardson, as with T. H. Green, the theory of the 'timeless self' shows a disconcerting tendency to develop, dialectically, into the theory that the individual 'self' is the *only* thing that either does or can change, in the full sense of the word; and that it is Reality, as opposed to the 'self' which is really timeless.

pilgrimage, still to seek. Its fidelity to the principle of Occam's razor (*cf.* pp. 16 and 104) is beyond reproach. Its 'explanation' of experience possesses what Mr. Richardson should regard as the supreme merit of being *absolutely* non-descriptive; for it tells us nothing whatsoever *about* experience. And, by the same token, the 'explanation' is absolutely final. For, accepting experience as the revelation of itself to itself, Solipsism transcends the everlasting 'Why?' of the metaphysical system-maker by transmuting it into an imperturbable, all-embracing, and self-sufficing 'Why not?' It thus overcomes not only the duality of subject and object, but also the duality of question and answer.

Then again, just because the Solipsist can logically seek to convince no one but himself, A's knowledge of the falsity and absurdity of Solipsist B's pretension to be the sole 'subject of experience'—or even A's persuasion that not B, but A himself, supports that solitary grandeur—cannot trouble the calm current of B's spiritual existence. It is for this reason—and *in this sense*—that Solipsism is, as Mr. Richardson says, "logically irrefutable" (pp. 21 and 170). Mr. Richardson himself goes so far as to say that "the events in the experience of an individual take place *just as if* he were the only existing subject" (p. 170).¹

Without doubt there are great and attractive possibilities in the idea of a pluralistic universe. But a 'pluralism' which oscillates between Monism and Solipsism, and which seems to have no definite idea of what it means by 'self' and 'experience' can hardly be regarded as a satisfactory solution of the philosophic problem.

HOWARD V. KNOX.

The Historical Method in Ethics, and other Essays. By JOHN HANDYSIDE, M.A. (Edin.), B.A. (Oxon.) late Lecturer in Philosophy in the University of Liverpool and Second Lieutenant in the King's (Liverpool) Regiment, 18th Battalion. Liverpool: The University Press; London: Constable & Co. Pp. xvi, 97.

OF the three great ethical questions (1) What ought we to do?; (2) How do we know what we ought to do?; (3) Why should we do what we see to be right?, it is with the second, which is logical or methodological, that Mr. Handyside's Essay which gives the title to this volume purports to deal. "The method of Ethics" he says, (p. 34) "is an *immanent* criticism of systems, a criticism, that is, which does not go for a criterion of systems beyond all systems—

¹ Mr. Richardson, who is here discussing the question of immortality, says: "This brings out the difficulties involved in assigning a definite meaning to the phrase 'ceasing to exist'". But it would be truer to say that it brings out the dangers involved in an uncritical acceptance of the notion of 'individual experience'.

for there is no Ethical knowledge, datum or construction, beyond all systems—but stays within the limits of the historical evolution, to criticise system by system, and part by part. And as the principle of this criticism can only be consistency, the method of Ethics is dialectical in that sense."

It is no doubt apparent inconsistency which gives rise to uncertainty and questioning; unresolved inconsistency is not to be tolerated, but we cannot conceive consistency to be an adequate criterion (except perhaps as applied to the whole, which is beyond our grasp). We always want to get rid of inconsistency—still the most thorough-going and systematic consistency cannot supply us with more than a negative criterion. It does not, *e.g.*, exclude incoherence—absence of apparent connexion. For system we require connexion of elements as well as absence of contradiction. Further, is it not as applied to the Whole only that we can say that all criticism of system must be *immanent*? We require a system, *e.g.*, of morals to be self-consistent—so far the criterion is immanent, but we also require it to harmonise with the *other* knowledge which we accept.

At the end of the essay Mr. Handyside speaks again of the criticism or immanent dialectic which, as the true method of ethics, "is the truth of, and takes up into a higher synthesis, the two imperfect and inadequate methods, the empirical and historical on the one side, and the rationalistic or demonstrative on the other". This latter is blamed for pinning its faith to *law*, whereas *law* "is not adequate to our moral experience," and it is to *system* and *consistency*—"systematic consistency" (p. 29)—that we must look for our criterion. But it seems difficult to see why the name of *law* should be refused to the notion or principle of consistency on which Mr. Handyside relies for systematisation in Ethics. This principle (or notion) is treated by him as though it were fundamental, an universally applicable criterion of valid ethical construction—a principle which could not reasonably be questioned, since according to him *consistent* means *rational*. Thus this principle would seem to carry its own evidence with it, and to be in fact a self-evident law used to systematise ethical material. The author, however, appears to hold that no *ethical* propositions are self-evident. But unless he can convince us of this his condemnation of "demonstrating" morality falls rather flat, and moreover the wind is taken out of his own sails, for as far as can be made out he never definitely admits any fundamental difference between 'moral' and 'positive' judgments, and on p. 23 rather anxiously discusses the question whether from historical ('positive') propositions, 'ethical' propositions can be proved. If self-evidence of propositions is not recognised, must not the self-evidence of conclusions from premises be given up too? It would seem to be only the self-evidence of the connexion between the steps in any process of reasoning, however lengthy, or between premises and conclusion in the simplest argument, that enables ordinary people

to follow the process and accept the conclusion. And if self-evidence in any case turns out to be illusory, we resort to a fresh application of the same test.

Mr. Handyside's indictment of the "Rationalistic or demonstrative method" affirms that attempts "to arrive by its means at laws which should have a universal claim on human conduct . . . have invariably failed" and expresses the opinion that the last attempt of this kind—that of Sidgwick—has even "demonstrably failed"—in fact, *must* have failed *because* every reasoning the conclusion of which is a moral judgment must have had some moral judgment as premise, and thus "must rest upon at least one moral judgment which is merely assumed". In criticising Sidgwick the author pays no attention to that writer's account of his own view, but applying to it the general considerations above referred to, pronounces that "those most ultimate propositions on which Sidgwick and his predecessors base their proofs of laws or maxims, either are not moral judgments, and in that case do not prove the conclusions, or being such are themselves equally in need of proof and equally unprovable". As far as I can see, the whole general contention is itself an assumption for which no evidence is produced, and the acceptance of which would seem to invalidate any system of Ethics into which reasoning enters.

As regards Prof. Sidgwick's Ethics, this is simply condemned without examination, and I venture to conjecture without first-hand knowledge on the part of the critic. Sidgwick (like Clarke, Kant, etc.) takes as ultimate and fundamental, propositions which he regards as self-evident, and among these Kant's Categorical Imperative "Act from a principle or maxim that you can will to be a universal law," and he gives us in his Philosophical Intuitionism an Ethics based on the principle of Rational Hedonism (no mere formal principle) which he regards as self-evident, and employs to systematise the facts and laws of moral life into a coherent, comprehensive and consistent whole, with the aid of all that ordered wealth of "historical" knowledge which he had at his command. According to Mr. Handyside such "history" is that which must supply the real material, the intuitional content, required by the "general form of all ideals," namely, the conception of System—"a scheme left to receive some concrete filling". Thus Sidgwick's Ethics does in point of fact fulfil the requirements of (1) system, and (2) concrete filling got from history and experience—conditions which Mr. Handyside seems to lay down, but which apparently he has not given himself a chance of discovering in Sidgwick's work. It is perhaps only careful readers of *The Methods of Ethics* who can appreciate the historical and critical equipment of the author, or the skill and thoroughness of the ethical systematisation which it accomplishes. The most relentless testing by summarising, indexing, and cross-references, and still more by long study, only serves to bring into relief the consistency and coherence, the articulation and underlying unity which make one think of the harmonious.

one-ness of a living organism.¹ On the whole, Mr. Handyside's version of what he calls the "rationalistic or demonstrative" method in Ethics, seems strangely undiscerning. His account of Intuitionism in morals (p. 24) is grotesque, and his report of the Ethics of Prof. Sidgwick (to whom he repeatedly refers, and whom he condemns as having perpetrated the last attempt in this direction) is absolutely beside the mark.

Mr. Handyside is genuinely interested in his topic—he is thoughtful and desirous of getting at the truth—nothing is more remote from his intention than intellectual dishonesty or conscious misrepresentation. But this, while it makes him keen to justify the view which he has adopted and to meet objections to it, has not led him to make any careful or thorough study of those very divergent ethical thinkers—exponents of "Ethics as usually and traditionally understood"—who are here lumped together under the name of "rationalising demonstrationists". It is particularly to be regretted that Mr. Handyside did not devote more attention to Prof. Sidgwick, whom he dismisses in the most cavalier fashion, without, it would seem, having either heard of his historical work in Ethics and Politics, or made acquaintance at first-hand with *The Methods of Ethics*. (The general absence of illustrations and of precise references in this essay is a serious defect, and nowhere more unfortunate than in the present instance.)

The reason why Mr. Handyside calls his Essay *The Historical Method in Ethics* seems to be that while, as we have seen, he distrusts the supposed alternative method of "rationalising demonstration" ("the usual and traditional method," which is regarded as such a derelict)—he believes that these two can be taken up into a higher synthesis by (p. 38) "the critical or dialectical or speculative method" of which Historical Ethics (which he thinks has been much neglected) is when broadly taken "an essential aspect . . . supplying all the real matter or material for that criticism or immanent dialectic" which (as already noted) he regards as "the true method of Ethics" (and indeed of all knowledge). "Practical thought," says Mr. Handyside, "opinion as distinguished from science, works with intuitions; and there is nothing to produce intuitions but History." This is the concluding sentence of his Essay—and it seems to want a good deal of elucidation. Why should "practical thought"—which, I suppose, means thought about Practice or Conduct—be stigmatised as *opinion*? What science is there that derives no assistance from 'intuitions'? What Mr. Handyside means by Method is not very clear. He does not seem sure that Validity does not depend upon Origin. He identifies Rational with Consistent—and does not distinguish what men do, have done, or will do, from what they *ought* to do. He lays great stress upon the importance of Historical Ethics for a complete view of the subject, but does not seem to have realised

¹ It may perhaps be permitted to refer here to the article *Henry Sidgwick* in vol. xi. of Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*.

how much has been done already in this direction. "The theory of knowledge," he says (p. 27) "seems ultimately to hold that the only possible criterion of the system of truth as a whole is its consistency with itself, its exclusion of contradiction"—hence "the test of consistency may be of more value in the case of a view of morality as system than in the other view of it as law". (We may note here that System is what all the philosophical moralists—those who reject mere Perceptual or Dogmatic Ethics—have aimed at—*e.g.*, Kant and Sidgwick.)

"Ultimately," Mr. Handyside conceives, "we have grounds for believing that only certain forms of Being, of relation, and of system, or only one form, can be self-consistent, and such a form, if any, must be found for the ethical system, if ethicality is to be equal to the Absolute" (p. 38). What, in his view, History contributes seems to be the 'intuition' that men 'have to create or maintain' a moral and social system "in which they may find their true selves, and so be truly satisfied" (p. 39). This is certainly something concrete, but it is highly ambiguous. Does "their true selves" mean their better selves (the selves which they ought to be) or the selves which they in fact are? Does true satisfaction mean a satisfaction with which a man is satisfied or with which he *ought* to be satisfied? Does *satisfied* mean *happy*? If it means 'happy,' no doubt we have here an end which most men have actually been pursuing, and which in the view of many moralists—including the Philosophical Intuitionists or Rational Hedonists who have been so unceremoniously dismissed—*ought* to be pursued. But the grounds on which precisely this deliverance of History—of 'intuition'—*ought to be accepted*, are not indicated. Does the dictum, that to be "truly satisfied" is man's ultimate aim, his true end, carry its own evidence with it? If not, by what method, by what logical procedure is it recommended or justified? The question which Method answers is: How do we know that this is right, or true? If there is a historical method of Ethics, it should show us by history what we ought to do; if it does not do this, it is either not a method of Ethics, or not historical. If our test is nothing less than the consistency or harmony of the *whole* we have no test for any part until we know the whole. We seem, to miss all through any clear distinction between justification and history, between what *ought to be*, and what *is*, done or believed. Ethics evaporates—Method eludes us. The reconciliations adumbrated are obscure.

Mr. Handyside considers that in passing to 'historical' method in Ethics we pass to an "empiricist account of morals," "an empirical and historical method," and this view of Method brings us to the *aperçu* that "Ethics is a positive science, a science about men's notions of value" (p. 5). It thus looks as though Mr. Handyside were here using 'historical method' in a sense that can "hardly be distinguished from the inductive method"¹—"there is nothing to produce [particular] intuitions but history" he

¹ Sidgwick, *Philosophy, its Scope and Relations*, p. 126.

says, p. 39)—opposing this ‘historical’ procedure to “deductive reasoning from general premises assumed or supposed to be self-evident”¹ to which at the beginning of his Essay he so much objects. It is, of course, matter of ‘experience,’ of ‘history,’ that men hold such or such “notions of value,” but it is only because the notions held are notions of *value* that they are ethically interesting and important—it is not in the mere occurrence of such entertained notions, but in the meaning and validity of “value” that we have to seek justification for ‘ethical’ as distinguished from ‘positive’ science, for ‘ought’ as distinguished from ‘is’. Good is what we *ought* to seek, Right what we *ought* to do, even as Truth is what we *ought* to believe.

We may recall that Mr. Handyside was hard at work teaching and examining from the time when he left Oxford in 1907, and it was only after being appointed at Liverpool in 1911 that his attention was specially directed to “moral and social philosophy”. When the great War came in 1914 he was keen to join the army, and received a commission in the 16th King’s (Liverpool) Regiment in 1915. In October of the following year he “was mortally wounded while gallantly rallying his men in a particularly awkward and desperate situation”. He lived and died as a brave man should, and was one of the many who could ill be spared—a man of intrepid spirit, strong to confront difficulties whether of thought or life. There can be no doubt that if he had had time and leisure for further study he might have done distinguished work—not only as a teacher, not only as a citizen, but also as a seeker after truth, and a thinker who tried to think for himself—his face was set towards the light—he saw “a great thing to pursue”. At the time when the Essay which we are considering was written, he seems to have been at the stage in which his desire to reach the truth took the form of trying to show that the doctrine which he had accepted—only in an anticipatory fashion perhaps, but to which he held tenaciously and loyally—met all legitimate demands, and that other and competing doctrines did not do so. We must recognise that this stage might naturally have passed into another—still what we are here primarily concerned with is, of course, the Essay as it stands. It is in some sort a first attempt on the part of a young writer to deal independently with some of the largest and most difficult of philosophical problems, and it is perhaps no wonder that he has not wholly succeeded where so many have failed. Of the other two Essays which the volume contains—“The Absolute and Intellect,” and “System and Mechanism”—it may be sufficient to quote a sentence from the very interesting Biographical Note by Prof. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, who says that “they are the work of one fresh from the study of constructive idealism as presented in the writings of Bradley and Bosanquet, and the author is in the main in sympathy with that position”.

¹ Sidgwick, *Philosophy, its Scope and Relations*, p. 126.

VI.—NEW BOOKS.

Mind and Conduct. Morse Lectures Delivered at the Union Theological Seminary in 1919. By HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL, L.H.D., D.S. Williams and Norgate. Pp. ix + 236.

ANYTHING on this subject from the pen of Henry Rutgers Marshall merits the closest attention and the most careful consideration, all the more so when, as here, the conclusions he has arrived at in several well-known books are brought together in a concise form. Possibly the form is too concise. Personally we must confess that we should have preferred that the more fundamental questions raised had been discussed at such length and in such detail as their importance and the difficulty of the problems they involve seem to demand. Our reason for such a preference will probably be clear to most people when we say that the eight chapters in this book are devoted respectively to: Consciousness and Behaviour, Instinct and Reason, The Self, Creativeness and Ideals, Freedom and Responsibility, Pleasure and Pain, Happiness, Intuition and Reason, and that there are two appendices, the first on the "Causal Relation between Mind and Body," the second on "Outer-world Objects". Nor is the book a mere popular and superficial skimming of the topics. Though here and there traces show themselves of its original form and purpose as a series of lectures to a general audience, the book as a whole is logical, closely reasoned, and fundamental. But the inevitable consequence is, seeing that as far as the topics discussed are concerned, the contents of a library are compressed within the covers of a two hundred page book, that dogmatic statement is sometimes substituted for critical development at the most controversial points. In the circumstances the fact that the author has already elsewhere argued the controversial questions out at length only partly excuses the omission of the argument here.

The book is divided into three sections. Part I. consisting of the first three chapters is headed "The Correlation of Mind and Conduct". No psychological account of mind or consciousness is attempted. That is assumed. The claims of behaviourism are alluded to but not examined. Some discussion of these claims would seem to be relevant to the topic under consideration, and it is not entirely satisfactory to find it omitted. Nor is the feeling of dissatisfaction lessened by the account which Dr. Marshall gives of the early stages in the rise of consciousness of Self. Thus the statement that "each human being realises that he himself is a man-animal, and each of us observes his own behaviour more constantly and more carefully than that of other animals" is, to say the least, questionable, while the paragraphs which follow are equally open to the criticism that the point of view of the psychologist is assumed as the point of view of the naïve mind. A statement like "I do not hesitate to say that my neighbour was afraid when he fled in a panic, although I observed nothing but his flight, and no fear at all," illustrates admirably the defect of too great brevity of treatment. Surely there are variations in the degree of confidence with which I assert that another person is afraid, dependent not

merely on the external signs I consciously observe, but on subtle signs which I cannot specify, and on my own emotional reaction to all the signs.

The argument of the first chapter leads up to the important conclusion that the "noetic and neururgic correspondence appears to be thoroughgoing," that is, not only is there no psychosis without neurosis, but there is no neurosis without psychosis. If the psychologist accepts the proposition that there is no psychosis without neurosis, he is practically compelled to save his consistency and even his science by taking the further step, but, as a psychologist, he may surely suspend judgment on the first proposition in the lack of sufficient evidence, and it is by no means certain that he will not escape more difficulties than he encounters by taking this line. In any case the recognition of thoroughgoing correspondence necessarily involves the recognition of the 'unconscious' on an indefinitely large scale. We are in fact brought to an 'unconscious' more akin to the 'unconscious' of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann than the 'unconscious' of Freud and Jung. Apparently ignoring this wide extension which must be given to the term, Dr. Marshall would designate "subconsciousness" preferably "subattentive consciousness". The suggested terminology is of doubtful value, even having regard only to the narrower 'unconscious' of modern psychology. 'Unconscious' itself is certainly an unhappy term. But the essential character of the processes so designated does not seem to be their relation to attention so much as their relation to that synthesis which makes the personal consciousness, and 'subpersonal' would probably mark this relation better than 'subattentive'.

In the second chapter the chief theme is the contrast between instinctive and adaptive actions, and between "instinct-feelings" and intelligence. The author comes to the conclusion that no clear line of demarcation can be drawn, either on the behaviour side or on the consciousness side, that all behaviour is influenced by past situations as related to the present, and by present situations as related to the future, and that when we overlook the first we call the act adaptive, when we overlook the second instinctive, the position being analogous as regards the corresponding consciousness. "All behaviour displays a unity of process," and "all situations in consciousness display a unity of process".

The third chapter, devoted to the discussion of the Self, ought to be central in the book, but the argument is so difficult to follow, and the conclusions seem so strange, that we cannot yet be certain that we have grasped Dr. Marshall's meaning. The main thesis seems to be that "presentations" given in attention are simply "emphases within the complex psychic system of consciousness," the unemphasised "something more of consciousness" being the Self to which the presentations are given. On the face of it this seems a rather high-handed setting aside of the verdict of consciousness itself. The idea of Self, he further states, is a presented concept "and is but an image or simulacrum"—whatever this may mean—of the real Self, which is unpresentable. The questions are too large to go into here, and a perfunctory criticism would be worse than useless.

Part II., on 'Some Implications of the Correlation' begins with Chapter IV., entitled "Creativeness and Ideals". The main topic discussed here is the contrast between mechanism and vitalism, and their respective claims in the realm of the psychical. The conclusion is that creativeness is a marked characteristic of our psychic life, especially in connexion with adaptive acts and the corresponding intelligence consciousness. The existence of ideals is the most striking evidence of such creativeness, and these are quite obviously outside any possibility of a mechanistic explanation. The keynote, however, of the whole chapter is the notion of creativeness. Continuing the suggested noetic and neururgic correspondence of the first

chapter, Dr. Marshall holds that there is evidence to justify us in asserting creativeness all through Nature—objective creativeness he calls it, as contrasted with the subjective creativeness of consciousness. But the creative spontaneity of the Self as exhibited in ideals and purposes is the most tremendously significant fact of all.

The following chapter is devoted to "Freedom and Responsibility," and contains nothing that is really new in the light of the conclusions he has already arrived at. He has obviously 'freedom' already in his 'creativity'. The outcome is that the Self is free to act in accordance with its own nature, the choice between alternatives being due to "the creativeness inherent in the free Self". We are always responsible for our acts. The notion that there is such a thing as irresponsibility is erroneous, and arises from the fact that we tend to define responsibility "in terms of accountability rather than in terms of authorship".

Part III, entitled "Guides to Conduct" and is concerned mainly with the psychology of ethics as the title would lead us to expect. The argument need not be followed here. There is, however, a digression into educational theory in Chapter VI. (Pleasure and Pain), which is not a little interesting. Dr. Marshall obviously distrusts modern educational reforms, more especially along the lines which he takes to be those characteristic of the teaching of Froebel and Montessori. The educationist would have little fault to find with the argument, were it not for certain misleading suggestions which may conceivably do some harm by impeding educational progress. The first such misleading suggestion is that modern educational theory of the type indicated aims at making school work "amusing" to the child. Dr. Marshall says he finds the same idea as far back as Plato. It is in Plato, but neither in Plato nor in Froebel or Montessori is it adequately described in the way he suggests. If he will examine the opposing doctrine of effort in the light of the motives employed to produce the effort—for unmotivated effort is impossible—he will probably come to see the real inwardness of the contentions of practically every modern educator. The second misleading suggestion is that experiments in the line of modern educational theory have probably been tried again and again in the past ever since the time of Plato, and having failed have left no record, so that the traditional education represents the surviving fittest. To any one who knows the facts the suggestion verges on the absurd. The new theories are enormously more difficult than the traditional education to carry out in practice. A gifted teacher here and there may in the past have approximated to the education which theorists of the present are aiming at, but that is all that has ever been possible. Even to-day with carefully trained teachers the ideal is still remote, though we have perhaps definitely entered upon the road towards its attainment. In other respects much of what he says is sound, if too vague and general to be very helpful to the educator.

In spite of our criticisms it must be freely acknowledged that the book as a whole is a valuable one, and deserving of careful study in practically every sentence. It requires careful study in fact owing to its concentrated tabloid character. It is by no means a book that is easily read and digested. So much the better perhaps in these days when books on psychology have so multiplied that room on our bookshelves has to be rationed out with the utmost care.

JAMES DREVER.

Teoria Generale dello Spirito come Atto Puro. By GIOVANNI GENTILE. Terza Edizione riveduta. Bari: Laterza e Figli, 1920. Pp. ix, 244.

In a previous reference to Gentile's ideas (*MIND*, July, 1920), I raised the question whether the character of reality as something given in the

"atto puro" of the mind was consistent with its character as the universe and the "whole". In the present work we have more material than before for an answer to this question.

If there could ever have been any doubt whether the author intended to identify the real with the ideas of individual minds, there can be none in presence of this book. Quite explicitly, the proposition "that the spiritual world is conceivable only as the very reality of my spiritual activity" is here pronounced to be nonsense if we construe it of the empirical ego which is one among many things and persons (p. 12). We have to take it of the transcendental ego, the Person who has no plural, the constructive process of all our experience (pp. 13-15). It is quite clear that this being, or rather this becoming, for the term being is rejected as inappropriate, is to be considered as a real whole, "il tutto" (p. 217), which includes in its energy all persons, all space and time, and all that we call nature, which apart from it or him are but artificial abstractions.

But now our question returns upon us in a further form. If reality is one with this super-personal and all-inclusive activity, can it be so strictly identified, as the writer desires, with the actuality of mind, with its very "act in action" ("atto in atto," p. 6)? Must it not be largely burdened with implicit features, outside its activity in any one time and place, which would constitute a transcendence of immediacy, and so form a link with older doctrines involving transcendence, which perhaps the new metaphysic has rashly construed as transcendence not of immediacy but of experience—such as Plato's Forms, and Hegel's Logical Idea or Nature?

If, on the other hand, we are really to insist on the act in action, saying that the idea "cannot be absolute, if it does not coincide with the very act of knowing it; because,—and this is the deepest origin of the difficulties with which Platonism has to struggle—if the idea was not the very act by which the idea is known, the idea would leave something outside it, and the idealism would not be absolute" (p. 217),—if we are to insist on this creationism so very completely, is not the essence of knowledge itself endangered? We do not indeed think that knowledge lies in copying a transcendent real, but we are accustomed to suppose that for all knowledge there is a real of which it is true and which speaks in it; and that if there were not, it would be merely a psychical succession. Does the new metaphysic with its creative becoming impeach this principle? I think there is some confusion between a spirit which embodies a reality guarded by the law of contradiction against confusion, and one frozen into immobility by such a law as supposed to exclude all synthesis and change (pp. 35, 37, 154). If Gentile's Idealism were steered straight at the point where creativeness is to be reconciled with rationality, if I felt sure that he really held the inseparableness of identity and diversity, I should welcome his doctrine with much greater happiness.

A restatement on this head would affect his attitude to other idealism on the problems of progress and change within the real itself, and on the very serious kindred problem of the relation between morality and religion. His standpoint, like that of much recent philosophy, is essentially that of morality, involving perfectibility and imperfection *ad infinitum* in the individual. I contrast certain characteristic sentences. "L'idealismo moderno—si muove in una direzione affatto opposta a quella in cui è orientato il misticismo." It is "profondamente Cristiano; intendendo per Cristianesimo la concezione intrinsecamente morale del mondo, . . . Il Cristianesimo—scopre la realtà che non è, ma crea se stessa, ed è quale si crea—una realtà che spetta a noi di costruire" (pp. 230-231).

We may compare with this Mr. Bradley's well-known judgment (*Appearance* p. 500). "You cannot be a Christian if you maintain that

progress is final and ultimate and the last truth about things. . . . Make the moral point of view absolute, and then realise your position. You have become not merely irrational, but you have also, I presume, broken with every considerable religion." This latter feature is very striking in Gentile's remarks on Hellenism; and on all religions of the East except what he interprets as Christianity. I insist on the antithesis; because I believe that it—the opposition of the purely moralistic or ethical and the profoundly religious attitude, is more and more emerging as the dividing line and divergent aspiration of modern modes of thought.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

Discorsi di Religione. By GIOVANNI GENTILE. In series Uomini e Idee a cura di E. CODIGNOLA. Vallecchi, Editore, Firenze, 1920. Pp. 136. 5 fr.

This little book appears to me exceedingly valuable, both for its striking appreciation of an essential principle in idealistic philosophy, and for its clear and concise presentation of the quintessence of the author's views, explaining in some degree the prima facie exaggeration with which that principle is embodied in them.

The volume consists of three addresses on religion, the first of which "Il Problema Politico," was published in the review, *Politica*, in March, 1920, but the second and third, "Il Problema Filosofico," and "Il Problema Morale," now see the light for the first time.

We must not dwell upon the exceedingly interesting sketch, going back to the first "risorgimento," which explains how the new and positive "laicity" of Italian opinion to-day sprang by opposition out of the old and negative laicity or naturalism and anti-clericalism, which was itself a reaction against the larger and nobler liberalism of the Mazzinian epoch. "I giovani, a cui è indirizzato il mio discorso, mi intendono. Gli altri alzano pure le spalle, e tirino via." The men who have had experience of the war, so I understand him, had before it felt what a mere agnosticism in education meant, and are resolved to have something truly spiritual in the future. "Se la nostra azione è azione politica o Stato, il nostro Stato conviene pure che sia governato da uno spirito schiettamente e profondamente religioso" (p. 39).

But what does religion mean? Here, in the address on the philosophical problem, we approach what is the clearest statement known to me of Gentile's special point of view, which governs not only his idea of religion but his entire metaphysic. And in this work we have not only the point of view, but, I think explanations and illustrations which enable us to see its possibility more fully than I at least have grasped it before.

The paradox involved is the apparently absolute rejection of every "presupposto," and the consequent utter disruption of the philosophical tradition and also a fundamental perplexity as to how the spirit can connect itself with the universe. Modern philosophy in general, and the modern view of religion in particular, are taken as beginning *de novo* with Kant, as wholly and utterly divorced from the spirit of Greek thought, and as not attaining their genuine modern form even in Hegel, or before the present generation of Italian thinkers. It seems a good opportunity to look straight at this problem of the "presupposto," and understand what it implies, and how it affects, in particular, the author's religious standpoint.

You have the essential argument on nearly every page in Gentile;

here are two characteristic passages. "If there is anyone or anything beyond me, I am conditioned by it; and my action, my own being, does not depend only on me; I am not free" (p. 48). Or again "The great alternatives are two; either naturalism (however nature is understood, as material or as intelligible) or spiritualism. Either all is nature, or all is spirit. Since all cannot be nature, because, if so, we could not say even so much; then, all is spirit. And this cannot but mean that spirit has no preconditions (presupposti), and therefore is creator. This means that if I need, in the concrete, to conceive myself as thinking (thinking, for instance, a spiritualism) as spirit, I, whether I like it or not, am in the necessity of not presupposing anything as prior to myself; that is, of feeling everything as inward to me; of feeling the infinite responsibility of the act in which I posit myself, in which I realise my life, implicating the whole, and generating effects which will have their repercussion on the whole" (p. 74).

Now all this, in a sense, we are accustomed to. But when we find that the "presupposto" thus rejected is construed to include Plato's Forms, God or Nature as realities, and Hegel's logical idea, as each and all of them "block" objects of thought, given, transcendent, and immutable, denying all freedom to the finite spirit, we wonder in what sense the universe is to be a whole, and whether or no it is conceived as transcending the immediacy of the particular thinking being.

Yet we have seen in others of Gentile's works that he is fully aware how impossible it is to construe reality in terms of the particularity of the particular immediate individual. So far from the experience relied on being immediate and particular, it is just mediation and universality which are its note (p. 105). The Ego which is all-creative is Kant's transcendental ego, if we strike out all relation of experience to a noumenon. It is an Ego which is "We".

This we knew. But how at all to connect the actual individual's thinking with the universe which is thought, so as to avoid the sheer emptiness of an abstract creative liberty; this, on Gentile's principles we, or I at least, did not see how to do. In a minor detail, the same point arose where Croce denied the discipline of art under the external world.

But in this book there are elucidations which help us to see our way. The story of the formation of our moral freedom through "mediation and universality" (p. 105 ff.) seems to show that that with which we are in living unity, a social law, the mind and institutions of a group (pp. 107-108) is not to be counted as a "presupposto" in the sense which demands rejection, but is to be reckoned as inherent in the "We" whose pure and actual action is the all-creating spirit which "makes" itself and its world. Even the old example of the slave's attainment of liberty along with his master—the learning to rule through learning to obey—is recognised as a case of the law. All this we welcome.

But then from the position here recognised, that of the group-mind and communal life, an argument, we think, will run back and incorporate with our living real all that transcends, not our experience, but only our immediacy—Plato's Forms, and Nature, and the logical idea, and the living and immanent God. The view would remain good as insisting on immanence and unity, but its startling originality would be gone.

We may test this suggestion by two points on which Gentile is very explicit—(i) the absence of true morality from Greek ideas of life, and (ii) the predominant place of morality as against religion in genuine and characteristic modern thought.

(i) Greek Philosophy is naturalistic (as is every philosophy which recognises a reality prior to the finite spirit, even if it is Berkeley's

God), eudæmonistic (p. 95) and the intuition of the moral life is foreign to it (p. 98 n.). This is because in it the finite spirit accepts a reality which it does not create. The originating intuition of Christianity, on the other hand, "the ferment of all modern civilisation, is that the world is ours because we make it in the light not of what is but of what ought to be" (p. 70). "Love your neighbour" becomes moral when it refers to a moral act, not, as in Plato's love of the good, to a universal natural instinct (p. 99). Plato's real is there for the spirit to conform to; the Christian real is not there, but is an "ought to be" for the spirit to make. "If the good *was* originally, we could not make it (or do it), and the good which is not *done* (made) is not good." Therefore it is not a "*pre-supposto*" (levelled at Plato's "good") but a *result* of life and action (pp. 120-121).

This conception of an absolute new departure in Christianity, culminating in Kantian ethics and in the attitude of creative idealism, though it lays emphasis on an important feature of the progressive modern mind, seems wholly to ignore the mode of participation by which Gentile has explained how the finite spirit is linked with the group-mind, nourished by it and embodied in it. For this, the recognition of the human-divine spirit in the communal life, is the golden thread which links Plato to St. Paul and St. Paul to modern thought. And apart from such a recognition, extended to the universe, we hardly see how absurdity can be escaped when we insist on the truth that nothing is really ours which does not spring from our will.

(ii) In the third address, on "the moral problem," we are shown the conclusions which attach to this violent emphasis on the creative aspect of the spirit. "Modern philosophy" (the "actual idealism" before us) "is essentially ethical," and not, except in a subordinate sense, religious. "Idealism must say that morality and religion are antithetic terms, each of which is the negation of the other: *mors tua vita mea*" (p. 130). For religion is essentially mystical, the annihilation of the subject before an unknown transcendent object, and its attitude is essentially "where God is, we are not; in so far as he is, we are not" (p. 78). Here again the identity and diversity of the divine and human will in the communal spirit appears to be forgotten, and the true religious insight, that if God were not, we certainly should be nothing, the reverse of that embodied in the above proposition, to be ignored. Morality, then, is taken to include religion, but not as the element of peace and unity with reality, but rather as the element of negation and sacrifice of the subject, religion *per se* being indeed not a tenable attitude, but only intelligible and realisable as supplemented by philosophy, which restores the self-assertion of the subject, annihilated in religion. And so we are amazed, though we ought not to be surprised, to find the following utterance: "But Christianity is not solely a religion; it is also a philosophy, and therefore a moral doctrine; and its greatness rests on the philosophical and moral truths which it proclaimed, and by which it succeeded in transforming human civilisation, not on its sheer religious element" (p. 129).

Clearly we are here on the whole confronted by the moralistic attitude as opposed to that of religion, the attitude of individual perfectibility and progress *ad infinitum* which is so powerful in many philosophies of to-day. But this is not the end of the matter. In this case the attitude in question represents a justified hostility to the mythical transcendence and externalisation of God, and a demand for the synthesis of his reality in and through our inner life. It seems, after all, that there is recognised a divine reality, with which in some sense (we recall the lesson of the group-mind) man may be at one and may pass beyond himself, although it

certainly appears as if his value were to lie wholly in his private actual attainment, and not in a union by love and faith with a universe greater than himself.

"Religion, from this point of view, rather than the negation, is, in truth, the school or apprenticeship of the moral will. A school from which no spirit will ever believe itself discharged which does not hold its day's work to be finished, and which feels its life as an unceasing progress in learning what it is to create one's own personality." These are the concluding words of the book, and I am not perfectly sure of their import. But I suppose it to be that religion is the sense of imperfection and defect which urges forward the finite spirit, and that it does not, or not appreciably, involve the sense of peace in unity with the whole through faith and will, which to us seems fundamental to religion, and just to be wanting to morality. Yet we can understand in some degree from the author's emphasis on the "We" of the group-mind how it is possible for him to refer, as it seems, the very universe itself to the creative fact of our will and the process of our cognition.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

The Foundations of Einstein's Theory of Gravitation. By ERWIN FREUNDLICH. Preface by A. EINSTEIN. Authorised English Translation by H. L. BROSE, M.A. Introduction by H. H. TURNER, D.Sc., F.R.S. Cambridge University Press. Pp. xvi, 60.

This pamphlet is worthy of the numerous and eminent fairy godfathers who have stood sponsor for it. Herr Freundlich wrote it; Einstein gave it his *imprimatur*; Mr. Brose became acquainted with it while interned in Germany, and (not having heard, presumably, that the Allied scientists had officially determined that German science was merely an inferior imitation of their own brilliantly original discoveries) determined to translate it. Prof. Turner and Prof. Eddington (who cannot plead the excuse of ignorance) encouraged Mr. Brose; and the former provided an excellent introduction. The result is the best account of the new theory, for the purpose of the general reader, that has yet appeared. Prof. Eddington's *Report* is of course considerably more detailed, but there is much in it that can hardly be understood by anyone who is not pretty familiar with mathematical physics. Herr Freundlich's pamphlet should be intelligible to any educated reader, whilst at the same time it is full and accurate and not in the least 'popular' in the bad sense of the word. The translation seems to have been thoroughly well done, and Mr. Brose is to be congratulated on his work.

The following points may be of special interest to readers of MIND. (i) The author lays special stress on the work of Riemann on manifolds, and points out how Einstein's theory is a development of ideas thrown out by Riemann. (ii) He points out that the equations of the special theory of relativity might have been deduced from simple and almost self-evident considerations without reference to the velocity of light. It follows from these that there must be *some* velocity which will be reckoned to be the same in magnitude by all observers in uniform relative motion. That this velocity is *finite*, and is in fact that of light *in vacuo*, is an additional empirical fact established by the Michelson-Morley experiment. These statements may be compared with Prof. Whitehead's results in his *Principles of Natural Knowledge*. (iii) He shows very clearly how the new theory fastens on the two weak points in the Newtonian mechanics—absolute motion, and the unexplained identity of inertial and gravitational

mass—and successfully avoids the first and clears up the second. It thus avoids the one great objection to Newton's mechanics, and synthesises the two principles which immortalise his name—the laws of motion and the law of gravitation. Lastly (iv) Herr Freundlich makes great play with two epistemological principles, which he regards as lying at the base of Einstein's theory and as furnishing a kind of limiting condition to which any satisfactory physical theory must conform. As they both seem to me somewhat doubtful, it may be worth while to say a few words about them.

The two principles are the denial of action at a distance, and the demand that 'only those things are to be regarded as being in causal connexion which are capable of being actually observed'. The first is supposed to show that the law of gravitation, as stated, cannot be ultimate, because, in the formula $\frac{d^2 r_1}{dt^2} = \gamma \frac{m_2}{(r_2 - r_1)^2}$, we have a *finite* distance, $r_2 - r_1$, on the right-hand side. 'The distances between points which are at *finite* distances from one another, must not occur in these laws, but only those between points infinitely near to one another.' The second is supposed, both by Herr Freundlich and by Einstein himself, to be the motive for getting rid of absolute space, time, and motion in the statement of the laws of nature.

The following criticisms suggest themselves at once. (i) If space be continuous there are no points 'infinitely near one another'; and therefore the first principle cannot be fulfilled. (ii) Even if there were infinitesimal distances they certainly are not the distances that can be observed, and therefore to regard purely differential laws as ultimate involves a breach of the second principle. (iii) It is rather unfortunate to insist on the absolute necessity of such laws at a time when pure mathematics is rapidly developing, in the theory of integral equations, methods that enable us to deal with integrated laws; when physics, in the theory of Quanta, is moving rather in the direction of discreteness; and when certain philosophers, such as Russell, are developing the notion that the continuity of nature is a logical construction, and that the ultimate data are of finite magnitude. (iv) The second epistemological principle seems to me, as I have argued elsewhere, to have very little in its favour, if taken as anything more than a methodological postulate. Physics certainly cannot get on if it confines itself to what actually can be observed. On the other hand, anything that could exist is in principle *observable*, i.e., if we had the right kind of senses we could observe it. The fact that we should need a greater modification in our senses to enable us to perceive points of absolute space, if there be such things, than to enable us to perceive electrons, if there be such things, is surely epistemologically quite irrelevant. Naturally we ought to avoid postulating unobservable entities if we can do without them, and Einstein has at length shown that we can do without absolute space, time, and motion in mechanics. But the real objection to them has always been, not simply that they were unobservable, but that they did nothing. Electrons and molecules are postulated as causes and their properties can be determined with more and more accuracy from their observable effects. The laws of mechanics profess to *analyse* all motions; absolute space, time, etc., were merely parameters that simplified the analysis; and it was always clear in principle that they must somehow be dispensable.

C. D. BROAD.

Theology as an Empirical Science. By DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH, Ph.D.
London: Allen & Unwin. Pp. xvi, 270.

Prof. Macintosh has written a fresh and able book which deserves a longer notice than is possible here. In the Preface he tells us he will not cavil about the right to term theology an 'empirical science,' if the reader accepts the view that "a genuine knowledge of a divine Reality has been gained through religious experience at its best," and that "this knowledge may be formulated and further developed by means of the inductive procedure advocated and exemplified in the body of this book". The author is of course right in insisting that theology must set out from the data of religious experience: Schleiermacher taught us this, though Prof. Macintosh is more careful than Schleiermacher not to identify religious experience with the experience of a particular church. Still it is not so clear that theology can be regarded as a purely descriptive or empirical science. So-called inductive procedure is never merely inductive, and least of all in religion where the data are not bare data but always involve interpretations and valuations. The writer, however, is justified in claiming that the theologian need not be unscientific; he may follow the method of other investigators, examining a specific experience and trying to understand it.

Dr. Macintosh holds that in the religious consciousness we have experience of a divine Reality, and the fundamental hypothesis of theological science is, that man can learn by 'observation and experiment' what God does under different conditions. Generalising from these data we reach 'empirical theological laws,' laws which tell us how God can be depended on under given circumstances. Thus testing religious experience we can build up a body of theological laws and establish a religious theory. Theology, like the other sciences, has a pre-scientific stage out of which it develops.

Spiritual experience has two aspects, an objective and a subjective. Revelation on the one side has its correlative in religious perception on the other. Or, to put it otherwise, there is a constant and a variable factor in religion, God being the constant, and the human adjustment by which God is experienced the variable. Prof. Macintosh finds revelation most conspicuously present in Christianity, and especially in Christ. But his conception of revelation is broad, and his interpretation of Christ and the Gospels is free of dogmatism.

In the third part of the book entitled "Theological Theory" the writer seeks to formulate theological principles on the basis of the working religious consciousness. Thus, when formulating the moral and metaphysical attributes of God, he does so on the ground of the pragmatic absoluteness or absolute sufficiency of the religious Object as given in experience. One must object, however, that the moral perfection of God is not to be reached empirically: it is a postulate.

The book may be cordially commended: it is frank and courageous without being extreme. Its defect seems to be that it overstates the case for empiricism. For instance the author time and again appeals to 'religious experience at its best,' as if this were an empirical datum. Yet what is best in religion rests on valuation, while valuation implies a standard or religious ideal in the light of which selection is exercised. And this ideal cannot be merely empirical.

G. GALLOWAY.

Saggio di una Concezione Idealistica della Storia. By MARIO CASOTTI. In series *Il Pensiero Moderno* a cura di E. CODIGNOLA. Vallecchi, Firenze, 1920. Pp. 447. Lire 12.

This thoughtful and elaborate work is a defence and application of the doctrine that the essence of reality is in history, and that its fullest manifestation is in the evolution of philosophy. The writer follows Gentile and Croce, though not slavishly. His treatise is closely reasoned, and the account I can give of it is no more than an outline.

The book falls, as he tells us in the Preface, into two parts. The first four chapters criticise empiricism and metaphysical realism, which are for him correlative doctrines, each of them implying on the one hand a world of appearance, and on the other a rigid reality, external to the knowing mind. On such a basis (p. 77) history can exist only on sufferance. The logic of such a reality is the logic of bare identity (p. 86), of the concept and purely analytic inference, and in such a reality nothing can ever come to pass.

The remainder, and by far the longer portion, of the book, deals with the realisation of "becoming" as the metaphysical basis of the universe, and the consequent prerogative place of history in the world (p. 105); its identity with actual and living thought and the dialectic by which that develops *ad aeternum* (p. 122).

The pivot of the argument is the conception of self-creative thought, according to which, following Vico's principle of "*Verum et factum convertuntur*," the spirit can know nothing, but what itself posits and produces (pp. 32-33). Any object, any pre-existent being, limits thought *ab extra*, and is incompatible with the reality of becoming in the universe.

To carry out this argument it is essential to show that all forms of experience, from the world of sense-perception upwards, can be identified with forms of philosophical thinking, and the reasoning takes the shape of a sort of deduction of the categories, according to which this conclusion is attempted to be established with regard to sense-perception, art, moral will, and religion (pp. 140 ff.).

But, in harmony with the underlying purpose, an important subtlety is introduced into the exposition, differentiating the point of view from that of Hegel. It is, in a word, the reduction of Phenomenology to Logic (ch. viii.). That is to say, sense-perception and the rest are not to be actual phases of mind which follow each other in history. Facts cannot be categories; for every fact has all the categories in it; and the forms of experience are not historical facts but philosophical categories which govern the course of history, but do not take the shape of a finite factual sequence. Thus history falls, in a sense, into cycles, *ricorsi* in Vico's phrase, but not mere or recurrent cycles (p. 236). Philosophy itself, for example, though the highest thing, may become abstract and effete; and then the inherent impulse of the whole will call for a recrudescence of sense-perception or of religious intuition to renew the missing element. The point is to avoid finality in the dialectic—to make it a recurrent though not a mere repeating series (pp. 234 ff.).

Obviously the whole thing turns on the paradoxical identification of all reality with philosophical thinking—the fresh and actual life of thinking, which alone is creative and ultimately originative. We are accustomed to something of this kind in the consideration that all knowledge must grow out from our present basis and activity of judgment. The transition is effected, as it seems to me, with extreme ingenuity, by insisting that every phase of experience implies a philosophy—an attitude—and therefore that ultimately the completed shape of art, say, or even of sense, is that

attitude to the world which a being in any one of these modes by implication adopts. Even a monera, we are told (p. 149), has its attitude to the universe. Therefore in thinking at its completest you have all experience and all reality (pp. 262 ff.). And this, as we said, being identified with creative thinking, is characterised by its novelty and originality. It meets contingency, as I understand, and reduces it to order, as the *fieri* passes into completion (p. 354). This slight sketch may suffice to indicate the line of thought we are dealing with. There are signs, which I welcome, that there really is to be a whole and a universe. The world of values is eternal; and the spirit, one would think, must be a whole, or it could not enforce the dialectic sequences. (Croce's doctrine of "opposites" and "distincts" is modified, I should say, by the author, and very effectively applied). Moreover, it is plain and emphatic that the thinking in question is not that of the particular human unit (p. 410). It is the whole which creatively maintains itself (pp. 262 ff.), but then the identification with thinking is harder and harder. If, as once is said, it is the whole which thinks in me, then the paradox of creative thought is a good deal blunted.

I welcome the high importance here assigned to thought; but I am perplexed by the apparent omission to consider what it is that thought has to tell us. Does it not always affirm that it reveals to us a reality which is *not* the mere act of thought? The apparent denial of this is something which I hold that our new idealists should reconsider.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

L'Essenziale della Filosofia del Diritto. By Prof. PAMFILO GENTILE, Libero Docente nella R. Università di Napoli. Aquila: Officine Grafiche Vecchioni. 1919. Pp. viii, 128.

The chief interest of this little book lies in its being a serious attempt to apply the principle of literal immanence—the principle of Croce and of Giovanni Gentile—in the province of the Philosophy of Law. Beginning with an explanation of objective knowledge on the principle of coherence, as against any view which involves correspondence with a "transcendent" reality, and dismissing as irrelevant all attempts to base the principles of right on historical and evolutionary fact, it proceeds to wrestle with the difficulty that a literal exclusion of transcendence *prima facie* destroys the possibility of progress. Thus the ordinary conception of natural law as an ideal beyond actual events—an "ought-to-be"—is excluded, and it is hard to explain—to admit or to deny—the historical phenomena of better and worse. For as nothing can be outside the series of facts, all the good and evil there is ought to be equally present in it throughout. And the author's manful defence of this position, in his loyalty to the immanent doctrine, is almost admitted by himself to be unsuccessful, seeing that he returns to the conception that the Philosophy of Law must be accepted as a science of what ought to be and sometimes is not. Only we are to beware of the belief in ultimate ideal codes of Law.

Thus Law ranks with Morality, and he explains, I think rightly, against the section on Law in Croce's *Pratice*, in what sense a legal system is distinguished from moral principles by external "coerciveness"; not *de facto* coercion. Yet this distinction is capable, I hold, of a yet more pregnant elaboration.

He adheres, however, to Croce's rejection of a speculative treatment dealing with forms and details of the State. It is part of Croce's reluctance to insist on any characteristic which involves the external expression

of mind. And he takes as a prerogative instance of its uselessness the contractual theory, which, literally interpreted, fails, as he says, to explain how a majority is justified in coercing a minority. Law should be justified, he urges, not by its source or imponent, but by its ethical content.

The "superpersonal" or ethical will, has, he tells us, nothing to do with the generality of the will, and may be realised in any form of government. For this view there is much to be said; but I should urge, reversing a phrase which the author applies to the "state of nature" in relation to law, that such forms of government should be "above" and not "below" popular democracy.

As it is, just for want of a reasoned nexus between general and universal, his final conclusion comes terribly near the *reductio ad absurdum* that you need not obey a bad law, and that the mantle of ethico-political sovereignty falls on the shoulders of any rebel who is sure he is right. Only, if we recognise rational freedom, and take the individual as rational and not as merely natural, we may practically, as I understand him, sympathise with modern democracy.

In principle, the difficulties here pointed out arise from the narrow assumption of literal immanence, which makes it impossible to indicate a real whole manifesting itself in the shapes of actual life. In his references to Hegel and elsewhere I think the author greatly modifies this narrow immanence, to which he desires to be loyal, and his book appears to me to be instructive from its clearness, candour, and sincerity.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

Psychology of Normal and Subnormal. By HENRY HERBERT GODDARD. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. N.D. [1919]. Pp. xvii, 349.

This is probably the first psychology that has had its inspiration in feeble-mindedness. Its author, famous for his remarkable study in hereditarity, *The Kallikak Family*, has, as Director of the Vineland Laboratory and Training School for the feeble-minded, acquired from his experience a firm conviction that psychology should be the study of intelligence, i.e., of the power of varying adaptively the response to stimulation, and a healthy suspicion that it usually has been little more than a juggle with technical terminology (p. ix.). It is certainly extraordinary how much light he contrives to throw on normal psychology by his knowledge of the feeble-minded, and how aptly he can illustrate from it. But our wonder and delight are sensibly diminished when we discover, to our horror, that we are all suspected of feeble-mindedness ourselves. For putting his trust in the Binet tests, and explaining all mental achievements in terms of "neuron-patterns," Dr. Goddard places the high-water mark of mental development at the 'mental age' of 20, and decides that the 'average' mental age cannot be more than 16 (pp. 53-56). Later on, however, he finds that he has been too optimistic. "Present indications point to a level much below our assumed level of 16 years" (p. 251). For "the use of mental tests in the U.S. Army has established beyond dispute" (p. 234) that "half the human race is little above the moron," with a mental age of about 13, while "12 per cent. of the drafted army of the U.S. was found to have too low intelligence to be sent over seas" (p. 250). Moreover, Millet's famous *Man with the Hoe* is manifestly "a perfect picture of an imbecile," who is unfit for higher work (p. 240), and "the truest democracy is found in an institution for the feeble-minded and it is

an aristocracy—a rule by the best” (p. 238). Thus it is that “the facts of modern civilisation” are best explained (p. 234).

Now all this is highly important, if true. For if true, it would call for a pretty complete reconstruction of our social and political institutions. Instead of our gerontocratic ‘democracy,’ which raises men to power when they are too old either to enjoy or to exercise it, we should institute an aristocracy of youthful intelligence and vigour, if the mind culminates at 20. And yet it quite well may be true. For civilised societies have now for many generations been so organised as to favour the survival of their inferior stocks. It is quite credible, therefore, that the ‘average’ man may have sunk to the ‘moron’ level. But Dr. Goddard hardly adduces convincing proof of this. The U.S. army tests should have been more fully discussed; as it is, they may be suspected of having been merely a device for camouflaging the allotting of commissions on ‘aristocratic’ lines. As for the Binet tests of intelligence their value is plainly empirical and not *a priori* and infallible; it would be very interesting to learn how the leading psychologists would stand them. But if they were required to give the public this pledge of their faith in their own methods, it would probably turn out that they were not simple-minded enough to run any risk of appearing feeble-minded!

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

La Filosofia di Benedetto Croce. By EMILIO CHIOCCHETTI. Second Edition, revised and enlarged.

Religione e Scienza. By AGOSTINO GEMELLI, Società Editrice, “Vita e Pensiero”. Milan, 1920.

A famous cartoon in *Punch* many years ago represented Gladstone and Disraeli each presenting to the other his newly published work. Disraeli as he receives *Juventus Mundi* is saying to himself, “Dull!” Gladstone accepting the new novel is saying, “Frivolous!” I am reminded of this whenever I open a book and find it impressed with the approbation of the Holy Office, or when I am informed that a philosopher’s book has been placed on the Index. There is something distinctly comic in the idea of an official censorship of philosophy—but this is not enough to account for the feeling. It seems, in advance of acquaintance, that an approved book must be dull and that a forbidden book can only have been condemned for some frivolous reason.

The two books now before me, bear the *Imprimatur* and I expected them to be dull. They are not. On the contrary both bear witness to the wonderful vitality and strength of the neo-scholastic philosophy in Italy. If there be any evidence of dullness it is on the part of the censor, for the authors seem able to expound sympathetically the most alarmingly unorthodox doctrines and have only to add that of course they do not themselves hold them.

To expound the philosophy of Benedetto Croce to the followers of the neo-scholastic philosophy is the purpose which Signor Chiochetti sets before him and he fulfils it in an admirably clear and complete manner. He has one advantage. Croce is not hostile to Christian belief or even to Catholicism although to both he is distinctly antipathetic. Religion is not opposed to philosophy but it is lower and not higher in degree, also as mythology it is a mixed or hybrid, and not a pure form of philosophy. This is a very different attitude towards religion to that taken by positivism, which also has still a large following in Italy. The keynote of

Croce is immanence. There is no transcendent God. Croce is not an absolute idealist but rather a realistic spiritualist,—meaning of course by spirit not something ghostly but the universally active concrete mind. There is no reality confronting mind, either above it or below it in degree. Reality is life or mind in its activity. Nature is not thing in itself, the only reality is *Lo Spirito*. Chiocchetti's exposition is more than sympathetic, it is enthusiastic, and over and over again he interposes to say how he himself accepts it without reserve. Yet he must have a transcendent God, and notwithstanding Croce's declaration that the immortality of the soul has lost its meaning and interest in philosophy, God and the soul are still, for Chiocchetti, "i massimi problemi". The origin of Croce's philosophy in Hegel and Kant is excellently expounded and so too is its relation to the older Italians, Rosmini and Gioberti, and to contemporaries. The author is very sympathetic to Varisco, on account of his devotion to religious problems, but as compared with Croce, Varisco's weakness lies in his lack of system. System our author thinks is Croce's strength. Not the least interesting part of the book is the final note on the *Idealismo attuale* of Gentile and his pupil Guido de Ruggiero. Another "note" in the book is interesting and amusing. It is a good-natured reply to that flippant sceptic, Giuseppe Rensi, the Professor of Philosophy at Genoa.

"Religione e Scienza" consists of a series of "Saggi Apologetici" by the eloquent and learned professor, Brother Agostino Gemelli, the Franciscan. The essays are not culled from reviews and periodicals, they are serious studies connected by a common purpose and ideal. There is a curious difference in the way the problem of religion and science presents itself to a believer in revelation, according to whether he holds the catholic or protestant faith. Challenge a protestant concerning his belief in miracles, he will bring to mind some dogma such as the virgin birth, and the question for him will be whether a certain interpretation of a single historical event is credible. But challenge a catholic, and he will bring to mind a dogma such as that of the real presence, which affects his whole conception of nature and present everyday fact. The relation between catholicism and science is therefore different in one of its essential characters from that between religion and science.

Brother Gemelli is not content to affirm that there is no real conflict between science and faith, he holds that there is positive harmony between them. They rest on postulates common to both, and the mental dispositions in catholicism and science are akin. This is set forth in the first essay in an argument masterly in form, although it may not carry conviction to the non-catholic. It shows how the catholic may reconcile himself to science but also, what is more important, how faith may give him more and not less freedom in research.

Gemelli is a vigorous controversialist,—to have seen him rise in his Franciscan robe and address a congress of philosophers is an experience to remember—and he has himself investigated the matters with which he deals in the essays. They are intended to illustrate and enforce his own conclusions. One of them tells the story of the thinking horses of Elberfeld. It bears the humorous title "Beasts who think and discourse and — men who do not reason." Another is named "The miracles of biology," and deals with the researches of Carrell and others. A third treats of the methods of certain believers in spiritualistic phenomena and particularly of the famous medium Eusapia Paladino. The two last essays are historical. They deal with definite charges which have been made against the Church of obscurantism and direct hostility to scientific research in matters of human welfare. One is the case of the Plague at Milan in the sixteenth

century named after St. Carlo Borromeo, a story familiar to readers of Manzoni's *I promessi sposi*. The charge was that the church by insisting on certain religious processions against the earnest protest of the civil authorities, who had forbidden them in order to prevent the spread of the contagion, actually and positively spread the plague. The last essay is on the trial and condemnation of Galileo.

H. WILDON CARR.

The Construction of the World in Terms of Fact and Value. By CYRIL TOLLENACHE HARLEY WALKER. B. H. Blackwell, 1919. Pp. vii, 92.

Mr. Walker's subject is a problem which in modern times is being increasingly recognised as central in philosophy, viz., the relation of fact to value within the real world. Chapter I. shows how the concepts of fact and value arise in "the world of the average man," how they are developed over against each other in "the objective world of common-sense," how they reach sharp distinction in the world of science (the realm of pure fact) and of art (the realm of pure value). With the help of this survey of actual worlds, Mr. Walker then sketches the resulting problems presented to philosophy, and argues that there is a fundamental distinction, though not a complete disjunction, between fact and value. Chapter II. resumes the enquiry from the subjective side, and discusses the distinct character of cognition as apprehension of fact and of valuation as the making of values. Mr. Walker throughout insists on the receptive quality of the former process and the contributive quality of the latter. He thus reaches by a study of cognition and valuation, some definition, or rather characterisation, of fact and value in general. Fact is determined first as something given, capable of being stated, particular, and verified. Value is not simply a derivative of fact, nor is valuation simply a consequence of cognition. Neither, on the other hand, can facts be eviscerated into a species of value. Value is seen to be an ultimately distinct something added to fact by the activity or reaction of the cognising mind. Value is first different from fact, in that it is something *made*, not *given*. Values then become relatively independent of facts through being attached to the ideal contents of facts dissociated from their actuality. Thus values, such as love and beauty, etc., are originally made by a reaction of the mind towards particular facts presented to it; but the contents of the particular facts are detached by the mind from their actual occurrence, and thus arises an ideal world where contents possessing value can be handled and systematised independently. A value is finally defined as a content which counts as good, bad, or indifferent. A further difference therefore arises between fact and value, in that a value need not, like a fact, be particular. Nevertheless values must, like facts, be ultimately expressed in language and verified in concrete experience.

Chapter III. leads on to a discussion of value-systems. We are shown how values, in spite of their original subjectivity, may become objective and even absolute. Prof. Bosanquet's and Prof. Münsterberg's theories on this subject are criticised, and it is argued that "absolute" values are those which pass the test of being found consistent, persistent, and satisfying in human experience. In conclusion the author claims to have shown that value and fact may be combined as two finally distinct elements in reality, and that value-systems and fact-systems are both legitimate and distinct constructions, representing respectively the receptive and creative functions of the mind.

The great value of Mr. Walker's discussion lies in the fact that he employs a radically empirical method, while at the same time maintaining

a perfectly clear distinction between the spheres of psychology and logic. Nevertheless his argument often suffers from over-compression, and would have gained greatly in lucidity if he had made more frequent use of concrete illustration. It is difficult to say what actual concepts Mr. Walker regards as values, or how he would classify the different values which he does recognise. Is truth for instance essentially a value? If it is, it seems impossible to exclude value from the world of pure science. If it is not, in what sense precisely is truth, even in the world of science, *better* than falsehood or error? Pleasure and pain Mr. Walker apparently refuses to recognise as values, on the ground that they are mere feelings, whereas values are created by a definite act of the mind (p. 86). But are not pleasant and painful sensations immediately felt as good and bad respectively? What of utility again? It seems to be essentially a value-concept. Yet Mr. Walker, in order to show that subjective idealism breaks down in the world of *fact*, does not hesitate to argue that it is more *economical* to assume a common world (p. 70); and he also meets the sceptical objection to the permanence of substances as given facts, by saying that it is "less arbitrary and more convenient" to accept the view of common-sense (p. 48). Moreover in speaking of the world of art as the world of pure value he says that utilitarian activities as such do not belong to it (p. 26).

In short the processes of cognition and valuation, and the worlds of fact and value, seem to interpenetrate and involve each other more essentially than Mr. Walker's sharp distinctions admit, and his very instructive attempt to define them leaves some impression of vagueness owing to his failure to state or classify the actual kinds of value in use.

OLIVER C. QUICK.

Beauty and the Beast. An Essay in Evolutionary Æsthetic. By STEWART A. McDOWALL, B.D., Chaplain and Assistant Master at Winchester College, Author of *Evolution and the Need of Atonement*, etc. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1920. Pp. 33. 7s. 6d. net.

THE argument of this book presupposes in the main Croce's philosophy, more especially his Æsthetic, but attempts to carry it further by contending that beauty is not only expression, but more definitely, the expression of relation, or "relationship"—are the two ideas quite convertible, "Beziehung" and "Verwandschaft"? The relation, thus expressed in beauty, is the personal relation of the divine love (pp. 28, 34, 38).

Perhaps the chief contention, bearing on the actual nature of beauty, which this interpretation necessitates, is the rejection of the traditional view that æsthetic experience is in essence a "quieter" of desire. The author maintains that its characteristic is the opposite; a "longing," and creative stimulus, which can find satisfaction only in the above-mentioned relation.

On this I would only remark in general that if a man has come to a certain metaphysical doctrine on what he thinks sufficient grounds, it is natural that all forms of experience should seem to him to point in that direction. But still it is an awkward matter to make such suggestion the primary point in any special province of life. A difficulty arises in knowing exactly what we are speaking about, and in distinguishing such a definite phenomenon as truth or beauty from the underlying suggestion with which we believe that all experience is charged. Thus the account of

truth, beauty, and goodness, on page 69, hardly gives us a valid differentia for each of them.

The main idea of this *Æsthetic qua* Evolutionary lies in developing the supreme sense of personal relation out of beginnings which show themselves in the sexual impulse, psycho-analytic enquiries being pressed into the service. "In the great adventure of Creative Love, to sex is given the task of bringing about those relations which constitute the ground-work of the personal union which is Love" (p. 64). "Then Beauty is seen as Spirit's grasp upon the relation between all the parts of the whole—a relation that is not yet complete, and can only be complete when the sole relation is that of love between personal beings, of whom God is the first in timeless Being" (p. 66).

What I cannot help feeling is, that in addition to the contradictions involved in Croce's theory (*cf.* pp. 9 and 10) we have here got a further development which may or may not be instructive for evolutionary theory or for religious philosophy, but tells us nothing, strictly speaking, of what we mean by beauty, and of what we care for when we try to appreciate it. The whole enquiry is given a special twist.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

Six Theosophic Points and other Writings. By JACOB BÖHME. Newly translated into English by JOHN ROLLESTON EARLE, M.A. Constable. Pp. vii, 208. 10s. 6d. net.

The translator, as I judge, wishes this book to be received on its intrinsic merits. It is a well printed companionable volume; and has no introduction, and almost no note or comment, with the exception of a single and very helpful citation from Prof. Joachim. The writings have their own several title pages which show that they all date from 1620 or 1622. But the unlearned, of whom I am one, cannot identify them with books whose titles they have seen elsewhere, or with parts of those books.

And, I take it, this treatment is right. The book is thus not loaded with learning, of which plenty no doubt can be found elsewhere. The occasions of writing, and the details of the jargon, do not very greatly matter. The volume, if I am right, is meant to be a friend, like a great poem or a devotional book. Learning would have stood in our way.

My overwhelming impression, which I must set down very shortly, is that of the intense and penetrating realism of Böhme's views. If we ask for his theories and arguments, indeed, we are tempted to say the reverse. But if we attend to his judgment and insight as to what sort of a place the world is, what we have to expect there, and where in it our happiness and misery lie, how it pierces to the heart! The world, we learn, is not a place of quietness or comfort; it is essentially, in its very roots, a place of battle and victory. Gentleness, indeed, not fierceness, is the conqueror; but fierceness and pain are fundamental, because gentleness and goodness are, by their nature, not original, but to be won by what we should call a self-transcendence. The most coherent conspectus of the ideas is on pp. 166 ff., where we really might be listening to the feeble pessimism of to-day and its refutation.

And if you ask Böhme for his evidence, he does not at bottom refer you to his alchemy. He would answer simply, as elsewhere: "I speak as I know and have found by experience; a soldier knows how it is in the wars"

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

The Ways of Life: a Study in Ethics. By STEPHEN WARD. London: Humphrey Milford. Pp. 127. 6s. 6d. net.

The preface says, "Ethics resemble science in that what is most promising is also most debatable". . . . "So the aim of ethics should be, not to say all that has been said, but to establish new relations, and, by means of these, get others, according to the increasing subtlety and capacity of human kind."

This seems to me a very hard book to estimate. It is full of good things, and full, too, of what I almost venture to call mistakes. And the above quotations suggest that the author would welcome this opinion, at least if I wrote "paradoxes" for "mistakes". Book I., "Manners," is aimed, I take it, at showing what simple factors are all man needs to describe and guide his life, if only he used them straightforwardly. He is a co-operative being; he likes to be active and to play a game for the sake of playing it; and life is just such a game—just a game whose interest never ends. (Here, I think, something is wrong. A game, as he says, is hypothetical. Life, I hold, is categorical.) Thought makes our world, which is a means of endless variation of our activities. The great difference between one group's world and another's is how much thought has been applied to it.

But man has not in the past let himself think freely and guide his activity by thought, and so his life is exceedingly unsuccessful. And the enemy, in Mr. Ward's language, is morality. If he had printed it "morality" most of us would see what he meant, and sympathise with him.

The second book, "Morals," draws out his idea. Morality, printed *without* the quotation-marks, is in its most pronounced form a taboo. It is all that is objectionable in codes, precepts, preachments, prejudices, imperatives, customs that corrupt the world. The antidote and antithesis is thought. Make a clean sweep; teach everybody to think, and manage their own lives, which is what their brains were given them for, get rid of morality ("morality" I insist is what he means), and you will have transformed the world for the better.

And to the vices of "morality" he adds the paradoxes of ethics, making, I think, undue capital out of them. To feel an "ought" shows you must be bad. To do a duty because it is good is proof of an ulterior motive, *i.e.*, contradicts morality. To exercise choice proves that you are not free. Self-sacrifice involves several absurdities, because the author will not see that the self can transcend its existence. The moral consciousness is the greatest thing in life, but it cannot be directly made a rule of living. You can only value it rightly "when the arbitrary relation between morality and conduct has been severed".

I should suggest, *meo periculo*, that if we read "morality" where the author writes "thought," "codes and imperatives" where the author writes morality, and, perhaps, "religion" where the author writes "the moral consciousness," though he does not quite see *how*, in religion, are realised the freedom and perfection which morality demands but cannot find in life—if we might make these emendations we could see what he is driving at, and sympathise.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

Philosophical Currents of the Present Day. Vol. II. By DR. LUDWIG STEIN, O. S. Professor of Philosophy, University of Berne. Translated by SHISHIRKUMAR MAITRA. The University of Calcutta, 1919. Pp. iii, 235-393.

The second volume of Prof. Stein's book contains chapters on Hartmann (neo-realism), Spencer (evolutionism), Voltaire, Nietzsche, and Stirner (individualism), Dilthey (mental science), and Zeller (history of philosophy). The book is of some interest to those who like their philosophy watered with biographical anecdotes and literary references, and it seems to have been well written in the original. These qualities may have justified its first publication, but they are scarcely an excuse for translating it, and the jolts in the translation are not the less aggravating on account of the discursive amble of the philosophy. The following 'sample of the style of the great linguistic artist' W. Dilthey is not elegant in English, "But from the stars there rings, when the stillness of the night comes, even to us, that harmony of the spheres, of which the Pythagoreans said that only the noise of the world could drown it, an indissoluble metaphysical union which is at the base of all arguments and survives them all" (p. 356). Even an uncouth translation, however, may be disfigured by carelessness in proof-reading and otherwise. The translator is plainly ignorant of Greek; but any of his friends who happened to possess a very moderate acquaintance with that tongue could have told him that the letter τ is not the letter ι , and that there are conventions concerning accents. One might ignore misprints, but the date 1917 in the quotation from Spencer (p. 276) makes nonsense of the passage in which it occurs. And what can be said for this 'howler'? "The great favourite of Popper is Voltaire. From the philosopher von Ferney Popper took . . . his philosophical starting point for he dealt with the problem of the 'significance of Voltaire for modern times'" (p. 309).

J. L.

Employment Psychology. By HENRY C. LINK, Ph.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1919. Pp. xii, 440. 10s. 6d. net.

As Prof. Thorndike rightly says in his introduction to this book, the author "has the great merit of writing as a man of science assessing his own work, not as an enthusiast eager to make a market for psychology with business men. Indeed, the story of his experiments is distinctly conservative, for in many cases he could have obtained an even better prediction of success at a given job than he did obtain, by applying the technique of partial correlations and the regression equation so as to obtain a weighted composite score from a team of tests."

The book is valuable not so much for its addition to psychological knowledge as for its exposition of the practical application of psychological methods to the problems of vocational selection. The actual results obtained are correlated with the known skill of the workers or with the foreman's estimate of that skill before and after he became intimately acquainted with them. The tests applied are carefully described. They were designed to examine assemblers, tool makers, machine operators, clerks, stenographers, typists, and others. The book can be heartily commended for its sane, scientific, and practical outlook on the subject.



The Mind of a Woman. By DR. A. T. SCHOFIELD. London: Methuen & Co. Pp. viii, 120.

This chatty little book claims to be a contribution to feminine psychology by "a physician occupied almost exclusively for some thirty years with nervous diseases" so that "he has become intimately acquainted with women's minds, at any rate in a pathological state" (p. 7). The results are by no means as lurid as might have been expected: in fact the book is just the sort of production a cynical suffragette (if such there were) might point to with pride, when justifying the contention that if once women got the vote, a general feminisation would follow, and all other things would speedily be added unto her, in a 'democratic' country. The author, who professes great admiration for Benjamin Kidd, nevertheless notes (p. 62) that even in the three specifically feminine arts of dress, cookery, and music, woman has never been able to wrest supremacy from the male. But the chief thing he proves, perhaps, is that these popular comparisons of the sexes are in no way profitable.

F. C. S. S.

Vivre, Essai de Biosophie théorique et pratique. By PAUL OLTRAMARE. Geneva: Georg & Co., 1919. Pp. xvi, 326.

Biosophy, the discipline expounded in this book, is "at the same time practical and theoretical, social and individual," being "the science of life considered in its highest manifestation, the spiritual". Yet it "has not the ambition to supplant religion. Its aim is to prove that human life can be fully spiritualised without the intervention of the strictly religious hypotheses and hopes" (p. xvi.). Or as the publishers' announcement declares, "it is particularly addressed to those who are alienated from all religious faith," and wishes "to enrol them in the good fight of truth against error, and of liberty, justice, and beauty against everything that tends to lower man to the brute". Actually it appears to be a sort of revival of Comtian positivism and is composed of moralising reflexions in the style of the ancient Stoics, full of amiability and enthusiasm and the most unexceptionable sentiments. In fact it contains little or nothing that anyone could take exception to as new, and nothing that could be censured as severe, not even the (very sound) criticism of psycho-analysis on pp 227-228. Prof. Oltramare hopes that his book will lead to the formation of an international Biosophical Alliance, and this hope we may all echo. Unlike other international alliances it cannot do any harm.

F. C. S. S.

Psychology and Folk-lore. By R. R. MARETT, M.A., D.Sc. Methuen & Co. Pp. ix + 275.

This is an excellent little book of its kind. The title is perhaps somewhat misleading, for there is much more Folk-lore than Psychology, in the sense of the psychology of the schools. But interesting psychological material there is in plenty, and the book itself is thoroughly readable from beginning to end. It is a collection of addresses, lectures, reviews, and articles on anthropological topics, nearly all with the psychological interest more or less emphasised. As one would expect, therefore, the chapters are somewhat loosely bound together, and there is no sustained argument, anthropological or psychological, running through the book as a whole.



The title is taken from the first address, a presidential address to the Folk-lore Society. The main contention here is that the folk-lorist must approach his subject matter from a psychological, and not merely a sociological, still less a purely descriptive, point of view. The usage of 'psychological' is somewhat wide. The author means simply that the folk-lorist must get at the real inwardness of survivals from a past stage of culture, thus understanding "why survivals survive". A considerable part of the address is taken up by a criticism of a view attributed with dubious justice to Dr. Rivers, that the folk-lorist as such is concerned with sociological rather than psychological considerations. Possibly the disputants are using the word 'psychological' in different senses. Chapters IV., V., and VI. continue the theme, more especially the last on "The Interpretation of Survivals," which is a further strong plea for the psychological attitude.

Chapters VII., VIII. ? and IX. also belong together. These chapters discuss "Origin and Validity in Religion," "Magic or Religion," and "The Primitive Medicine Man". In the first two, the interest is not psychological in any marked degree; in the third, that interest again becomes prominent in the working out of the relation between the 'psychological' medicine of the primitive medicine man and the medical science of the modern doctor. The remaining chapters are much more anthropological than psychological, and their interest for the psychologist as such is slight. All of them, however, are interesting.

JAMES DREVER.

The New Psychology and its Relation to Life. By A. G. TANSLEY. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1920. Pp. 283. 10s. 6d. net.

Some of the most remarkable advances in psychology have come from those who have received no systematic training in the subject. The aim of this excellent book is to present in non-technical language such recent psychological advances: it has been written by a botanist. As the author observes, "the flood of light thrown upon the workings of the human mind by the discoveries and the resulting conceptions of modern psychopathologists has illuminated the mental mechanism, not only of the hysteric and the madman, but of the normal human being". He has endeavoured to combine "what may be called the 'biological' view of the mind—a view excellently represented, for instance, in Dr. McDougall's well-known, *Introduction to Social Psychology*—with the concepts which we owe mainly to the great modern psychopathologists, Prof. Freud and Dr. Jung".

The book is therefore based on the writings of Freud, Bernard Hart, Janet, Jung, McDougall, and Trotter. It can be thoroughly recommended for the scientific and temperate standpoint which it endeavours to maintain from start to finish and for its general clearness of exposition. It will prove full of interest not only to the general reader who seeks a fair summary of the above-named writers' views, but also to the expert psychologist who is enabled by his professional knowledge to supply criticisms which it was beyond the power of the author to suggest. Psychology owes a debt of gratitude to Mr. Tansley for his useful book.

Le Thomisme. Introduction au Système de S. Thomas D'Aquin. By E. GILSON. Strasbourg, 1920. Pp. 174.

An excellent general introduction to Thomism. M. Gilson's main object throughout is to dwell on the point that Thomism is no mere "apologetic,"

but a systematic and coherent philosophical theory of the organisation of the whole of reality. This is well brought out by starting with the problem which, as a matter of fact, confronted St. Thomas,—the refutation of "Averroism," and passing in review successively the Thomist doctrines of the relations between faith and reason, the nature of God and the proofs of the existence of God, creation, the nature of angels, the nature of man, the union of soul and body, the intellectual and conative "powers" of the soul, and the "end of life". The work is skilfully done and with close adherence to the text of the Angelic Doctor. The brevity at which M. Gilson aims makes his exposition at times hard reading, but it may confidently be recommended to all who wish to know something definite about a very "live" philosophy and have not the leisure or the opportunity for minute personal study of the original texts. For readers of the texts the constant references to the parts of the Saint's extended works where the fullest treatment of the special problems will be found are highly valuable. It is a pity that so good a piece of work should be disfigured by an unusual number of tiresome errors of the press.

A. E. T.

Un Philosophe Néo-platonicien du XI^e Siècle, Michael Psellus. By CHE. ZERVOS. (Préface de M. François Picaret.) Paris: Ernest Lecroix, 1920. Pp. xix, 269.

Light is still much needed on the obscurest part of the history of the transmission of classical thought to modern times, the early middle ages of the Byzantine Empire. M. Zervos has done good service by this careful and fully documented study of the revival of Hellenic letters at Constantinople in the eleventh century and of the life and character of one of the leading figures in the movement, Michael Psellus, first Dean of the Faculty of Arts,—as we should phrase it—in the University of Constantinople after its re-opening by the Emperor Constantine Monomachus towards the middle of the century. The work is based on wide study of all the remains of the period, published and unpublished, and may serve as a valuable corrective to current views which tend to treat the revival of thought and learning as a purely Western affair and to represent the mediæval Eastern Empire as intellectually stagnant. M. Zervos is enthusiastic for his subject and his hero, though I cannot honestly say his study does much to remove the impression of Psellus as morally and mentally a poor creature which one had gathered, e.g., from the notices of him in Finlay. Perhaps one ought not to expect much of a protégé of the successive husbands raised to the throne by the amorousness of that lively old lady, the Empress Theodora. A valuable feature of the book is the full and careful bibliography of the not very accessible published works of Psellus. I am not sure whether M. Zervos is really quite at home in the earlier history of Neoplatonism. Some of his statements about Plotinus surprise me, and it is unfortunate that Maximus, the unlucky associate of the Emperor Julian, should be referred to several times over as Maximus of Tyre. His home appears to have been Ephesus and there is, so far as I know, no evidence to connect him in any way with Tyre. I am much afraid he has been confused with an earlier and a better man, the well-known writer of the second century.

A. E. T.

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VII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS.—
 xvii., 9. **J. E. Creighton.** 'Philosophy as the Art of Affixing Labels.' [The concrete universal is a cure for all the criticisms of philosophy.]
G. A. Barrow. 'A Via Media between Realism and Idealism.' [A review of Lossky's *Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*.] xvii., 10. **D. F. Swenson.** 'The Logical Implicates of the Community.' ["Unless men are capable, in principle, of a logical understanding of one another, they cannot understand one another either aesthetically or ethically," and understanding depends on "rationality in the sense of meaningfulness, consistency and truth". The first depends on the principle of identity, which guarantees sameness in the universe of discourse, in so far as minds "really understand each other". The second depends on the principles of inference, causation and teleology, the third is not creation but discovery.] **J. R. Kantor.** 'Intelligence and Mental Tests.' [Believing that "with the passing of a subjectivistic psychology and its replacement by an extensive study of concrete human reactions the need for a native intelligence . . . will disappear," the writer explains the failure of mental tests to lead to "a wider extension of knowledge concerning psychological phenomena" as due to the assumption that "what is measured by the tests is a mental factor and not a specific mode of adjustmental response," for all "intelligent acts must be *specific*; for our reaction patterns are definite concrete responses," and to increase them increases "our *general* capacity to respond," and so our 'general intelligence'.] **J. E. Turner.** 'Dr. Wildon Carr's Theory of the Relation Between Body and Mind.' [Criticism of his Aristotelian Society Address, 1917.] xvii., 11. **H. C. Brown.** 'The Problem of Philosophy.' ["The fundamental category of science is description . . . of philosophy, action" . . . "Scientific description involves selection" . . . "Philosophy starts from the truths with which science ends, but its purpose is not merely to cite or to systematise . . . where the scientist seeks discoveries, the philosopher makes interpretations." But no complete agreement on these is likely.] **C. I. Lewis.** 'Strict Implication—An Emendation.' [Corrects a mistake in his *Survey of Symbolic Logic*.] xvii., 12. **T. L. Davis.** 'De Profanitate.' [Points out that the practice of swearing is a proof that a false proposition implies any proposition.] **E. L. Schaub.** Report on the 20th Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association. xvii., 13. **J. H. Randall, Jr.** 'The really Real.' [Points out that 'real' is "essentially a category of laudation and a judgment of value" and that 'neo-realists' degrade the term when they apply it to all that merely 'is'.] **I. Bentley.** 'A Note on the Relation of Psychology to Anthropology.' [Apropos of a complaint by Dr. Hrdlicka about the difficulty of getting psychology properly defined.] xvii., 14. **E. B. Holt.** 'Professor Henderson's "Fitness" and the Locus of Concepts.' [Destructive criticism of *The Fitness of the Environment* and *The Order of Nature*, which are charged with systematic misapplication of concepts (the question of their 'locus');

Henderson's argument for teleology is denied any "iota of value," and need not "cast the faintest shadow on the path of the most uncompromising mechanist".] **G. A. Katuin.** 'The Ideality of Values.' ["Values are dynamic, evolutionary and changeable. Above all values are practical" but "a judgment of value is something more involved and more complex than just a state of appreciation" . . . it is not "mere instinctive or habitual reaction to an act or object".] xvii, 15. **L. E. Hicks.** 'Normal Logic or the Science of Order.' [All men think alike by 'instinct,' "the basis of instinct is cosmic order . . . the cosmos is logical" and "not only are we in the cosmos; the cosmos is in us" and subjects us to "external control". Also direct "dyad inference" (from implications) should not be rejected. As regards a criterion, "logical thinking is based on constant relations, inspires belief, has true-or-false quality, advances knowledge, is orderly, coherent, harmonious with the environment". This is not absolute, but 'fairly reliable'. It follows that "no hard-and-fast line" can be drawn "between logic and its neighbours"—psychology and epistemology.] **G. D. Walcott.** 'A New Content Course in Philosophy.' [Consisting of comment on the results of the sciences as formulated in the Home University series.]

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. No. 85. February, 1920. Articles. **H. Pinard, S.J.** *Essai sur la Convergence des Probabilités* (concl.). [Conclusion of the essay mentioned in the summary of this review given in *MIND*, N.S., 116. The general line of argument is that, in spite of the logical weakness of "induction," we can reach practical certainty in dealing with questions of historical fact through the "convergence" of probabilities, i.e., by what is often called in English the "consilience" of inductions. The reason why this method is more trustworthy in history than elsewhere is that the weaknesses of induction only affect it as a method of generalisation. In history we are not generalising but attempting to establish unique singular facts. Has the author sufficiently considered whether it is ever possible to know anything but "universals" about the "singular" fact?] **J. Le-maire.** *La Connaissance sensible des Objets extérieurs.* [A discussion of the 'reality' of the objects of sense-perception. The argument is too long and intricate for reproduction here. The conclusion is that the immediate object apprehended by sense is "within" us, but can be shown to have its analogue "without the mind". The writer holds that this view preserves what is fundamental to the doctrine of S. Thomas about the *species sensibiles*. The points are well argued, but it is assumed, on what seem to be insufficient grounds, that what I perceive must in some sense be "in" me, and that the so-called "objectification of our sensations" is a genuine psychical process. What if one denies both assumptions?] **R. Kremer.** *Le Néo-Realisme Américain.* [A good introductory account of the position of the American so-called "new" realists.] **R. M. Martin.** *La question de l'Unité de la Forme substantielle.* [An historical discussion of the views of the English Dominican scholar Robert Fishacre.] Note on Cardinal Mercier's American tour. Reviews of books. No. 87. August, 1920. **P. Charles, S.J.** *L'Agnosticisme Kantien.* [A short historical article tracing the development of Kant's views on the "proofs of the existence of God" from the dissertation of 1763 to the publication of the first *Critique*, with the object of showing that Kant's final rejection of the "cosmological argument" is a logical development from misconceptions of its point already latent in the *Dissertation*. I could wish the author had discussed the curious question why Kant, in the *Critique*, entirely omits to examine the special form of the argument on which he had himself formerly relied as "the only demonstration" of God's existence.] **E. Janssens.** *Notes sur la conscience douteuse.* [In defence of "probabilism" against all other

systems of casuistry.] **J. Bittremieux.** *Notes sur le Principe de Causalité.* [An interesting article. The reasoning is difficult to follow, but the author's object is to establish the *a priori* character of the principle of Causality by arguing that even if we deny that it can directly be deduced from the law of Contradiction, the denial of it can be shown to violate that law. The principle is thus *a priori*, a position which it is desired to maintain because of the part played by the principle of Causality in the arguments for the existence of God. The author's method of proving his point does not impress me. As I understand him, he first assumes that the principle of Causality is true and self-evident, and then argues that, this being so, to assume that its contradictory is also true violates the law of Contradiction. But surely this is equally true if one assumes the truth of any proposition which contradicts a proposition already known to be true. Apart from deference to the Aristotelian tradition, there seems to be no reason for attaching more importance to the Law of Contradiction than to any other principle of logic.] Reviews of books, etc.

VIII.—NOTES.

TO THE EDITOR OF "MIND".

DREAMS.

SIR,—Dreams present features which condemn Freudian speculation as inadequate. And we ought, I think, to agree further that the "incoherence" and "illogicalness," emphasised by Signor Rignano (*A New Theory of Sleep and Dreams*, July MIND), are frequently absent. In the first place, the dream may be as "fantastic" as, say, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, and yet be quite "coherent" within its own sphere. The practical interests of waking life being suspended, freedom of invention is untrammelled. This invention may be grotesque,—as is the work of many of our day-dreams,—but it *may* be well ordered and exceedingly beautiful. In the second place, there is a sort of dream, not only remarkable in point of its inventiveness, but respectful of the kind of "coherence" which we value in waking life. I was once the victim of a grim dream-serial quite as reasonable as are most adventure novels. And on one or two occasions I have enjoyed what may be called the reflective dream; carrying the familiar psychological and æsthetic interests into a new field. Thus the question of the perceptual content of dreams had been interesting me. I found myself anon floating in a room with richly decorated walls and was able to examine the detail of this decoration deliberately. I noted its complexity, and knew that I was doing so in a dream. On another occasion I was able to alter my perceptual surround at will, with the same belief, fully reflective, that I was playing with the contents of a dream. There is nothing more surprising in these night-dreams than what characterises an ordinary day-dream on the mountain-side. The point is that "coherence" and the "logical" may show equally in both. Day-dreaming becomes fantastic very readily; the creation of genius may be merely that portion of which is worth preserving.

Dream-experience may thus be coherent and purposive, even when a marked freedom in the way of inventiveness is displayed. But there is dreaming, of course, in which "dissociation," anarchy, and chaos predominate. "Many dreams . . . have a plot, the point of which is usually directed against the dreamer. He at any rate neither foresees nor constructs it. Now this implies 'dissociation,' not merely between the dreamer and the waking self (as is attested by the amount of amnesia for dreams), but also between the dream and the 'maker of dreams'."¹ Now to account for this dissociation we may have to look back very far. It repeats, perhaps, on the small scale, within us human sentiments, what took place originally on the great or cosmic scale. The tendency which can "dissolve" even 'waking personalities' and which is displayed so frequently in our more anarchic dreams may be continuing the titanic

¹ Dr. F. C. S. Schiller in his review of Bergson's *L'Energie Spirituelle*, MIND, July, 1920.

process in which all finite sentient arose. We are watching the tide now at the point of its furthest advance.

In the specially anarchic dream, where dissociation is very marked, there is prolonged or echoed, as it were, the original process of the birth of sentient (with its inevitable attendant confusion and discords), which took place at the dawn of this particular world-system. (*World as Imagination*, p. 462 ff.) Novel sentient actually arise within us and contend with us—e.g., the malign ‘maker of dreams,’ who is sometimes more formidable than any ordinary adversary of waking life.

But there are dreams and dreams. And we have to be on our guard against the theorist desiring simplicity who seeks to account for all dreams in the same way. Reality, after all, is not concerned to be simple just for the psychologist’s convenience.

DOUGLAS FAWCETT.

Villa Sommerheim, Wengen,
Switzerland, 18th July, 1920.

DEATH OF WUNDT.

PROF. WUNDT died on 1st September at the advanced age of eighty-eight years. The world is thus deprived of the most prominent and widely-known of present-day philosophers. Few, indeed, would claim for Wundt either the speculative genius or the imaginative insight of a Herbart or a Lotze; but his extraordinary versatility and his comprehensive acquaintance with vast fields of knowledge have rarely, if ever, been rivalled. Year after year, books and monographs and articles issued from his pen in steady succession, and almost everything he wrote exhibits a surprising mastery of detail and power of turning it to account in constructive work. As a teacher, too, he was effective and inspiring; without a note, and in pre-war days usually to audiences of more than three hundred students, gathered from all parts of the world, he would handle, in a concise and lucid manner, themes of notorious difficulty.

Wilhelm Wundt was born on 16th August, 1832, at Neckarau, near Mannheim. In 1851 he began the study of medicine at Heidelberg, and took his degree in 1856. In the following year he habilitated in the Department of Physiology, and remained in Heidelberg for some years as Helmholtz’s assistant in the physiological laboratory. During that period he published two monographs on physiological subjects—one on the theory of muscular movements (1858) and the other on the theory of sense-perception (1859-62). He was still at Heidelberg when, in 1863, the *Vorlesungen über Menschen- und Thierseele* appeared—a volume which, he used in later years to say, contained the wild oats of his youthful days. Two elaborate monographs on the mechanism of the nerves and nerve-centres followed in 1871 and 1876, which embodied a good deal of careful experimental research. In 1874, Wundt succeeded F. A. Lange as Professor of “Inductive Philosophy” in Zürich, and, in the same year, the first edition of the *Grundzüge* was published in one volume (increased to three volumes of huge proportions in the fifth edition of 1902). His sojourn in Zürich was, however, a brief one. He removed to Leipzig in 1875, on his appointment to one of the philosophical chairs in the university; and Leipzig continued to be his home for the last forty-five years of his life. In his *Antrittsreden* of 1874 and 1876 Wundt sketched the view which, as Professor in Leipzig, he consistently maintained of the function of philosophy, and of the influence which philosophy, as he conceived it, should

exert upon the empirical sciences. Philosophy, he maintained, is based upon the results reached by the empirical sciences, and forms their necessary supplement and completion. Three years after his advent in Leipzig (*i.e.*, in 1873), the Leipzig Institute of Experimental Psychology was started in a humble way, but it grew by rapid strides, and was the precursor of similar laboratories in practically all the German Universities. The *Philosophische Studien*, of which Wundt was the editor, served as a medium of publication for the work of his pupils, and many valuable articles of his own, not however always on psychological subjects, are likewise contained in the twenty volumes that appeared from 1883 to 1903. From 1880 onwards a series of elaborate philosophical works were given by him to the world. The first volume of his *Logik*, devoted to "Erkenntnislehre," was published in 1880, and the second (in later editions expanded into two volumes), dealing with "Methodenlehre," in 1883. Then followed, in 1886, the *Ethik*,—an investigation, as he described it, of the facts and laws of the moral life. And, as the culmination of his attempt at philosophical construction, the *System der Philosophie* appeared in 1889, in many respects the most original of all his works, wherein an idealistic metaphysic is developed, widely removed, however, from the forms of idealism prevalent at the time. The later years of his life were occupied with a huge undertaking. In 1900 the first volume of his *Völkerpsychologie* saw the light, and five other bulky volumes followed. He was dependent here for his material upon the labours of others, and the book cannot be said to be of the value of his more strictly philosophical treatises. It should be mentioned that Wundt contributed an article on "Central Innervation and Consciousness" to the first volume of *MIND* in 1876, and also an interesting account of "Philosophy in Germany" to the second volume. He married shortly after leaving Heidelberg, and leaves a son and daughter surviving him, the former being a distinguished authority in Greek Philosophy. His own work was done; but philosophical science loses in him a genuine inquirer who spared himself no pains in the search for truth.

DEATH OF MEINONG.

We deeply regret to announce the death of Dr. Alexius Meinong, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Graz. Prof. Meinong died, after a short illness, on 27th Nov. at the comparatively early age of sixty-seven years. His important work, *Ueber Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit: Beiträge zur Gegenstandstheorie und Erkenntnistheorie*, published during the war, has only recently reached this country, and contains some of Meinong's most careful and original investigation. We hope in a later issue to give an account of his many contributions to philosophy.

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